The Complete CAPTAIN,

OR,

An Abbridgement of CESARS warres, with obſervations upon them;

Together

With a collection of the order of the *Militia* of the Ancients;

and

A particular Treatiſe of modern war:

Written

By the late great Generall the Duke *of* Rohan:

Engliſhed by *J. C.*

CAMBRIDGE,

Printed by ROGER DANIEL, Printer to the *Univerſitie:*

And are to be ſold at the *Angel* in Popes-head-alley in *London.* 1640.

4°4338

April 24. 1640.

Imprimatur per Typographum Academiæ *Cantabrigiensis*,

Jo. Cosin, Procan.

To his worthy friend Captain *Cruſo* upon his excellent tranſlation of the *Duke* of *Rohan's Le parfaict Capitaine.*

Cæſar, whoſe brain contriv'd at once the fate
Of his great ſelf and of the *Romane* State,
With mightie action caus'd, where-ere he ſtood,
The trembling place to ſweat forth humane bloud.
Who tam'd rebellion ſo, as in that ſinne
His own contrivance had the traitour bin.
How nimble-ear'd! and with what piercing ſight
He could diſcern advantage! and then fight.
Cold, waves, winds, hunger, watching, labour, warre
Were accidents through which he oft did dare.
How patient for his ends! How quickly he
Unthought of could defeat his enemy!
Whoſe expedition, as an engine hurl'd
Him from one ſide to th'other of the world;
Whoſe way of victory begot the fame,
That he but *went*, and *ſaw*, and *overcame.*
Dark ſtratageme, quick action, and the all
Of him built up a mighty Generall.
And to make wonder gaze more, he could be
Th' Hiſtoriographer and th' Hiſtorie:
As if his mightie acts to vanquiſh men
Had been on purpoſe done to trie his pen.
Oblivion ſo threw duſt upon what he
Moſt fairly wrote unto poſteritie.
And thou, brave man at arms, great *Rom*, haſt tane
His lively portraict out of *Mars* his fane,
And arm'd thy ſelf by him: yea, ſhown to all,
Thou knew'ſt to write, and be a Generall.
See with what art the Chymiſt deals, and how
Spirits from bodies he extracts, ſo thou.
How ſmart he gives his ſtratagemes, and where
Their hidden vertue lies he makes appeare!
Mark with how curious hand he thoſe doth trie
And fit unto our times, and ſo apply.

The *Grecian* tacticks *Cæsar* brought to *Rome*,
And this brave Duke to us, as from their tombe.
What weapons and what forms may fit again
He well perceives which seem'd before but vain.
If e'r *Pythagoras* were right to hold
A transmigration, he doth it unfold.
But view his own directions, quick and wise;
He makes towns strong, but strangely doth surprise:
He rouzeth lazie minds, and seems to write
Men into field, and teach them how to fight.
Mirrour of manhood, that art here, though gone;
Then Vertues self a better tombe there's none.

And Thou, my Friend, that freely dost discover
So rich a jewel, and hast brought it over,
Merit'st no mean applause. Me thinks, I see
Each noble mind admire thy industrie,
And cherish thy rare worth; since few there are
That for the publick undergo such care.

Mount still in thy endeavours, and shine bright:
His glorie's great that lends to others light.

To the right worſhipfull,

Sir *John Hobart* Knight and Baronnet,
Sir *Thomas Woodhouſe* Knight & Baronnet,
Sir *John Holland* Baronnet,
Sir *Hamon le Strange* Knight,
Sir *Edward Waldgrave* Knight,
Sir *Charles le Gros* Knight,
Sir *Robert Kemp* Knight, Deputie Lieutenants of *Norfolk* and *Norwich*;
And *Clement Corbet*, Doctour of the Civil law, Chancellour, and Deputie Lieutenant of *Norwich*.

Right Worſhipfull,

A *Great book is a great miſchief (as it is in the Greek Adagie) and therefore it was well ſaid of* Seneca, Magni artificis eſt clauſiſſe multum in exiguo. *Such an Artiſt the late great Generall the* Duke *of* Rohan *hath here proved himſelf, in his excellent abbridgement of* Ceſars *warres, with his own obſervations upon them; and his* Militia *of the* Greeks *and* Romanes. *His work is like fruits which are dried in the ſunne; contra-*

cled to a small bulk, but full of substance and virtue. The transcendency thereof moved me to communicate it to our Nation in these times of action. May it please you to afford it your Patronage, and to accept it as a testimonie of all due respects from

Your most humble

Servant,

J. C.

The complete Captain,

OR

An Abbridgement of Ceſars *warres.*

The I. Book.

CESAR having the government of the *Gauls* for the ſpace of five years, the firſt war that he made there was againſt the *Suiſſes*, cauſed by the ambition of *Orgetorix*, who was a rich, noble and powerfull man in that Nation: He perſwaded this people (which were hardy by nature, and exerciſed in arms by the warres which they had with their neighbours) to inlarge themſelves into *Gallia*, a countrey more ſpacious and better then their own. For this effect (reſolution being taken) they take three years ſpace to make their preparations: In which time they furniſh themſelves with waggons and horſes of burden, taking order that all their countrey be imployed to all ſorts of grain to make their proviſion of victuall, and name *Orgetorix* to be their Generall and Conductour, who for his part imployeth that time in fortifying himſelf by the aſſiſtance of his neighbours, perſwadeth *Caſticus* a *Burgundian* to make himſelf Lord of his countrey as his father had been, draweth in *Dumnorix* of *Autun*, brother to *Diviſiacus* to the ſame deſigne, the moſt powerfull man of his citie, and giveth him his daughter in marriage. But the *Suiſſes*, being ever jealous of their libertie, and perceiving that *Orgetorix* aſpired to

Helvetii.

Sequanni.

Æduum.

bring them under ſubjection, ſeiſed on his perſon; and during the conteſtations about his triall (having a great train of kinſfolks and partakers) he died in priſon. This abated not the deſigne of this people; which on their appointed day having taken as much victuall as would ſerve them for three moneths, burnt the reſt of their corn, and all their cities to the number of twelve, and 4. hundred villages, and having perſwaded thoſe of *Baſil*, *Diſtalingen*, and *Clacky*, their neighbours, to do the like, they depart and march towards *Geneva*, there to paſſe the *Rhoſne*. *Ceſar* having intelligence thereof goeth ſpeedily to *Geneva*, aſſembleth what forces he can, cauſeth a bridge to be broken down which lay upon the *Rhoſne*, and maketh a ditch and rampire of eighteen miles long from the lake of *Geneva* to the hill *Jura*, to hinder their paſſage over the *Rhoſne*. Which the *Suiſſes* underſtanding ſend deputies to him to deſire paſſage: he holdeth them in ſuſpenſe, and promiſeth them anſwer at another time; mean while he prepareth to hinder them: and they (after refuſall, and having attempted the paſſage in vain) take their way through *Burgundie* which *Dumnorix* procured for them. Which *Ceſar* obſerving, leaveth *Labienus* at *Geneva*, goeth and levieth new Legions, followeth them, and lighting upon them at the paſſage of the *Saoſne* defeateth the fourth part of their troups, which were not as yet paſſed over. After that, he maketh a bridge over the river, and purſueth them: but his victuall beginning to fall ſhort, and perceiving that *Dumnorix* hindered thoſe of *Autun* from affording him ſuch proviſions

Rauraci.
Tulingi.
Latobrici.

Rhodanus.

Arar.

visions as they had promised, he acquainteth *Divitiacus* with it, being his great friend and brother to *Dumnorix*; who confesseth it, intercedeth for him, and obteineth his pardon. After that, having learned that the *Suisses* were incamped at the foot of a hill, he causeth it to be viewed, and finding it to be of easie acceſſe, he sendeth *Labienus* thither (causing him to march all night) to gain the top of the hill: and in the morning, having put his forces into battalia, he dispatcheth *Considius* to discover; who, having taken the allarm of *Labienus*, returneth to *Cesar* that the enemy had seised the top of the hill, which stayed him that day from defeating the *Suisses*. The day following he taketh the way of *Beaulne* to distribute corn to his armie: which the *Suisses* perceiving, follow him, *Cesar* seeing them coming possesseth himself of a hill, embatteileth his army about the middle of the descent, & on the top he quartereth two new levied legions and all the baggage, alighteth and sendeth away his horse, and causeth all the rest to do the like, to shew them that they must overcome or die. The *Suisses* charge him; he defeateth them and pursueth them hotly, forbiddeth those of *Langres* to assist them with victuall, and in the end constraineth them to submit to his discretion: He disarmeth them, receiveth hostages, and forceth them to return to inhabit their countrey, and reedifie their houses. And of three hundred sixtie eight thousand persons (whereof there were ninetie two thousand bearing arms) there returned in all but an hundred and ten thousand.

Bibracte.

Lingones.

Obſervations.

THe reſolution of this people, which ſeemeth to be barbarous, and which for the bad ſucceſſe is univerſally condemned, hath nevertheleſſe the ſame principles which all Conquerours have, namely, the deſire of command and enlarging themſelves: and they are remarkable in their forecaſt of three yeares preparation, in their conſtancie for not deſiſting from their deſigne after the death of their Generall; and in the executions thereof, burning their goods and houſes to the end they might leave themſelves no hope of ſafetie, but onely in the ſharpneſſe of their ſwords. Whence we may gather, that we ought not to undertake any great deſigne timorouſly, nor to look to the means of eſcape but rather of overcoming. For if in the beginning of a dangerous deſigne you make known a way of eſcape, the impatience or naturall timorouſneſſe of men maketh them find out that way upon the leaſt accident that befalleth. And if the Suiſſes had not met with the incomparable virtue of Ceſar, who by his valour, induſtrie, diligence and good fortune ſtayed their furie, they might have atteined the ſcope of their enterpriſes.

In the manaſing of his warre Cæſar hath ſhewed (as in all other) that that which hath made him fortunate in his exploits hath principally been his invariable order of encamping ſtrongly, alwayes entrenching himſelf, that ſo he might never be compelled to fight but when he pleaſed, and that he might lay hold on ſuch occaſions as offered themſelves to defeat his enemies; alſo his providence in taking care that his proviſion of victuall failed not; and his continuall keeping of his ſouldiers in exerciſe and in breath, to make them able to execute his deſignes readily and in good order.

The pardon of Dumnorix is obſervable: his naturall clemency induced him to it, ſuffering himſelf to be overcome by the intreaties of his brother Diviciacus whom he loved: Nevertheleſſe he cauſed heed to be taken to his deportments, that ſo he might receive no new inconveniences by him afterward.

The errour of Conſidius ſheweth how much it concerneth to ſend men of experience to diſcover an army: And the commanding of the Suiſſes to return and reinhabite their countrie was an act of prudence, thereby hindering the

the Germanes *(being a moſt powerfull nation) from preoccupation thereof, and by that means their neighbourhood to* Provence.

The ſecond warre.

THe ſubject of the ſecond warre was this: The diviſion of the *Auvergnats* and *Autunois* puiſſant people in *Gallia* had called in the *Germanes*, by the help of which the firſt had overcome the other; nevertheleſſe they all found themſelves oppreſſed, and the conquerours much more then the conquered: for theſe were diſcharged for ſome tribute and hoſtages, and from the other the *Germans* took away the greateſt part of their lands, inſomuch that all ſeeing themſelves ſubdued, they hold an aſſembly of States by the permiſſion of *Ceſar* to deſire his aid, which he promiſeth. But having ſent to *Arioviſtus*, the Generall of the *Germanes*, to this end, he received replies ſo inſolent, that at laſt they fell fowl; where *Ceſar* defeated him, and chaced both him and all the *Germanes* out of *Gallia*, forcing them to paſſe the *Rhine* again. *Averni & Ædui.*

Theſe two wars were finiſhed in one ſummer.

Obſervations.

WHereby we may obſerve how dangerous ſuch auxiliarie ſuccours are, eſpecially when you require them of a people more powerfull then your own. Ceſar *hath indeed driven out* Arioviſtus, *but the* Gauls *have done nothing but changed maiſter. He imbarked himſelf in this war for two reaſons: the firſt, becauſe he ſuſpected that this puiſſant nation, taking footing in* Gallia, *might come to gain upon* Provence, *and ſo draw near to* Italy; *and the other, that thereby he inſinuated himſelf inſenſibly into the conqueſt of the ſaid* Gauls. *which buſineſſe he managed ſo dextrouſly by entertaining their diviſions amongſt them, that*

that by the aid of the one he conquered the other, and in the end ſubdued all.

We muſt further obſerve his diligence (ſo much recommended in all his actions) to poſſeſſe himſelf of Beſancon, *having prevented his enemies, and by this means provided for the nouriſhment of his armie. There it was that a panike fear ſeiſed upon his ſouldiers, which began by the voluntiers: who deſiring to depart diſcouraged the reſt, that ſo they might cover their own ſhame by the generall delinquencie of the armie: which is a moſt dangerous thing, and whereof a Generall of an army ought to take extraordinary care, never to hazard any battel untill he hath recovered his ſouldiers ſpirits again; which* Ceſar *did at this time by making an oration to them, wherein he excelled. He further helped himſelf (as many other commanders, eſpecially* Marius*) by encamping ſtrongly before this terrible armie, and making his ſouldiers know by ſmall skirmiſhes that their enemies were not invincible nor more valiant then themſelves; and cauſing them to conceive that joyning order and militarie diſcipline to the prudence of their Generall, they were their ſuperiours. For the* Romanes *have never conquered other nations by their great number, nor by their valour, but by their knowledge in warre, (which they alwayes exerciſed) by the obſervation of their order, and entrenchment of their camp. Whereupon we muſt conſider that* Arioviſtus *being encamped betweene* Ceſar *and the place from whence he had his victuall, and that* Ceſar *not being able to draw him to battel in five dayes, after that he had well fortified that camp he goeth with all his army in battaglia to fortifie a ſmall one, in a place of advantage, two miles diſtant from the firſt, and which favoured the way for his victuall, making the third part of his army to work whileſt the other two thirds ſtood in battaglia, which repulſed the troups which* Arioviſtus *ſent to hinder the ſaid fortification: which being made he leaveth two legions there, and leadeth away the reſt into his old camp. The next day* Ceſar *putteth himſelf into battaglia between the two camps, but being retired,* Arioviſtus *aſſaulteth the ſmall one, and is repulſed.* Ceſar *having thus reconfirmed the courages of his ſouldiers, ſallieth out with his whole armie in battaglia, and goeth up to the very trenches of* Arioviſtus*, provoketh him to fight; who ſallieth out, and is defeated.*

The

The third warre.

The II. Book.

Cæſars third warre was againſt the *Belga*, the third part of *Gallia*, and at that time the moſt warlike. The principall cauſes were, that, ſeeing the reſt of the *Gaules* in peace with the *Romanes*, they feared an aſſault; beſides they were ſolicited by certain *Gauls* diſcontented, or ambitious: the one of which took as little pleaſure to ſee the *Romanes* as *Germanes* in their countrey; and the other apprehenſive that during their abode they ſhould not be able to poſſeſſe themſelves of any principalitie or dominion. The number of their forces amounted to two hundred eighty and one thouſand fighting men. *Ceſar*, having underſtood theſe great preparations, cauſeth thoſe of *Beauvais* to be aſſailed by *Divitiacus* and thoſe of *Autun*; and being aſſured of thoſe of *Rhems*, which declared themſelves for him, he goeth & encampeth upon the river *Daiſne* near to *Soiſſons*, relieveth *Brenne*, and (the enemy attempting to paſſe that river) he oppoſeth and killeth a great number of them. After that, victuall growing ſhort for ſo great an armie, and they of *Beauvais* underſtanding that *Divitiacus* harried their countrey, they reſolved to return every man to his own home, and be in a readineſſe to relieve the firſt that ſhould be aſſaulted: But they retreated in ſuch diſorder, that *Ceſar* had leiſure to overtake them; who charging on the rear, routed them, where he made a great maſſacre; and in purſuit of them he beſiegeth and taketh *Noyon*. All theſe ſubmitted

Bellouaci.

Axona.
Sueſſonet.
Bibrax.

Noviodunum.

Nervii. ted, except they of *Tournay*, esteemed the most valiant of al; who having disposed of their old men, women, and children, resolved to defend themselves. *Cesar* goeth to them: who assault him so furiously as he was going to his quarters, that they had like to have defeated him: so that he confessed, that in this conflict his good fortune had equall share with his valour and industrie. Nevertheless he defeated them, after which he findeth no more resistance; the renown of whose victories made him dreadfull even as farre as *Germanie*, and gained him all *Normandy* and *Bretain*, which *Publius Crassus* one of his Lieutenants subjected to the Romanes with onely one Legion.

Observations.

WE must here observe the judgement of Cesar, *who by his diligence assured himself of those of* Rhems, *by his industrie and affabilitie held them faithfull, and by his foresight prepared a diversion against those of* Beauvois, *(a bold and stout people) which redounded much to his profit. Further it is to be considered that an army of thirtie or fourtie thousand men trained and well disciplined, is able (with patience well intrenching and encamping it self) to discomfit the most numerous armies, which for want of victuall destroy themselves; and if they fight (provided that you avoid being surrounded on all parts) their disorders and confusion will also break them. The warres of the* Romanes *do prove this true; who have never defeated their enemies but with lesser number; nor were ever forced to sallie out of their retrenched camp, to give battel against their wills: and particularly this present, wherein* Cesar *hath had more to do against one Province alone of the* Belgæ *then against all the rest together, having very particularly described the battel which he had against those of* Tournay, *as one of the most dangerous which he ever had; wherein there be diverse things worthy consideration.*

The

The first, That those of Tournay being advertised that Cesar caused every Legion to march with its baggage after it, they resolved to lay an Embuscado and to fight with them, truly judging that the baggage separating the Legions in an inclosed countrey, they should not be able to relieve each other, and that otherwise they might (with all their forces) set upon each Legion apart.

The second, That they found themselves deceived in their presupposition; because that though Cesar commanded his army to march so in a countrey of securitie for the commodiousnesse thereof; nevertheless when he was in a suspected countrey, he caused six Legions to march together, then all the baggage, and in the rear of that two Legions newly levied. And it was in this order, and upon his encamping, when they charged him.

The third is the confession of Cesar: who freely acknowledgeth that his armie was assaulted so unexspectedly and courageously, and in a countrey so inclosed, that it was neither his customary order which saved him (for he had no leisure to embattel) nor his exhortations, nor his appearance in all parts (for he was forced to fight in the place he then was in) but he attributed the safetie thereof onely to the continued discipline of his souldiers, which knew of themselves to range where they ought, & to that that he ever made all his officers exactly observe the performance of their duties, whilest the intrenchment of the camp was a making; so that in all parts were found some ready to command, and others to obey; which made good the resistance, and hindred the affrightment.

The fourth, That a rash resolution is oftentimes to be feared; and to avoid it, must never be omitted whatsoever dependeth on military discipline.

And the fifth, That the treason which those of Bolduc (whom he had besieged in the best of their fortresses) would have committed against him after they had yielded themselves, should teach us that we should alwaies distrust an enemy, and keep our selves so much the more upon our guards, the nearer we are to overcome. *Aduatici.*

The

The fourth warre.

The III. Book.

THe firſt exploit of arms was againſt *Servius Galba* one of *Ceſars* Lieutenants, who having ſent him with a Legion and ſome horſe into the countreyes of *Aelen, Valias*, and *Sion* (which extendeth from *Savoy* to the lake of *Geneva*) to aſſure the traffick of merchants, after ſome ſucceſſefull combats, made peace with that people, received their hoſtages, and having left two companies in the countrey of *Aelen*, he goeth with the reſt of the Legion to quarter at the town of *Martanach* ſituated in a valley, and divided into two by a little river called the *Branſe*: on the one ſide whereof he intrencheth his camp, and on the other he quartereth the *Gauls* which were with him. The ſmall number of ſouldiers which he had in his camp (as yet not in good defenſe) emboldned thoſe people to revolt; hoping that they ſhould at the firſt aſſault defeat him. For it was inſupportable unto them that he ſhould have their children in hoſtage: and they feared alſo that the *Romanes* would annex thoſe places to *Provence*, which was near at hand. So that he ſaw himſelf aſſaulted on all parts, before he had leiſure to underſtand the danger he was in; and finding his affairs in great extremitie, having neither victuall to ſubſiſt nor men to make a long reſiſtance, deſpair made him follow the counſel of *Publius Sextius Baculus* firſt Centurion of that Cohort, and of *Caius Voluſenus* Colonel of a thouſand men, which was to ſally out from all parts

Antuatti. Veragri. Seduni. Allobroges Lacus Lemanus.

Octodurus.

Tribunus.

parts upon the enemy: which they did so violently, that they which thought they were not able to defend themselves in their trenches defeated them in open field. That done, he maketh use of their discomfiture to retire his Legion into a place of safetie.

But the occasion of the fourth warre was this. *Publius Crassus* one of *Cesars* Lieutenants having sent divers Tribunes to make provision of corn necessary for the feeding of his army, into the countreyes of *Perche*, *Cornoaille*, and *Vannes*; they reteined them contrary to publick faith, in hope thereby to recover their hostages. By this example their neighbours did the like, and all sent word to *Crassus* that they would not deliver them up unlesse he restored their hostages. *Cesar*, having heard of this combination, prepareth diligently for a warre, truly considering that if he suffered this he should open a gap to a generall revolt; for he well knew the readinesse of the French to take arms, loving their libertie and abhorring servitude. He provideth in the first place to hinder the increasing of the league; to this end he sendeth *Labienus* into the countrey of *Triers* with the cavalrie, giving him order to visit those of *Rhems* and the *Belga*; *Publius Crassus* into *Gascongne* with 12 Legionarie ensignes, and good store of horse; *Quintus Titurius Sabinus* with 3. Legions into *Perche*, *Allencon*, and *Lysieux*; giveth the command at sea to *D. Brutus*, & himself with the land-forces resolveth to charge those of *Vannes*, the chief cause of this war. Their countrey is maritime, of difficult approch, and strong in shipping; insomuch that when with much labour he had brought a place

Vuelli.
Curiosilitæ.
Veneti.
Trevori.
Aquitania.
Lexobii.

place to the extremitie of being taken, the inhabitants imbarked themselves with their goods, and removed to another: so that what he did was little worth, untill his navie being arrived he gave them battel, and defeated them: after which they yielded themselves to *Cesar*, who put to death all the *Senate*, and caused the people to be sold. At the same time the Lieutenants which *Cesar* had distributed amongst the *Gauls* had their hands full: *Q. Titurius Sabinus* was set upon by *Viridonix*, commander of severall nations, with strong forces; but by his patience and subtiltie he drew him on to assault him in his camp, and overcame him; which reassured all that countrey. *P. Crassus* on the *Guyenne* side defeated the *Sontiates*, besieging them in their citie, and took it. After capitulation *Adcantuannus* their Governour made a sally with six hundred of his trustiest souldiers, and attempteth to master the *Romane* camp; but being repulsed, *Crassus* nevertheless holdeth himself to the capitulation before agreed upon. During the time of this siege the people of *Spain* and *Gascongne* about the *Pyrenean* hils make a league together, and choose their commanders out of those Captains which had been trained under *Sertorius*. *Crassus* assaulteth them: they entrench and cut off his victuall, in so much that he is constrained to fight with them within their trenches, wherein (as good luck served) he found some defect, by means of which he defeated them. This victory caused all that people to submit. *Cesar* seeing none in arms but onely those of *Tervoenne* and *Gueldres*, though the summer were farre spent, marcheth thither; where he findeth a new way of

Morini.
Menapii.

of warring, the people holding themſelves within, he goeth to find them out, and being near approched, as he was fortifying his camp they aſſaulted him, and were repulſed: after which, *Ceſar* advanceth into the forreſt it ſelf, cauſeth the trees to be cut down, and made uſe of them inſtead of a rampart; and by an incredible labour and diligence he was already advanced to the place where they kept all their cattel and laſt baggage; but the ſeaſon grew ſo ſtormy and wet that he was conſtrained to draw his armie into their winter-garriſon.

Obſervations.

SO ended this warre: where we will obſerve firſt the profitableneſſe of the intrenchments of camps, which in entire countreys ſerve for a bridle, as citadels to cities; the Romanes *having never been able to have held ſo many conquered States under their obedience, but onely by that meanes: For armies garriſoned in ſeverall towns may by being ſo ſeparated be defeated totally, or in part, by conſpiracie; beſides, the delicacies of cities do overthrow all militarie diſcipline, and abaſe all generous courage. Howſoever if there be more fortreſſes then can well be maintained, you muſt demoliſh them, to the end that nothing may be able to reſiſt the armie: which being always i.. an intire body, oppoſeth it ſelf againſt all combinings of conſpiratours; it being moſt certain, that not onely for the keeping reliefs out of a conquered Province, but alſo for the conſervation of your country againſt greater forces then your own (giving order that there be no want of victuall) it is to be done by intrenching ſtrongly: for whoſoever putteth himſelf wholly upon the defenſive, and ſhutteth himſelf up in walled towns, muſt in time neceſſarily periſh, unleſſe he receiveth forreign reliefs: for that by two or three yeares ſpoil of the increaſe of the champains the cities muſt of neceſſitie ſtarve, and thereby know your inabilitie to preſerve them; ſo that they will rather yield to your enemy then periſh.*

In the second place we will consider how Crassus was put to it, when he had to do with commanders which had been trained under Sertorius, *and which (according to the custome of the* Romanes) *could make benefit of the advantage of grounds, fortifie their camp, and cut off their enemies victuall: for by such a manner of warring they had brought the said* Crassus *to such a passe that he was constrained to assault their camp; which albeit he forced (whether by having better souldiers, or by finding some part of it ill fortified) yet it is certain that he undertook that task out of despair rather then judgement, as being in danger to perish for want of victuals.*

We will further observe that Cesar *in all these actions by no diversitie of making warre was ever astonished, whether he were assaulted in open field or in his camp, whether surprised, or whether his enemie retired into places inaccessible; alwayes finding them out in all places, and that without omitting one onely point of militarie discipline. For though our enemies sometime do actions which have shew of fear, the better to circumvent us; yet must we not therefore disesteem them: no profession being like to that of a souldier, wherein one fault can never be repaired, and wherein one houre causeth the losse of that reputation which hath been thirtie yeares acquiring.*

To conclude this discourse I will onely adde this, That the cruelties which Cesar *used towards those of* Vannes *ought not to blemish his clemencie manifested in the whole course of his life; but we must rather believe that he forced his disposition in this severe action to chastise the violaters of the law of nations, in that they imprisoned those which (under promise of safetie) went to negotiate with them; and also to give a terrour to all that people so subject to revolt, by letting them tast the sweetnesse of a mild government while they kept within the lists of obedience, and by using them rigourously when they departed from it.*

The

The fifth warre.

The IV. Book.

THe *Germanes* of *Francfort* and *Heſſen*, to the number of foure hundred thouſand ſouls, finding themſelves perſecuted by the *Suevians* (the moſt puiſſant and hardy people of *Germanie*) abandon their native homes; and after, wandring through divers countreys, they approch the *Rhine* about the Provinces of *Gueldres* and *Gulick*: out of which they drive the inhabitants, and poſſeſſe themſelves of their territories on both ſides of the river. *Ceſar* (which knew the humour of the *French* to be turbulent and ready to ſhake off the yoke of ſervitude) reſolved not to ſuffer the *Germanes* to ſettle themſelves on this ſide the *Rhine*. And though he well perceived that they had begun a treatie with them, he diſſembled it, and (anticipating the time which formerly he uſed for his going into the field) haſtneth directly to fight with the foreſaid *Germanes*: Which (being aſtoniſhed at this diligence) ſend Embaſſadours to him to treat of peace. He giveth them fair audience and courteous anſwer, but holdeth on his march ſtill towards them: at laſt they come to accord, conditioning with *Ceſar* to remain where he was three dayes; he granteth them one: whereupon his cavalrie (to the number of five thouſand) advancing to forrage, encountreth with eight hundred *Germane* horſe; which charge them bravely, rout them, and chace them even to the *Romane* camp: but the next day ſending all their principall commanders to

Uſpetes. Tenchtheri

Ceſar to excuſe this action, and to make appear unto him that it was by mere accident. He reteineth them priſoners, marcheth with his army towards the *Germanes*, ſurpriſeth them, and cutteth them all in pieces. Which done he makes a bridge over the *Rhine*, goeth into *Germanie*, relieveth the citie of *Cullen*, granteth peace to ſuch as would deliver hoſtages, burneth and waſteth the reſt, and at the end of eighteen dayes breaketh down his bridge and returneth into *France*.

Ubii, or *Colonia Agrippina.*

Obſervations.

WE *muſt here obſerve* Ceſars *wiſe conduct, who by his ready and unexpected march diſſolved the practices which were in agitation between the* Germanes *and* Gauls; *by his diſſimulation towards the* Gauls *(pretending not to know their plottings, and teſtifying his confidence of them) held them in fair quarter and hindred them from precipitating themſelves into a league with the* Germanes; *by his induſtrie delayed them by treaties, whileſt he ſtill marched towards them; and when occaſion ſerved took his advantage to take them in diſorder and deſtitute of commanders, making them believe they had firſt broke the treatie.*

Next we muſt conſider, that upon the fame of this great defeat he cauſed the Romane *Eagles to flie on the other ſide of the* Rhine, *to ſtrike a terrour into the* Germanes, *and be a means to retein them for the future from further attempting: Beſides, he would not paſſe over the* Rhine *by boats, as a thing too full of hazard, but he made a bridge, which he cauſed to be fortified and guarded on both ſides of the river: neither ſtayed he longer in that countrey then was neceſſary for the reputation of his armie; and at his return broke down his bridge, taking away by that courſe the means from the* Germanes *of making uſe thereof.*

I adde further, that the defeat of five thouſand Romane *horſe, by eight hundred of the* Germane *cavalrie, and*

and the day after, the defeat of foure hundred thousand Germanes *by thirtie or fourtie thousand* Romanes, *sheweth plainly that it is not the naturall valour of one nation above another, nor the greater number above the smaller, which giveth the conquest; but the exact observation of militarie discipline, and the continuall exercise of arms: which instructeth men not onely to fight well, but also to take advantages, and to know when to fight and when not.*

The sixth warre.

Cæsars sixth warre was against the *Britains*, becaufe the inhabitants of that Iſland did oftentimes aſſiſt the *French* againſt him. To this end he enquireth of merchants which trafficked there, what nations did inhabit it, what their manner of warring, under what laws they lived, and which were their beſt havens. Then he diſpatched *C. Voluſenus* to diſcover the coaſt: Then ſent for his ſhipping, which he had uſed in his war againſt thoſe of *Vannes*, and prepared all things neceſſary for his deſigne. The noiſe of this preparation gave occaſion to many cities of *Britain* to ſend Embaſſadours to him, to promiſe obedience, and to offer him hoſtages; which he returned with fair language, and with them *Comius* (whom he had made king of *Arras*) under which pretext he might the better diſcover the countrey: Neverthelеſſe, *Comius*, not daring to truſt himſelf amongſt the *Britains*, ſtayed onely five dayes upon their coaſts, and then returned to give an account of what he had diſcovered. Mean time *Cæſar* makes peace with thoſe of *Terovenne*, that ſo he might leave no warre behind him, taketh two Legions and part of his cavalrie, ſendeth the reſt of his army into the countrey of *Guelders*, under the com-

Atrebates.

Morini.

Menapii.

command of *Q. Titurius Sabinus*, and *Aruncu-leius Cotta*, giveth the guard of the Port from whence he imbarqued unto *P. Sulpitius Rufus*, and putteth to ſea. He arriveth ſafely upon the coaſt of *Britain* (with his Infanterie onely) which he findeth all in arms; he attempteth to land there, where finding too much difficultie, he goeth and doth it eight miles further, and yet not without danger: Nevertheleſſe he ſo affrighted the *Britains* that they ſent to him to deſire peace. But a tempeſt ariſing, which battered many of his ſhips, and drove aground all thoſe which carried his horſe, gave them new courage; and inſtead of giving him hoſtages, they armed all the countrey againſt him, ill intreating one of his Legions which went to forrage; which he relieveth, and bringeth ſafely off. In theſe extremities *Ceſar* taketh care for the repairing of his navie, for proviſion of victuall, and for the ſecuring of his camp; and being again aſſailed by the inhabitants of the Iſland, he giveth them combat, and defeateth them: Which forceth them afreſh to deſire peace: he granteth it, taketh hoſtages of thoſe that would readily deliver them, and carrieth back his armie into *Gallia* ſafe and ſound; onely two ſhippes with three hundred ſouldiers, which landed a little lower, were ſet upon by thoſe of *Teraenne*; which *Ceſar* being informed of, haſteneth thither with his cavalrie, reſcueth them, and defeateth the enemies.

Obſervations.

Obſervations.

IT is to be obſerved, that to beginne a warre in autumne, without apparent advantage, in a countrey undiſcovered, not having any intelligence there, and the Ocean to paſſe, is an enterpriſe (in my opinion) well worthy the invincible courage of Ceſar, *but not of his accuſtomed prudence. Nevertheleſſe, this eſcape muſt be attributed to his good fortune, which he had ſubjected to his will. For in this deſigne, where it ſeemed that men and elements were conjured againſt him, the earth refuſing him victuall, the ſea battering his ſhips, the air furniſhing tempeſts, and the countrey where he landed conſpiring his ruine, he conſtantly reſiſted all this; oppoſing againſt famine his providence of making proviſion for his armie; againſt the wracks of the ſea, his diligence in repairing his veſſels; againſt the aſſaults of his enemies, his armies to reſiſt them, inſomuch that he conſtrained them to beg for peace: and ſo he returned gloriouſly from a bad countrey, where any elſe would have ſuffered extremely. Let us alſo conſider, that before he departed from* France *he took care to provide what was neceſſarie to keep it in obedience, and for the ſecuritie of his return. Let us further note, how abundant* Ceſar *was in his inventions, for the advantagious taking of his time, in the very occaſion it ſelf: for perceiving that his ſouldiers (not accuſtomed to ſea-fights) were diſtracted at their landing, he (in the very action) changeth his firſt order, and with his galleys approcheth nearer the coaſt, and in ſpite of his enemies landeth; and they (ſeeing a kind of veſſels they knew not) were affrighted, and betook themſelves to their heels. Alſo we ought to admire in* Ceſar *two things which he had to perfection, and which render a commander excellent; namely that he forecaſt and provided for all things which might either further or hinder this deſigne before he undertook it; and that in the very execution he failed not to take his advantage when occaſion preſented it, or to remedy upon the inſtant ſuch unexpected accidents as befell; wherein he hath been inimitable.*

The ſeventh warre.

The V. Book.

CEſar not ſatisfied with his firſt voyage into *Britain* imployeth the winter to cauſe ſuch equipage to be prepared as was neceſſarie for his paſſage thither the ſecond time, and according to his cuſtome goeth into *Lombardy*, from whence (before his return) he paſſeth into *Sclavonia* to quiet ſome ſeditions which were there befallen: afterwards returneth to his armie, findeth all in good order, commendeth every man for their diligence in getting all things in readineſſe. But before his departure he goes to *Triers*, a very powerfull people, about a diviſion fallen between *Induciomarus* and *Cingentorix*, the two great men of the town: The laſt cometh to him and promiſeth him all obedience: the other prepareth for warre; nevertheleſſe, fearing to be abandoned, yieldeth himſelf; *Ceſar* receiveth him, but diminiſheth his authoritie, and augmenteth that of *Cingentorix*, whom he believeth beſt affected to him: which done, he continueth his deſigne, takes along with him the principall men of *Gallia* in this warre. *Dumnorix* of *Autun* makes difficulties; *Ceſar* preſſeth him, he excuſeth himſelf; then attempts to ſeduce the *Gauls*, at laſt he flies; *Ceſar* ſendeth after him, but refuſing to return, is ſlain. He imbarkt at *Calice*, where he left *Labienus* with three legions and two thouſand horſe; he paſſeth into *Britain*, and landeth without reſiſtance: he fortifieth a camp to guard his veſſels, leaveth *Q. Atrius* there, and paſſeth further; forceth the camp of the *Britains* not farre diſtant from thence. The next day *Atrius*

Illyricum.

Iccius.

trius ſendeth him word that the tempeſts had ſhattered the greater part of his navie; he returneth thither, imployeth ten whole dayes about repairing them, draws them on ſhore, cauſeth the camp to be well fortified, commandeth *Labienus* to cauſe new ſhips to be built, then advanceth towards *Caſſivellanus*, declared Generall for the *Britains*, who dares not aſſail him but when he goes to forrage, which cauſeth him to go ſtrong and in good order; & after he had triall of his manner of fight by ſome skirmiſhes, he defeated him by *C. Trebonius* one of his Lieutenants, who went thither with three legions and all the cavalry. After this defeat there appeared no more enemies in groſſe; and *Ceſar*, being come to the river *Thames* paſſeth it at the onely place where it was fordable, in deſpite of the *Britains*, who endeavoured to their utmoſt to hinder him: which ſo aſtoniſhed *Caſſivellanus*, that all his care was to hide himſelf in the woods; & ſeeing that divers towns had yielded themſelves to *Ceſar*, he alſo ſent to him; who received him, giving hoſtages, impoſing a certain tribute upon the countrey. The ſeeing the ſeaſon much ſpent, and fearing ſome tumults in *France*, he repaſſeth the ſea, bringing back his armie glorioufly, which (contrary to his cuſtome) he was conſtrained (by reaſon of the barrenneſſe of the yeare) to ſeparate into divers garriſons to keep it alive. But before he could go into *Italie*, *Ambiorix* and *Cativulcus* inſtigated by *Induciomarus* take arms, aſſail *Sabinus* and *Cotta* two of his Lieutenants, defeat and kill them as they were removing from their camp; from thence they go and aſſail *Cicero* in his camp,

another

another of his Lieutenants, which defendeth himſelf with much difficulty; *Ceſar* relieveth him, and defeateth the *Gauls*. The report of the defeat of two *Romane* legions inciteth the other *Gauls* to revolt; inſomuch that *Labienus* is aſſaulted in his camp by *Induciomarus*: he withſtandeth the aſſault, afterwards conquereth and killeth him. As the firſt defeat of the Romane legions moved all the *Gauls* to revolt, ſo theſe two laſt overthrows made them lay down their arms.

Obſervations.

IN this ſecond voyage of Ceſar *into* Britain, *though he went thither with greater forces and better prepared then at firſt, having ſupplied thoſe defects which were wanting before; nevertheleſſe going into a countrey which he could not come to but by ſea, where he had no intelligence, and going from another newly conquered, ſubject to revoltings, and which grudgingly endured ſubjection, he rather therein ſatisfied his own ambition, then that he added any great profit to the* Romanes. *Wherein we will firſt obſerve his dexterity and prudence, in that he carried along with him (as voluntaries) all the ſtirring ſpirits amongſt the* Gauls, *which ſerved as hoſtages for him. But it appears, his naturall clemency made him commit an errour, in contenting himſelf to have diminiſhed the authority of* Induciomarus, *when indeed he ſhould have ruined him; whereof he found the inconvenience afterward.*

Secondly, that he never was moved at any unexpected accidents, for which he was prepared as if he had foreſeen them, which he made to appear to good purpoſe in this great tempeſt, which ſhattered all his ſhips, and would have driven any but himſelf to deſperation.

Thirdly, though he were renowned for the Captain which beſt knew how to make uſe of his victories, and which hath purſued them homeſt; he would not do it here, becauſe he was in an unknown countrey, and his camp not as yet well fortified.

Let us conſider alſo, that howſoever the ſcarcity of corn compelled

compelled him (contrary to his custome) to cause his army to make their winter-garrisons in severall places, and not all together, to the end that they might with more facility be furnished with victuall; yet he did it with such judgement, as that the places where they quartered were not so far distant, but that they could easily relieve each other; nor so near, but they held divers States in obedience. Nevertheless the successe sheweth us evidently, that it is not so good as to be quartered in an intire body, because it is easier to assail a small troop then a great; which gave encouragement to the Gauls to revolt and to assail the camp of Sabinus & Cotta: where the artificiall oration of Ambiorix perswading them that the revolt was so generall, that at the same instant all the other camps were assaulted, and could not relieve each other, put them into such a confusion in matter of counsel, that fear made them choose the worst, which was to forsake their camp and retreat. Whence we may learn, That he never speedeth well that followeth the counsels of an enemy; and, That a retreat in view of the enemy is the most dangerous action that can be undertaken.

Cicero his resistance within his camp, which refused to follow his enemies counsel, and resolved to defend himself within his trenches, proved for his safetie and great glory; and gave time to Cesar to relieve him: wherein there be two things remarkable; The first of Cesar, who having understood that the Gauls came towards him to give him battel, finding himself weak maketh choice of an advantageous place, fortifieth it, maketh his camp very small, to the end he might the better defend it, and make his enemies believe that he was exceeding weak; whom (after they had many times provoked him to fight) they began to disregard, which begot a neglect of all order amongst them; so that they assaulted him ever after disorderly: having thus lulled them asleep, on a day he chargeth them so furiously, that he defeateth them without resistance. And Labienus one of his Lieutenants by a like stratageme did the like to Induciomarus. The second of the Gauls, who not being able to force the camp of Cicero, shut him up by a retrenchment which contained ten miles in circuit, made in three houres, and by men which had nothing to dig with but their swords, and nothing to carry earth with but their clothes: which argueth they were a great multitude, and sheweth what may be done by armies well regulated and well provided.

The

The eighth warre.

The VI. Book.

Cæſar, perceiving the affairs of the *Gauls* to incline to warre, fortifieth himſelf by three *Romane* Legions, and as many other ſouldiers as he could get; which fell out very happily for him: for after the death of *Induciomarus* the *Trevois* put their government into the hands of his kindred, which made league with all that would revolt, and particularly with *Ambiorix*; whereof *Cæſar* being advertiſed, joyns foure legions together in winter, ſurpriſes thoſe of *Tournay*, forceth them to yield & deliver hoſtages. And in the ſpring following cauſeth the *Gauls* to aſ-
Lutetia. ſemble at *Paris*, from whence, on the ſame day that the aſſembly brake up, he goeth and aſſaulteth thoſe of *Sens*, then thoſe of *Chartres*, who
Senones. *Carnutes.* (finding themſelves ſurpriſed) yield. From thence he prepareth to ſet upon *Ambiorix* and thoſe of *Triers*, but firſt he laboureth to draw away from them their allies: To which end he diſcardeth all his baggage, which he commits to *Labienus* (who was in the countrey of *Triers*) with two legions to guard it, and himſelf with five goeth to aſſail the *Gauls*. For execution whereof he divided his army into three parts; for that he well knew they were not able to diſpute the champain with him, and ſo burnt and pillaged their countrie, that he conſtrained them to yield, to deliver hoſtages, and to forſake *Ambiorix*. At the ſame time they of *Triers* aſſail *Labienus*; who making a ſhew of fear, and retreating as if he had fled, draweth them in diſorder into place of diſadvantage, where he defeateth them, and

taketh

taketh the very citie of *Triers*. This expedition being finiſhed, *Ceſar* maketh a bridge over the Rhine, and paſſeth it: they of *Cullen* adhere to him; he fortifieth his camp, and maketh proviſion of victuall, attempteth to compell the *Suevians* to battel; but ſeeing them retreat into vaſt and deep forreſts, he forbeareth to purſue them; repaſſeth the *Rhine*, cutteth off (on the *Germane* ſide) onely 120 foot of his bridge, maketh a good tower on the end thereof, at the other end on the ſide of *Gallia* he buildeth a fort, leaving twelve cohorts to guard that and the ſaid bridge. (In this place *Ceſar* maketh a deſcription of the manners and cuſtomes of the *Gauls* and the *Germanes*.) That done he goeth to continue the warre againſt *Ambiorix*; and the better to ſurpriſe him he ſendeth *L. Minutius Baſilius* before, with all the cavalrie, forbidding him the making any fire in his camp to the end his approch might be undiſcovered, by which means he thought to have ſeiſed upon *Ambiorix*; who ſaved himſelf miraculouſly by flying from one place to another, & *Ceſar* (the better to follow him) conveys again his baggage into a caſtle of the *Liegeois* called *Vatuca*, for guard whereof he left *Q. Tullius Cicero* with one legion, commanding him for even dayes (the time which his expedition would take up) to look carefully to his guards, and not to ſtirre out of his trenches. Then divided he his army into three parts to harraſſe all that countrey; who meeteth with nothing in the form of an army to oppoſe him, inſomuch that his greateſt care was to prevent that his ſouldiers (coveteous of booty) ſtraggled not too far abroad, for fear of being cut off by the enemies, which lay hidden

Eburones.

wachten-donck.

hidden in forrests and boggs. The report reached presently to the other side of the *Rhine*, that *Cesar* exposed the countrey of *Gueldres* to pillage; which occasioned the *Westfalians* to participate of the booty: they presently get together two thousand horse, passe the *Rhine*, pillage without resistance, & are so well pleased with tast thereof that they resolve to set upon the *Romane* camp; when by misfortune, that day being the seventh from *Cesars* departing, *Cicero* (which had observed his command very exactly, and having no news, nor suspecting an enemie) suffered himself by the importunity of his souldiers to give way to them to forrage, and at the same instant was (unexpectedly) assaulted by the *Westfalians*, against whom he had much ado to defend himself; untill that his souldiers returning from forrage, part of them made their way through the enemies, and regained the camp; but the rest were cut in pieces. Nevertheless this relief bereft the enemies of all hope of forcing the camp; and so they returned to their countrey with their bootie. Awhile after arrived *Cesar*, who rebuked *Cicero* for transgressing his command. Then he resolveth afresh to expose the countrey of *Gueldres* to fire and sword, and to pursue *Ambiorix*, who had yet escaped: after that he sendeth his army to garrison, which he supplieth with corn, and then goeth into *Italy*.

Menapii.
Sicambri.

Observations.

IN this warre Cesar had no great resistance, all fleeing before him, having nothing to do but to pillage and burn the countrey; notwithstanding there be very good observations to be made thereupon: for though you learn not hence how to fight a battel, or to expugne fortresses, yet you may here

here learn how to deal with such as save themselves by flight and by retiring into inaccessible places: wherein many Commanders have failed for the not observing of three principall things, which Cesar did: First, to prevent the enemy by such extraordinary diligence, as to surprise them before they be able to retire themselves or their victuall into the forrells; so that by this means you may constrain the one to yield, and the other to perish through famine. The second, to divide your army into as many parts as you can with safety, that so assayling a countrey in severall places all at once, the inhabitants thereof will be doubtfull to what part to retire unto. And the last is, to hinder the souldiers from disbanding when they go to pillage, for fear they be cut off by the enemies. By which oversight many great inconveniences have often befallen conquering armies; which should teach us never to slacken the severity of military discipline, though we believe our selves far from an enemie, and in great security. The example we have in this book of Q. Cicero is excellent in that kind, who received a great losse, and had like to have been utterly defeated, by suffering himself to be perswaded by the importunity of his souldiers, which (contrary to Cesars command) would needs go out of their trenches to forrage.

We may further see the difference between old souldiers and new, who (for want of experience) knew not how to choose what was for their safety and honour, but retreated to a hill and there were cut in pieces: but the other, knowing there was no safetie but by recovering the camp, made their way with their swords, and saved both themselves and their camp. Here we may observe how ingenious fear is to seek out subjects to augment it self; for because this place was the same where Titurius and Cotta had been defeated the yeare before, they took it for an ill omen.

Let us further observe, that Cesar (when he would make an expedition for seven or eight dayes, where great diligence required) discharged himself of his baggage, which in truth is a marvellous impediment in a champain; & it is impossible to conduct an army well, if (according to occasions) you do not strongly intrench your camp, or march without baggage.

Let us also admire the good intelligence Cesar had by spies; a thing of such utilitie, as that a Prince or Generall ought to spare no cost for, it being the most powerfull means to undertake

dertake brave deſignes, and to avoid great ruines.

Neither muſt we forget his dexterity in dividing thoſe which were entring into a combination againſt him, and his aſſaulting them ſeverally, nor his cuſtomary diligence in ſurpriſing them; having attained to the end of the moſt part of his great deſignes by theſe wayes.

we will conclude the obſervations of this book with the ſtratageme of Labienus: *who, deſirous to fight with thoſe of* Triers *before the* Germanes *were joyned to them, reſolved to make it publickly believed that he was afraid of them, and that he would retreat; knowing right well that there were* Gauls *in his own army which would diſcover it to them; and in the mean time gave order ſecretly to retreat with a great noiſe, & making ſhew of much fears whereof they of* Triers *having intelligence, without ſtaying for the* Germanes, *conceiving they ought not to let ſlip the occaſion which offered it ſelf unto them, paſſed the river, and came diſorderly as to an aſſured victory: but* Labienus *turneth upon them in good order, and defeateth them. Yet would I not counſel you at any time to attempt ſuch a ſtratageme with new-levied ſouldiers, which uſually are fearfull when they ſee men running towards them and without order; which (on the contrary) aſſureth thoſe which are experienced.*

The ninth warre.

The V. I. Book.

THe affairs of *Gallia* quieted, *Ceſar* goeth into *Italy*, according to his cuſtome: where he heareth of the death of *Piſo*, and the garboils of *Rome*; which gave new occaſion to the *Gauls* of revolting. *Chartres* began, the *Auvergnats* followed, and at length many others. *Vercingetorix* an *Auvergnat* is choſen Generall for all. *Ceſar* hearing this cometh away in the depth of winter, paſſeth the mountains of *Genaudan* covered with ſnow, and appeareth in *Auvergne* before it was known that he was come from *Italy*: which cauſed many to hold for him, and ſtartled

Gabalii.

ſtartled thoſe which were revolted. With the ſame diligence he paſſeth into *Burgundy* and *Champaigne*, where he aſſembleth his army, cometh to *Berry*, and beſiegeth it; and taketh *Vellaudunum* (from whence he takes 600 hoſtages) then forceth *Gien* (or *Orleans*) where was made a great ſlaughter: *Vercingetorix*, ſeeing the ſucceſſe of his enemie, and conceiving his army inſufficient to deal with him in the field, endeavoureth to conquer him by taking away all means of ſubſiſtence; and to this purpoſe burneth more then twenty towns, preſerving onely *Bourges* (and that too againſt his adviſe.) *Ceſar* beſieged it, where he ſuffered much, and found himſelf in great difficulties and neceſſities; at length having overcome them, he taketh the town, putteth to the ſword fourty thouſand men, & there refreſheth his army. During this ſiege he attempted to ſurpriſe *Vercingetorix* his camp, but was repulſed: yet was not diſcouraged at all with all this ill ſucceſſe, but continueth the warre with much reſolution and prudence; and *Vercingetorix*, to hinder his enemie from paſſing the river of *Alier*, breaketh down all the bridges: nevertheleſſe *Ceſar* making ſhew to paſſe in one place, taketh advantage to do it in another; then goeth and beſiegeth *Clairmont*. *Vercingetorix* encampeth on the other ſide, where were many aſſaults and brave combats: nevertheleſſe *Ceſar* is conſtrained to quit the ſiege, whether for that he made doubt of taking the town, or whether to prevent the revolt of the *Autunois* artificially procured by *Litavicus*; who having procured himſelf to be choſen Commander of a relief ſent to *Ceſar*, being but ten leagues from him, pretend-

Bituriges.

Genabū.

Avaricum

Elaver.

Gergobia.

ed to have received news from the army, that all the *Autunois* there were put to the ſword; which news he preſently conveyeth to *Autun*, ſo that both there and in his camp all that was *Romane* ſuffered the like, with the loſſe of their goods to boot, but chiefly the corn which they carried to relieve the army withall: Whereof *Ceſar* being advertiſed by *Eporedorix*, without conſultation taketh foure legions and all his cavalrie, marcheth day and night, overtaketh *Litavicus* with his forces, maketh known his fraudulent dealing to the ſouldiers, and without ſtriking ſtroke reduceth them to obedience, and with great diligence ſendeth to thoſe of *Autun*, to give them knowledge of what had happened; & with the ſame celeritie returneth very opportunely to his camp, which he relieveth, finding it ſtrongly aſſaulted and hardly put to it by *Vercingetorix*. That done, he taketh his way again towards the river of *Allier* and paſſeth it; mean time *Litavicus* (who was fled towards *Vercingetorix*) procureth a league of the *Autunois* with him; *Eporedorix* and *Viridomarus* ſeiſe upon *Nevers*, where *Ceſar* had left his hoſtages, corn, and publick treaſure, which they pillage and burn: Which drove him into great ſtraits, becauſe that *Vercingetorix* alwayes coaſted him, and cut off his victuall. At laſt he reſolved by great marches to gain the river *Loyre*, which he paſſed over to joyn with *Labienus*, to whom (in the beginning of this warre) he had given foure legions to go towards *Paris*. Whileſt things paſſed in this manner, *Labienus* was much diſtracted by the garboils of all theſe revolts: notwithſtanding having poſſeſſed himſelf of *Melun*, he gave jea-

Noviodunum.

Ligeris.

Melodunum.

louſie

louſies to his enemies in many places, inſomuch that by this trick he paſſed the river *Seine*, & before that all theſe revolted people could joyn forces, he defeated the firſt which oppoſed themſelves, took *Prouvins*, and from thence joyned with *Ceſar*. At the ſame time the *Gauls* renew their conſpiracies and intelligences, they hold an aſſembly, where almoſt all the *Gauls* are preſent, they again chooſe *Vercingetorix* Generall, who maketh proviſion of great ſtore of cavalrie to the end he might diſaccommodate the *Romans* by cutting off their victuall. On the other ſide *Ceſar* maketh his proviſions, payeth his *Germane* cavalry; but *Vercingetorix* being carried away with good opinion conceived of his cavalry, adventureth a battel with *ceſar*, where he was defeated. After that he retireth himſelf to *Alexia*, whither *Ceſar* followeth him and reſolveth to beſiege him: *Vercingetorix* perceiving his deſigne gathereth together all the victuall of the town, cauſeth it to be diſtributed by meaſure, and judgeth that by well managing thereof there would be enough for near upon two moneths, diſchargeth his cavalry, ſendeth every one into his countrey to procure him relief in time, and he with eighty thouſand fighting men ſhutteth himſelf into *Alexia*: which *Ceſar* ſurroundeth with double & treble trenches, then maketh a ſecond circumvallation, to keep out reliefs from without, with an incredible labour and diligence, and maketh a proviſion of victuall ſufficient to make the beſieged conſume theirs; which ſuffer great extremity. At length relief cometh under the conduct of *Comius*, to the number of two hundred and fifty thouſand; he maketh three ſtrong

Sequana.

Agendicum.

aſſaults at divers times, two in the day and one in the night, is repulſed, and retreateth: whereby they of the town are conſtrained to yield themſelves to the diſcretion of *Ceſar*, who reteined the *Autunois* and *Auvergnats*, to regain thoſe towns which were neceſſary for him, and diſtributeth the reſt amongſt his ſouldiers. After this, all the reſt ſubmitted. Thus ended this warre, the greateſt and moſt dangerous of all that *Ceſar* had in *Gallia*.

Obſervations.

ALl Ceſars other warres in Gallia *have been made by divided parts, having made uſe of their diviſions to ruine them; but this, by a generall conſent of almoſt all: they choſe one ſupreme Commander, great in prudence & courage, who, well perceiving that the good diſcipline of the* Romanes *and their knowledge in the art military, made them invincible by way of battels, changed his own way of making warre againſt them, and by prolonging time without hazarding a generall battel, finding himſelf ſuperiour in horſe, and the countrey to friend, not ready to ſupply their armies with victuall, made juſt account to have ruined them: whereupon we may make very good obſervations.*

Firſt, upon Vercingetorix, *who having been by a generall conſent choſen Generall of divers States (which had emulations one towards another) hath known ſo well how to govern them, that what adverſitie ſoever he met with in his affairs, he hath alwayes maintained himſelf in great authority and aw amongſt them; not ſparing to be ſevere where occaſion required (fear being the moſt powerfull meanes to keep men in order:) ill ſucceſſes never being able to deject him or diminiſh his confidence. Even at that time when he was accuſed to have had intelligence with the enemy, he ſo boldly defended himſelf by an oration, that he came off more authoriſed then before. Alſo it is an efficacious meane to continue ſeverall people in a fair obſequencie, to parle often with them upon ſuch affairs as happen. He had the power to make them ſet fire on above twenty cities to diſcommodate their enemies, which argued his great judgement for*

for it was the onely way to have overcome the Romanes *(ſtronger then they in battel) to have fought with them by famine. And in ſuch affairs all moderate counſels, or but half executed, are ruinous: as the taking of* Bourges *ſerveth us for a memorable example, for the ſaving of it from burning preſerved it for the benefit of the* Romanes; *which (by taking thereof) found therein ſuch commodious things as they ſtood in need of. His great credit is very remarkable: for to a free people at the beginning of a warre, before they had taſted of bad ſucceſſe, and in their hope to be able to overcome without being driven to ſo ſmart remedies, he prevaileth with them to fire their houſes and goods, for the conſervation whereof warre is for the moſt part made. It was a very hard enterpriſe, for that the loſſe of things certain and preſent which we ſee and feel, is preferrable (with the ignorant) to things whereof the events are uncertain, and the benefits remote; and no man can well apprehend this difficulty that hath not experimented it in the government of the people. He hath beſides ſhewed his conſtancy even to the end, and made no ſcruple (being the chief of ſo many ſeverall nations) to be ſhut up in a citie, where he did all that a provident and brave Generall ought to do, and hath ſurmounted hunger and the diſcommodities of a ſiege, having held out even untill his relief was repulſed and defeated; but becauſe hiſtories make not but for the victorious, we ſee uſually none had in eſteem but the ſonnes of fortune.*

Now let us examine Ceſars *carriage in this warre, which brake out he being in* Italy, *in the depth of winter, his army diſperſed in ſeverall countreys, far diſtant from each other, and the revolted States ſo in his way, as it was almoſt impoſſible for him to unite his legions. In ſo great difficulties he findeth no other means but to ſurmount them by incomparable labour, wherewith he maketh way over the mountains covered ſix foot thick with ſnow, and affrighteth his enemies more appearing in the middeſt of them (when they believed him ſtill in* Italy *and out of poſſibility to get to them) then by his great forces. He alſo added to this aſtoniſhment by induſtry, cauſing his cavalry to ſhew it ſelf in ſeverall places at one and the ſame time, to cauſe a belief that he was very powerfull.*

Let us further conſider that Ceſar *ſeeing the faſhion of the warre changed, and that the enemy avoided battel, applyeth himſelf to ſieges, wherein he ſhewetth himſelf no leſſe a*

master then in his other actions of warre. For all that which the most excellent modern Generalls put in practice, is drawn from his actions: and whatsoever we admire of Ostend, Breda, 'Bolduc, and many other sieges of the late Prince Maurice (who hath surpassed all others in that matter) is infinitely inferiour to the two circumvallations of Alexia, where the industry, the labour, and the short time in which they were finished, farre exceedeth all that hath been done elsewhere. I am not ignorant that the invention of powder and of artillery hath changed the manner of fortifications, of assaults, and of the defense of towns; but not in such sort, but that the principall foundations whereupon they are established are particularly taken from Cesar, who in that hath far surpassed all the Romane Generalls.

The Busse.

He is also admirable in his inventions and stratagemes, & in the undauntednesse of his enterprises, who when he intended an assault upon the trenches which were about Clermont, he put a jealousie into them by a body which he made of the horse-boyes and baggages of the camp, which he caused to march in their sight towards that part which he meant not to assault, but not at so near a distance that they might discover what kind of people they were; and having laid a legion in embushade in the night-time, and caused some selected souldiers to convey themselves into the little camp which was nearer to the town, he assaulteth them so at unawares that he made himself master of all their trenches.

When he would have passed the river of Allier, which Vercingetorix attempted to oppose, he caused some legions to lie in ambush near to a bridge which had been broken, and with the rest of the army (which he made shew as if it had been intire) he passeth along the river, as if he had sought some other passage, by which means he so deluded the enemies, as that he caused the bridge to be repaired before it could be taken notice of, and so passed over without any hindrance.

When Vercingetorix (in the time of the siege of Burges) was gone out with his cavalry, he departed by night, and went and assaulted his infantery within the camp, and wanted little of defeating it.

When at the siege of Clermont he understood of the revolt of ten thousand Auruois which came to his relief, he taketh foure legions, marcheth day and night to overtake them: which he doth, and took them all, and returneth time enough

to

to defend his camp, which was aſſailed by Vercingetorix. *whereby we may obſerve by the way the benefit of having a camp alwayes well fortified, to the end we may be ever in a readineſſe to attempt upon the entmy as occaſions ſhall offer themſelves.*

I cannot forget his great modeſty. Comius (*whom he had favoured, raiſed to wealth & honour, and on whom he much truſted*) *he rather excuſeth then blameth for revolting; alledging that he was forced to comply with the generall reſolution for recovering the liberty and glory of all* Gallia.

Let us ſpeak a word or two of Labienus, *one of his Lieutenants, who finding himſelf in a ſtrait with foure of* Ceſars *legions, in this generall revolt, encircled on all parts with enemies, and being to paſſe the river* Seine *upon boats, to joyn himſelf to* Ceſar, *oppoſed by ſtrong forces which encreaſed every houre, in this extremity he imployeth both his courage and induſtry, divideth his troups into three parts, maketh great appearance of paſſing over in two places, where indeed he intended it not; by which means having ſeparated their forces into divers troups, not knowing where to attend to oppoſe him, he paſſeth over by night with three legions, or leſſe, with which he fought with the firſt troups that came againſt him, and defeated them; inſomuch that having paſſed the reſt of his troups at their eaſe, joyned them (without further inconvenience) to* Ceſar. *whereupon I will make this obſervation, namely, That he which is not very carefull and diligent in the guarding of a paſſage of a river or mountain, is for the moſt part circumvented: becauſe he which hath the poſſeſſion thereof ſleepeth ſecurely upon the advantage he hath; and he which would have it ſearcheth out all poſſible means (and at laſt findeth them) to remove all obſtacles.*

The tenth warre.

The VIII. Book.

THe *Gauls* deſirous to make one attempt more to ſhake off their yoke of ſervitude, divers towns conſpired together to revolt: whereof *Ceſar* being advertiſed, ſurpriſeth them ſo unex-

pectedly, as that he continued thoſe in their fidelity which were not as yet revolted, and reduced the reſt. Eighteen daies after his return to his winter-garriſons, they of *Bourges* gave him knowledge that they were aſſaulted by thoſe of *Caſtres*; he goeth to relieve them, & (notwithſtanding the unſeaſonable weather) bringeth them to ſubmiſſion. After that thoſe of *Rhems* deſired his aſſiſtance againſt the people of *Beauvois*, the moſt powerfull and valiant of *Gallia*, led by *Corbeius* and *Comius* two brave Commanders; he marcheth thither, taketh care to get intelligence from them, encampeth himſelf before them, where his ſouldiers receive an affront going to forrage; but after that *Corbeius* had charged his camp, and better fortified his quarters, he underſtood that he had laid an embuſcado for his ſouldiers which went to forrage; whither he goeth ſo ſtrong that he defeateth and killeth him. This victorie obliged thoſe of *Beauvois* to yield themſelves. But *Comius* fled, not daring to truſt himſelf amongſt the *Romanes*, becauſe that a little before *Labienus* would have cauſed him to have been made away by *Volluſenus* contrary to publick faith. This warre thus ended, *Ceſar* goeth and waſteth *Ambiorix* his countrey, to procure him hatred amongſt his own people, under the command of *Fabius* one of his Lieutenants; he relieveth *Limoges* which was aſſaulted by *Dumnacus*, whom he purſueth; and as he haſted to gain the river *Loyre* to put himſelf into ſafetie, he defeateth him. Then ſubjugated thoſe of *Chartres* and *Bretagne* with great promptitude and alacritie. Under the command of *Caninius* he beſiegeth *Drapes* and *Luterius* in the citie of

Lemovicum.

Cadenac:

Cadenac: who ſallying out to provide corn for the town, *Luterius* going about to convey it in is defeated; and at length *Drapes* is aſſaulted and taken in his camp. After this, he really formed the ſiege, whither *Ceſar* came in perſon, who found means to hinder them from water, ſo that this poore people yielded themſelves to his diſcretion; with whom he dealt rigorouſly, cauſing their hands to be cut off which had born arms; which ſo went to the heart of *Drapes* (then their priſoner) as that he wilfully ſtarved himſelf: and a few dayes after *Luterius* was taken and brought to *Ceſar*. At the ſame time *Labienus* defeated thoſe of *Triers*, and the *Germanes*, and took all their Commanders. *Uxellodunum.*

After ſo many happy victories of *Ceſar*, obteined by himſelf or his Lieutenants, he finiſheth that ſummer by viſiting the towns of *Gallia*, the better to aſſure his conqueſt, eſpecially in *Gaſconie*, where he had been but little, and diſperſeth his army (compoſed of ten legions) into ſuch places as he conceived moſt advantageous; which ſerved him for a ſtrong ſupport to maintein himſelf in the civil broils of his native countrey, which he was going into.

Obſervations.

Some attribute the ſo frequent revolts of the Gauls *to their changeable and impatient humour, which cannot endure to be lorded over by ſtrangers: and others, to the too great clemency of* Ceſar. *I grant that clemency apt to pardon emboldens to revolt: for that we eaſily forget all benefits which do not intirely eſtabliſh our liberty; but if cruelty cauſeth them leſſe frequent, yet it renders them more dangerous; for that when deſpair driveth men thereunto, and that the hope of ſafety reſteth onely in victory, the revolted become all valiant, obſtinate, conſtant, and faithfull to the end;*

which

which never falleth out where there is hope of the enemies clemency. we have here plentifull examples thereof. Cesar in the greater part of the revolts of the Gauls hath often found great facilities to reduce them to his obedience, by reason of his clemency; which hath been a powerfull means for him to make divisions amongst themselves, and to prevent obstinacy in their revolts: and if sometimes it hath so happened that he hath used severity, it hath been occasioned by fowl and unworthy acts; as when they of Vannes under publick faith imprisoned the Romane officers which came to them to buy corn for the sustenance of the army, (but I cannot excuse that of Cadenac.) On the contrary, the cruelties of the King of Spain executed by the Duke of Alba drove poore fishermen so into despair, that they have shaked off his insupportable yoke, and with an admirable constancie have maintained and enriched themselves, and are grown so potent as that they are able to resist him by land, and by sea take from him his treasure in the Indies.

Cesar sheweth us also by his care and industry to get intelligence of the enemies proceedings (whether by taking prisoners in the field, or by having good spies) the advantage which may be made thereof; many of his successefull designes having been founded thereupon, there being great advantage in the attempting them; for that he which assaileth hath more courage then he which is assailed, and always believeth the assaliant to be the stronger, not knowing what part he will assail, and ever jealous that he hath some secret intelligence. Briefly, all that a well exercised and well disciplined army is able to do in such a case, is to defend it self; but where are new-levied souldiers fall out great disorders: which was the reason he took so much care to fortifie his camp very strongly, to the end he might defend it & all his baggage with a few men, & might without danger execute many brave designes, being always assured of his retreat. Let us further take view of the siege of Cadenac: which Cesar judging to be impregnable by force, and knowing it to be well provided of corn, undertaketh by a great and dangerous labour to keep them from water, which was from a fountain without the town, from whence they were onely supplied: which the besieged perceiving, having set fire on Cesars works, by a salley they hindred him from quenching it. Cesar not being able to repulse them by reason of the advantage of the place, resolveth to make an assault upon the town; which apprehension caused them to retreat.

The

The Abbridgement of the civil wars of *Cesars* Commentaries.

The I. Book.

THe true cauſe of the civil warre between *Pompey* and *Ceſar* was, becauſe the one would have no companion, and the other could not endure a ſuperiour: but that which appeared, was the refuſall made to *Ceſar* of admitting his ſolicitation for the Conſulſhip being abſent (though it had been promiſed him) or elſe becauſe they would have him alone diſarm, and that they which were his declared enemies ſhould continue ſtill armed: a forced reſolution, and contrary to the will of the Commons; inſomuch that the Tribunes of the people were conſtrained to quit the citie, and to go find out *Ceſar*: Who taking occaſion by the forelock, of his private cauſe he maketh a publick; declaring to his ſouldiers that he is not in arms to other purpoſe but to reſtore the people (now oppreſſed by the *Senate*) to their libertie; and having well incouraged them thereupon, he departeth from *Rimini*, which *Ariminum.* was yet part of his gove nment, and poſſeſſeth himſelf of all the marches of *Ancona*; which cauſed a great aſtoniſhment at *Rome*. *Pompey* and the *Conſuls* forſake the citie, and dare not gather their groſſe nearer then *Capua*: mean time *Ceſar* continuing his march beſiegeth *Domitius Ænobarbus* within *Corfinium*: who with all the Senatours which accompanied him were delivered

vered unto him by his own ſouldiers, which adhere to *Ceſars* partie. He gave leave to *Domitius* and the *Senatours* to diſpoſe of themſelves where they pleaſed, cauſing all to be reſtored that belonged unto them. Following his deſigne he beſiegeth *Pompey* in *Brunduſium*: who unwilling coſuſtein the ſiege, croſſeth the ſeas with his armie, which he could not do but at two times, for want of ſhipping; yet uſed he much art and precaution to conceal his retreat from *Ceſar*, and to prevent thoſe of *Brunduſium* from giving means to his enemie to entrap him. *Ceſar*, not being able to follow him for want of veſſels, ſendeth *Valerius* into the Iſland of *Sardinia*, and *Curio* into that of *Sicilia*; *Cotta* abandoned the one, and *Cato* the other; complaining that *Pompey* had very inconſiderately imbarked them in this warre, and ſo went into *Africa*. Mean while *Ceſar* cometh to *Rome*, juſtifieth his actions, and offereth to condeſcend to a reaſonable peace: but ſeeing that his enemies protracted time, he paſſeth into *Gallia*, to ſtrengthen his armie with *Gauls*. *Marſeilles* refuſeth him entrance; he beſiegeth it, and in the mean time ſendeth *C. Fabius* to poſſeſſe himſelf of the paſſages of the *Pyrenean* mountains; which he doth bravely. Then approcheth to *Petreius* and *Afranius*, which had their camp below *Ilerda*, and encampeth on the river *Segre*, where he maketh two bridges. At firſt there paſſed onely ſlight skirmiſhes between them, untill that two of *Fabius* his Legions being gone to forrage by that bridge which was furtheſt from the camp, it happened to break; whereof the enemies being advertiſed, they go with foure Legions and all

Maſſilia.

Sicoris.

all their cavalrie to give on upon them; but being retreated to a hill of advantage, and *Fabius* miſdeeming ſomething, going to relieve them, delivered them out of that danger. While theſe things were a doing, *Ceſar* having left *C. Trebonius* Lieutenant Generall at the ſiege of *Marſeilles*, and *D. Brutus* commander of his naval armie, arrived in his camp; where being, he would encamp himſelf between *Ilerda* and his enemies camp; but after a long fight (whereof either of them made advantage) both the one and the other retreated into their camp. Preſently after, the continuall rain carried away both theſe bridges, and made the river altogether unpaſſable, which drave him to extreme neceſſities, not being able to ſupply himſelf with victuall, nor receive thoſe new forces which came to him out of *Gallia*, nor repair his bridges by reaſon of the violence of the waters, and the hindrance which his enemies gave him, which were on the other ſide of the river: At laſt he cauſed boats to be made, and whileſt the *Pompeians* buſied themſelves to entrap certain *Gauls* which came to joyn with him, he carrieth boats on wagons twentie miles from his camp, putteth them into the river, cauſeth ſome ſouldiers to paſſe over to the other ſide, and without loſing time conveyeth thither two legions more, by favour whereof he maketh his bridge: and by that means recovereth his way, and ſafe paſſage for his victuall, and receiveth thoſe troups which came to relieve him. This action reaſſured his army, aſtoniſhed the enemy, and gave ſo much reputation to his affairs (with the news which he received at the ſame time, that

that *Brutus* had defeated the *Marſillians* at ſea) that five good cities yielded themſelves, and divers others came to parle. But following this good ſucceſſe, he maketh divers trenches to cut off the water from his enemies camp, and to make the *Segre* fordable. *Afranius* and *Petreius*, fearing the proſperitie of his deſignes, reſolved to gain *Octogeſa*, ſited upon the river *Iberus*, whither they had beforehand ſent to have a bridge made: To this end they depart at midnight; *Ceſar* cauſeth them to be purſued by his cavalrie, which he maketh to ford over, becauſe his bridge was a great way off: afterward (leaving his baggage within his camp) he followeth with his Infantery, and purſueth them ſo hotly that he overthroweth their deſigne, hindring them from going whither they intended, and returning from whence they came, inſomuch that he drave them into ſuch extremitie of hunger and thirſt that (without ſtriking one blow) they were conſtrained to yield themſelves to his mercy. He diſmiſſeth them all, and winneth them by incredible courteſies, never uſed elſewhere towards enemies. Thus he remaineth maſter of *Spain*, ſending away his enemies laden with diſgrace, and alſo with obligations to publiſh (though unwillingly) his clemency and valour.

Obſervations.

It is a moſt dangerous thing for a people, a Generall of an army, or an army it ſelf, to be ſurpriſed with fear for that it is alwayes ſeconded with perverſe and ruinous accidents: which all Leaders and Commanders of armies ought to foreſee and careſully to prevent. There be three notable examples in this book on this ſubject; The firſt, when

when Ceſar *paſſed the* Rubicon; *for before that they declared him enemy to the weal-publick.* Pompey *undertaketh with a ſtamp with his foot to raiſe an armie to him; that at his approch* Ceſars *own ſouldiers ſhall deliver their Generall into his hands; neither doth he think him worthie conſideration; ſuch as dare but name* Ceſar *are driven out of* Rome; *briefly, he is proceeded againſt as a criminall offender. Notwithſtanding ſo ſoon as he had but ſet the firſt ſtep to declare the warre, and though he did the ſame at* Pezaro *which he did at* Rimini, *having not the fourth part of his armie, every man was amazed;* Pompey *and the* Conſuls *betake them to their heels; the care of leavying of ſouldiers is caſt aſide, and* Rome *it ſelf abandoned. The cauſes of this great change proceeded from this, that* Pompey *never imagined that* Ceſar *durſt have undertaken ſo high a deſigne; grounding upon a preſumption which his vertues and good fortune had added unto him; which made him rather thoughtfull how to maintein his partie in the citie, then provide for defenſe thereof: Inſomuch that when he ſaw things go otherwiſe then he had publiſhed, he ſtood amaſed. It was therefore no great wonder if an ignorant people (which take aſſurance or fear from the good or bad countenance of him into whoſe protection they had delivered themſelves) did the like. Whereupon I will ſay, that in affairs of ſuch importance we ought (in imitation of* Ceſar) *before we enter into them, to conſider maturely the worſt that can befall, ſo that evil ſucceſſe diſmayeth us not; but when we are imbarked, we muſt not check at whatſoever happeneth, but with conſtancie go on to the end.*

The ſecond example is, when Domitius Ænobarbus *(being out of hope of being relieved by* Pompey*) took a reſolution to ſave himſelf within* Corfinium, *where he was beſieged: but for that his countenance was ſadder then uſuall, his ſpeeches leſſe reſolute then the time required, and by ſome neglect of the neceſſary works for the common defenſe, he diſcovered to his ſouldiers that which he would have concealed from them, ſo that (preventing his flight they delivered him unto* Ceſar. *It is a fair leſſon for a commander, to teach him that in greateſt danger he ought to ſhew moſt reſolution; for his ſouldiers become courageous or fearfull according to that they obſerve in his countenance.*

The

The third is, when Ceſar *diſcovered the fear of* Afranius *and* Petreius *ſouldiers, in that they ſeconded not each other, that they ſcarcely had received the brunt of the cavalrie but their enſignes were all on a heap, that they made not good their ranks nor diſtances, and that they ſtirred not from the field of battel where they could not ſubſiſt for want of water. And howſoever in theſe times armies approch not ſo near each other as then they did, by reaſon of the canon; nevertheleſſe, experimented Captains will make profitable uſe of ſuch judgements. I have ſeen* Henry *the Great chaſe eight hundred horſe with leſſe then two hundred; judging they would not dare to combat him becauſe of their confuſion and not obſerving diſtances which fell out as he had foretold it.*

And howſoever to retreat from a beſieged citie by a port of the ſea ſeemeth to be no very hard matter, nevertheleſſe the precautions which Pompey *uſed to retire himſelf into* Brunduſium, *was that which ſaved him. For having to do with a people which he abandoned, and an enemy vigilant, he had been loſt if he had not walled up the gates and barricadoted up all the entries into* Brunduſium, *except one or two (which were covert enough) by which his men iſſued to the haven; becauſe when his laſt men departed from the walls, the inhabitants at the ſame inſtant of time cauſed thoſe of* Ceſars *to mount them; for which reaſon in all kinds of retreats a captain cannot take too much care to make it ſafe and orderly: and though he may do it when he pleaſeth himſelf, yet muſt he do it in ſo good time and ſo readily as that he be not engaged to fight. In this place I will relate a diſputt between* Afranius *and* Petreius, *the one being for retreat by night, the other by day: They which were for the night alledged that they ſhould gain the mountains and places of ſafetie before they ſhould be diſcovered: but the others judged that having to do with* Ceſar, *and he ſtrong in cavalrie, they ſhould never be able to get off from him without fighting; and in ſuch a caſe the day was to be preferred to the night, which alwayes cauſeth diſorders in retreats; which opinion prevailed, but not at all to their advantage. For my part I hold the other opinion the better: for beſides that it is a moſt dangerous thing to retreat in the day time, in the preſence of an enemy; a well adviſed Captain will never engage himſelf to purſue an army by night; for that it is hard for him to prevent falling into an ambuſh.*

The

The ſecond Book.

WHileſt things paſſed thus in *Spain*, *Caius Trebonius* continueth the ſiege of *Marſeilles*; to the relief whereof *Pompey* ſendeth *L. Naſſidius*, who joyning his navall forces with thoſe of the *Marſeillians*, gave battel to *Brutus*, where he was beaten. The loſſe fell upon the *Marſeillians*, becauſe they fought more obſtinately then the reſt, as being more intereſſed, having to conſerve both goods and libertie; and that which afflicted them moſt was, that they had conceived too great hope of deliverance; howſoever they forbare not to continue a reſolute reſiſtance. Nevertheleſſe, the induſtry of *Trebonius* was ſuch, that with mantilets and other engines he approched a Towre, which he ſapped, and overthrew part of it: which ſo affrighted the *Marſeillians*, as they promiſed to yield themſelves ſo ſoon as *Ceſar* ſhould return, and deſired a truce till then: *Trebonius* granteth it; whoſe ſouldiers negligent of their guard upon confidence of the truce, on a very windy day the *Marſeillians* make a ſudden ſalley, and burn all the engines of the *Romanes*. *Trebonius* was but little diſcouraged for all this, and diligently repaireth them, whereby *Domitius* was forced to ſave himſelf by ſea, before *Ceſar's* arrivall, who (though the affairs of *Italy* called upon him) would not leave *Spain* untill it was all at his devotion. There onely remained *M. Varro*, who at firſt ſpake of *Ceſar* with great reſpect; but when he conceived his affairs ſtood doubtfull, he alienated himſelf and thoſe of his partie from him: in ſo much that after the defeat of *Afranius* and *Petreius* he found himſelf engaged to ſuſtein the warre. *Vinea.*

Corduba. But *Ceſar* having called an aſſembly at *Cordova*, all came thither to attend and acknowledge him, and divers towns forced from them *Varro's* garriſons: who found himſelf ſo farre forſaken, that of two Legions which he had, the one fell abſolutely from him, inſomuch that he was conſtrained to have recourſe to *Ceſars* mercy as well as the reſt. That done, he left *L. Caſſius Longinus* in *Spain*, and paſſeth to *Marſeilles*, which yieldeth to him; then goeth to *Rome*. At the ſame time *Curio* paſſeth from *Sicilia* into *Africk* with two Legions onely and five hundred horſe, encampeth himſelf in a place called *Cornelius camp*, near *Utica*, where *Petreius Accius Varus* had his camp; againſt whom he had an advantageous battel with his cavalry. Nevertheleſſe, upon ſome diſcourſes which one *S. Quintilius Varus* had with *Curio's* ſouldiers, there grew a panike fear amongſt them; which taken away by an oration he made unto them, he went and preſented battel, and beat *Varus* again, and drove him to retreat into *Utica*; where (with help of the ill will the inhabitants bore him) he put him hard to it; and underſtanding that king *Juba* was coming to relieve him, *Curio* retireth himſelf into his camp, with reſolution there to attend the coming of the reſt of his army which was in *Sicilie*. But having intelligence that king *Juba* came not in perſon, and that he onely ſent a weak ſupply under the cómand of *Saburra*, it cauſed him to change that ſo good a reſolution. Then puffed up with his former victorie, and having been more exerciſed in making orations to the people of *Rome* then in commanding their armies, he marcheth nigh and

and day to encounter this relief: his cavalrie in the night meeteth with ſome of the *Numidian* horſe, and beateth them. This ſucceſſe heighteneth him more and more, inſomuch that he marcheth as if he had purſued a victory; but thus wearied and in diſorder, he meeteth with a freſh and complete army, which defeateth him: whereupon he concludeth it his beſt courſe to expiate his raſhneſſe by his death, and ſo died a better ſouldier then commander.

Obſervations.

IT is a maxime held by all, and neglected by moſt, That in the time of truce there ought to be a better guard then at any other time. we have here a notable example thereof: Trebonius *by a marvellous labour had brought the* Marſeillians *to the laſt gaſp, when during the time of a truce (which out of pitie he had granted them) his ſouldiers ſo neglected their guards that they invited the enemie to their ruine, and he ſaw in one houre burnt what had coſt him the labour of many moneths. which ſhould teach us in warre never to ſlacken the ſeveritie of military diſcipline, though the ſouldiers grumble never ſo much: for you ought rather to content them by any other means then that; and when they ſhall ſee their commanders ſhare the dangers and labours of the warre with them, they will undergo them chearfully. For we may reade that by the exact obſervation of military diſcipline many commanders have ſurmounted great difficulties and obteined glorious victories, and that many others for diſregarding it have been ſhamefully defeated; but it hath never been read that the obſervation thereof hath been the cauſe of the loſſe of one battel or of the overthrow of any one enterpriſe.*

A great courage without experience is likelier to commit a great errour in warre then a more temperate one: for the firſt is uſually accompanied with preſumption, and is more incapable of counſel then the other; eſpecially when he hath made his entrie into armies by ſome happy ſucceſſe. Curio *is a fair example thereof, who of a* Tribune *of the people ſeeing himſelf a Generall of an armie,*

committed many errours, and those not ſmall ones: for after that he had the good hap to beat his enemies, to ſhut them up into Utica, *and upon the news of king* Juba *his coming to reſolve for the beſt, which was to retreat into his camp on the ſea-ſide, well fortified and well provided of munitions, there to attend the reſt of his armie; upon the firſt news that was brought him that the relief was weak, and that* Juba *was not there in perſon, without ſtaying for confirmation thereof, refuſing to adviſe with, or give credit to any, he croſſeth his firſt reſolution, and goeth to give them battel; after which his cavalrie meeting with ſome of* Juba's *horſe, of which foure were brought priſoners to him, he aſked who commanded them; they anſwering that it was* Saburra, *he preſuppoſeth that* Juba *was not there; ſo confirmeth himſelf in the firſt errour, and marcheth ſo faſt and ſo farre as that he findeth himſelf five and twentie miles from his camp, in a countrey which he knew not, with part of his forces (the reſt not being able to follow) much hurried and in diſorder: which was the cauſe that* Juba *eaſily defeated them. Which ſheweth us plainly, that neither a great courage alone maketh a good commander (however it helpeth well thereto) nor the reading of books, nor abilitie of diſcourſe; but it muſt be attained by long experience, and the being preſent at many overthrows as well as victories: for he that hath not had his ſhare therein, is not able to imagine what belongeth thereto, the braveſt ſouldiers ſometimes doing the pooreſt actions, as it happened here; where (though the reſidue of this armie was retreated into a well-fortified camp, and not aſſaulted, yet theſe imbarked themſelves ſo confuſedly and diſorderly as that a great part of them were drowned. Therefore I conclude that it is much better to make leſſe haſte and to know whither to go then to be forced ſhamefully to run away or periſh.*

The III. Book.

Ceſar being choſen Dictatour provideth for the affairs of the city of *Rome*, cauſeth himſelf to be publiſhed *Conſul* with *P. Servilius*, giveth over his dictatourſhip at the end of eleven daies, and after imbarketh himſelf at *Brunduſium*, whi-

whither he had ſent ſeven legions to attend him; but found not ſhipping enough for half his army; inſomuch that he was conſtrained to paſſe over with fifteen thouſand foot and five hundred horſe, leaving *Marcus Antonius* there with the reſt, to whom he promiſeth to ſend back the ſhipping. *Pompey* (who had all the yeare to prepare himſelf) had gathered together great ſtore of men, victuall, and ſhipping, ſo that *Ceſar* paſſed over not without trouble and danger; and inſtantly ſent back his veſſels to *Antonie*: but *Bibulus*, chief Commander of all *Pompey's* navie, took a ſquadron of thirty of them, which he fired, and put to death all the mariners to the end to deterre the reſt from undertaking that paſſage; and did ſo obſtinately continue his deſigne (notwithſtanding the winter-ſeaſon) as that he hindred *Antonie* from paſſing over. At the ſame time *M. Octavius* (*Pompey's* Lieutenant) beſiegeth *Salones* in *Dalmatia*, which defendeth it ſelf ſo couragiouſly as (without help of any) it compelleth him to raiſe his ſiege, and by a ſallie beateth him ſhamfully from thence; from whence he retireth to *Pompey* at *Durazzo*. *Dyrrachium.* On the other ſide, *Ceſar* having poſſeſſed himſelf of divers towns upon the ſhore, hindred him alſo from refreſhing himſelf. At laſt *Bibulus* dieth: and the ſea not being ſo exactly guarded, *Antonie* paſſeth over; where the winds ſo favour the good fortune of *Ceſar*, as that they change in the juſt inſtant to put his navie into ſafetie, & to caſt away that which purſued it. This news coming both to him and to *Pompey* at one and the ſame inſtant, (becauſe they were encamped near each other) the one goeth to joyn himſelf to

Antony, which he doeth; and the other to oppoſe him; which though he might have done, yet re-
Aſparagus. turneth to encamp himſelf at *Aſperagne*, belonging to the territory of *Durrazo*, and ſendeth to *Scipio* to bring his forces, and joyn with him. *Ceſar*, ſeing that the warre was like to be drawn out at length, ſendeth part of his army into *Macedonia* and *Theſſaly* to make proviſion of corn; becauſe that *Pompey* having the command of the ſea, he was to expect none from out of *Italy*. But *Scipio* in his paſſage meeting (at the ſame time) with an opportunitie, thought to have cut in pieces *L. C. Longinus*, with ſome of *Ceſars* legions; which he had done had not *M. Favonius* (whom he had left to guard his baggage with eight cohorts) ſent to him that unleſſe he made haſt to relieve him, *Domitius* was coming to defeat him: So he deſiſted from that purpoſe, and arrived oportunely for the relief of *Favonius*. At the ſame time young *Pompey* having underſtood that *Ceſar* (now the third time) was ſending his ſhipping to *Brunduſium*, and having left ſome few at *Oricum* under the charge of *Caninius*, with three cohorts he came and aſſailed them, and either took or fired them all. That done, *Ceſar* goeth and encampeth himſelf between *Durazzo* and *Pompeys* camp, to hinder him the benefit of *Durazzo*: but *Pompey* encamped at a place called *Petra* on the ſea-ſide, where being a ſmall haven, by means of his ſhipping he receiveth ſome benefit by it. Then *Ceſar* attempteth to encloſe him by trenches, and *Pompey* by other trenches enlargeth himſelf as much as poſſibly he could; who finding himſelf the ſtronger in forces aſſaileth the trenches, and in two

two encounters had the beſt ont, and hoped to have defeated him. *Ceſar*, not being able to abide here longer, retreateth towards *Apollonia* and *Oricum*, where having muſtered his army, and taken order for thoſe two places, he paſſeth into *Theſſaly* to joyn with *Domitius* his armie. *Pompey* followeth him, who alſo joyneth *Scipio's* forces to his own. The two armies (whereon the deciſion of the whole *Romane* Empire depended) encamp themſelves in ſight of each other. *Ceſar* ſought all occaſions to fight, and *Pompey* evaded them; at laſt he ſuffered himſelf to be overruled, firſt by the revilings of his ſouldiers, and afterward by the valour of *Ceſar*, who purſued him ſo fiercely after the victory of the battel of *Pharſale*, as he gave him no leiſure to rally his forces, arriving in *Egypt* almoſt aſſoon as himſelf, where king *Ptolomee*, violating the right of hoſpitality, & forgetting the benefits which his father had received from *Pompey*, cauſed him to be murdered, thinking by this wicked act to gain the victours favour; who revenged it, as we ſhall ſee in the book following. At the ſame time *Caſſius* Generall of the forces of *Syria*, *Phenicia*, and *Cilicia* ſet on fire the ſhipping which *Pomponius* kept in the port of *Meſſina*; and *Lalius* took a little iſland before the port of *Brundiſium*, as *Libo* had done in former times. But the news of *Pompey's* defeat overthrew all the deſignes of the Lieutenants. *Pharſalia.*

Obſervations.

IF the clemency and liberality of Ceſar *be ſo much recommended in all the courſe of his life, it ſeemeth that in this civil warre he hath out-done himſelf. To refuſe to defeat*

whole and intire armies in Spain *by the ſword, and having reduced them to yield to his mercy, to let them go with their Commanders, not ſo much as binding them from making war againſt him any more: To ſatiſfie his enemies their ſtipends, whileſt he borroweth money of his captains to pay his own ſouldiers; reſtoring to* Domitius Ænobarbus *a hundred and fifty thouſand crowns at a clap, which* Pompey *had given him out of the publick treaſury to make warre againſt him: To releaſe all the priſoners he took without ranſome, and even to cauſe all to be reſtored which belonged unto them, whileſt* Bibulus, Labienus, *and others, put to the ſword as many of his as they could take; are actions in my obſervation rather to be admired then like to be imitated, eſpecially in an age whoſe practice is much contrary to this generoſity, and even to that which he uſed in* Gallia: *where (ſometimes) he practiced great ſeverity. Therefore ſearching into the reaſons which cauſed in him this blind clemency, who ſeemed cruel to his own, I conceive we ought to diſtinguiſh the deſignes. In* Gallia *he was a conquerour, in ſuch ſort as when they abuſed his firſt and extraordinary clemency, he uſed ſeverity; to keep thoſe in aw through fear which by affability could not be made pliant. But here is a civil warre, wherein (under pretext of maintaining the libertie of the people) he intendeth to bring both people and Senate into ſubjection. For this end he depreſſeth all paſſions to attein the height of his deſignes. The more cruel his enemies are towards him, the leſſe he ſpareth them: inſomuch that they which make warre againſt him, fear him not but in battel, and not deſpairing of pardon, become the more inclinable to yield upon the firſt reverſe of fortune which befalleth them. It is not ſo in a civil warre, which we make not but for the defenſe of our perſon or religion: for then having no deſigne to poſſeſſe your ſelf of the State, you are obliged to repell cruelty by cruelty, otherwiſe you ſhould find none to take part with you. But when you fight for rule and domination, you muſt (to attein it) appear ſuch a one as that they may not ſuſpect either revenge or cruelty in you, and that they believe you to abound in liberality and all other ſorts of vertues: for no man at any time deſireth change of condition, but to better his own. So by this liberall reſolution and clemency, not continuing his Dictatouſſhip above eleven dayes, doing nothing but by the uſuall order, alwayes juſtifying his actions as a Protectour of the Common-wealth, ſhewing himſelf ſo much*

the

the more affectionated to peace by how much Pompey held off from it, that ſo he might the eaſilier work the indignation of his citizens and ſouldiers againſt him, and by that means go the better through with the warres, he attained the end of the higheſt and moſt glorious deſigne that ever was undertaken by man.

Ceſar having drawn all his forces together, attempteth to fight with Pompey: and not being able to draw him to it, he undertaketh a high deſigne, namely, to beſiege him in his camp, though he were the weaker of the two. This was near Durazzo, where he goeth about to cloſe him with trenches, helping himſelf with the advantage of little hills of difficult acceſſe, which in my opinion induced him to this deſigne. The reaſons which he alleadgeth are, that being weak in cavalry, and wanting corn, he could not get it if Pompey's horſe were at liberty: from which he ſhould alſo take away the benefit of forraging, and render it unprofitable to all the offices of war. Beſides, it was a way to diminiſh the reputation of Pompey throughout the whole Empire, and encreaſe his own, when it ſhould be reported that Ceſar kept him beſieged, and that he durſt not fight with him: a matter of great conſequence, for that men uſually turn to that ſide which is ſtrongeſt. On the other ſide, Pompey, being unwilling to quit the ſea-ſide or Durazzo where he had made his Arcenall & Magazine, reſolveth not to budge: and ſeeing that his cavalry might ſuffer too much if it were hindred from forrage, he maketh an incloſure of trenches of fifteen miles compaſſe on his ſide. So both Generalls omit nothing that maketh for their deſignes. In the end Pompey finding himſelf diſcommodated by being thus cooped up, ſetteth upon one of the angles of Ceſars trenches; where he had ſuch advantage in two encounters which fell both in a day, that Ceſar confeſſed, if he had known how to have proſecuted his victory he had defeated him. By this may be ſeen how neceſſary retrenchments are, & how by means thereof may be prevented to fight with an army one is fearfull of: one may alſo reaſſure affrighted forces, and famiſh a more potent army then ones own. For the art of warre conſiſteth principally in not fighting but when men are willing; and to this end you muſt take good order for your victuall, you muſt well exerciſe your ſouldiers in the uſe of their arms, and in the obſervation of all orders, and know very well how to make their retrenchments. And if Ceſar had had to do with any but Pompey, who ſhut himſelf up from the very begin-

ning,

ning, he had either ruined his army, or elſe compelled him to fight.

Ceſar ſeeing that he could not continue Pompey longer in that ſtrait, nor ſtay ſo near him without a great diſcommodity for want of victuall, he undertaketh to make a long retreat and for many dayes. To this end he cauſeth all the baggage to be ſent away over-night with one legion, about midnight all the reſt of his army ſaving two legions, and his cavalry (wherewith himſelf marched) at break of day. Pompey followeth him with all diligence, finding him quartered where he had been encamped before, and lodgeth himſelf alſo within his own old camp cloſe by him. But upon Ceſars making ſhew of ſending his cavalry to forrage (cauſing them to return ſecretly into the camp again) Pompey ſendeth out his horſe to the ſame purpoſe in good earneſt; and then alſo the greateſt part of his ſouldiers being returned to their old camp to look for baggage which they had left behind them, Ceſar departeth ſuddenly in the ſame order as the day before. Inſomuch that Pompey, not being able to purſue him for the preſent, & he continually marching by great journeys in the ſame order, leaving him no poſſible means to overtake him, at the end of foure dayes gave over his purſuit. This is a fair leſſon to teach us how dangerous it is for armies to retreat in view of an enemy; beſides, how careſully we ought to avoid fighting when we retreat, and what order ought to be given that we be not peſtered with the baggage; and that alſo a retreat is better made with a part of the army then with the whole. For if Ceſar were afraid to retreat in the view of Pompey, with an army ſo well exerciſed and accuſtomed to overcome, being redoubted by Pompey himſelf; what ſhould then the captains of theſe times do, which command armies newly levied, without order, without obedience, overlaid with baggage, the ſouldiers not knowing how to uſe their arms, nor the captains themſelves to teach them? Yet nevertheleſſe they would think it a blemiſh to their honour to make a private retreat. Certainly preſumption and ignorance are two bad counſellers in warre.

At the battel of Pharſalia Pompey was twice as ſtrong as Ceſar, eſpecially in cavalry, whereupon he principally grounded his victory; but he had not an army ſo well diſciplined nor ſo exerciſed to fight as Ceſar had: inſomuch that fearing that if his gave the charge they would doit diſorderly, he commanded them to attend the giving on of the enemy, with charge not to ſtirre from their places. Ceſar, diſliking that courſe, commanded

commanded his ſouldiers to give on upon the adverſe army, alledging that this exciteth the courage of ſouldiers to play the men, which ought rather to be increaſed then abated, not diſapproving the ancient cuſtome of beginning the fight with a generall ſhout. And experience teacheth us that in all actions of warre, he which giveth the charge redoubleth his courage, and he which is charged diminiſheth his.

Touching Pompey's order of battel; Having a river on his right hand, he placed all his horſe on the left, promiſing to himſelf that after he had repulſed Ceſars cavalry, he ſhould encloſe his army. Ceſar, judging his cavalry not of ſufficient ſtrength to reſiſt that of Pompey, ſtrengtheneth it by foot, which were fitted for that purpoſe, and mingled amongſt them. Beſides that, he taketh from every battalion one troup, whereof he compoſed a battalion to be as a reſerve, which he placeth without the ranks of the three orders of infantery, and commandeth them not to ſtirre to the conflict untill he appointed: ſo that when Pompey's horſe had repulſed Ceſars (which they could not do without putting themſelves into diſorder) they met with this battalion, which put them to a ſudden ſtop, and afterward to ſhew their backs, and wholly to abandon the left wing of Pompey's army, by which means Ceſar following his advantage eaſily putteth all the reſt to rout. Whereupon we ought to obſerve two things: the one, That we ought never to hazard all our troups upon one onely charge, but make a reſerve of the one to relieve the other: and the other, That we ought ſo well to obſerve the diſtances or intervalls, as well to the flanks as the rear; that the firſt troups happening to be reverſed, they reverſe not thoſe which ſhould relieve them; but to leave them a convenient ſpace to fall back, and to rally themſelves again in the rear.

If Ceſar knew how to conquer, he knew better how to proſecute and make his benefit thereof, but in none like to this of Pharſalia; where he contented not himſelf to force the camp, to beſiege the reſt of the army on a hill whither they retired, nor to purſue Pompey's perſon certain dayes journeys, but with three or foure thouſand men onely followed him ſo cloſe both by ſea and land, that he found him dead in Egypt, where he arrived almoſt aſſoon as the other; never giving him leiſure to recollect himſelf, or reinforce his troups. Which ſerveth to teach us to make uſe of occaſion when it offereth it ſelf favourable unto us, & not to deferre that to another time which may be preſently executed: for the affairs of the world are ſubjeſt

ſelf to great revolutions. And the affairs which Ceſar yet had after the death of Pompey *give us occaſion enough to judge, that if (in imitation of many great perſonages) he had gathered the fruits of his victories before they had been ripe, or taſted of repoſe before he had been ſecured, he might full well have repented thereof.*

Of the *Alexandrine* warre

written by *Aulus Hircius*, or *Oppius*.

The IIII. Book.

AS ſoon as *Ceſar* was arrived in *Alexandria* with three thouſand two hundred foot, eight hundred horſe, ten *Rhodian* galleys, and ſome ſhips of *Aſia*, he underſtood of the death of *Pompey*; and upon the bad quarter he perceived was between the ſouldiers of *Pompey* and the people of the city he ſent for new Legions into *Aſia*. Mean time he required to be informed of the teſtament of the late king *Ptolemee*, who had made the people of *Rome* his executours; and to this end ordained that *Ptolemee* the eldeſt ſon & *Cleopatra* the eldeſt daughter ſhould diſcharge their army, & come to him to give an account of their rights. But *Ptolemee's* Counſel did not approve of this way of accommodation, and underhand ſendeth for his troups which were at *Peluſium*, under the command of *Achillas:* whereof *Ceſar* being advertiſed, and that the King himſelf had intelligence with the ſaid *Achillas*, he deteineth him, and prepareth for defenſe: he giveth them the repulſe at their firſt approch, then cantons himſelf in one part of the city and the reſt in the other part. *Arſinoe* the Kings ſecond

cond ſiſter cauſeth *Achillas* to be ſlain, putteth *Ganymedes* into his place, and poſſeſſeth her ſelf of the authoritie, who continuing the former deſigne putteth *Ceſar* to great extremities, infecting his freſh waters; which he readily remedied by digging great ſtore of pits. He alſo ſendeth for ſouldiers, ſhips, and arms from all parts; and upon the news which he received that the thirty ſeventh Legion with great proviſions of victuall and arms was arrived on the coaſt of *Africa*, but could not get to him by reaſon of contrary winds, he putteth himſelf alone into a ſhip, taketh all his ſhipping with his mariners onely, and putteth to ſea in the very face of them. The enemies, knowing him to be without ſouldiers, aſſail him; he beateth them, and without other relief getteth to his legi...; then returneth to *Alexandria*. This firſt conflict affrighted the *Alexandrians*; nevertheleſſe they make their naval army ſtronger then ever, which *Ceſar* defeateth the ſecond time; where *Euphranor* Captain of the *Rhodian* galleys behaved himſelf very bravely. There is an iſle before the haven of *Alexandria* built and inhabited, which ſheltreth the town, and is joyned to the city by the peer, which is 900 paces long and 60 broad, upon which there were two forts. *Ceſar* thinketh it neceſſarie to take this iſle, that ſo he may have the ſea at liberty. He taketh it, then taketh one of the forts of the peer: but at the other he had a hot skirmiſh, and was repulſed with ſo great diſorder as not being able to hinder the ſouldiers from caſting themſelves abord, he ſaveth himſelf by ſwimming rather then to periſh. The *Alexandrians*, aſtoniſhed by theſe brunts, betake them to their

their ſubtilties, demand of *Ceſar* their King, who delivereth him to them, hoping it would be a means to facilitate agreement. Whileſt theſe things were in agitation *Mithridates* a *Pergamenian*, a man of high deſcent, a great ſouldier, of great valour and moſt faithfull to *Ceſar*, arriveth to his relief with goodly forces, taketh *Peluſium* in his way, & cometh to paſſe the *Nile* at a place called *Delta*. Whereof *Ptolemee* being advertiſed goeth in perſon to oppoſe him; and *Ceſar* on the other ſide goeth to relieve *Mithridates*, who, before the arrivall of either of them, had already encountred with and beaten *Ptolemee's* forces; and *Ceſar* alſo before he could come to *Mithridates* had defeated others. After which he goeth and aſſaulteth a ſmall fort which was between his camp and that of *Ptolemee's*, which he taketh; and the day after he aſſaileth the camp, which he alſo forceth; and the King attempting to ſave himſelf by water, is drowned. After which returning victorious to *Alexandria*, all ſubmit to him. Mean time the provinces of the Empire reſted not quiet. *Domitius Calvinus Ceſars* Lieutenant was defeated by *Pharnaces*, who poſſeſſed himſelf of the kingdome of *Pontus*. In *Illyricum Gabinius Ceſars* Lieutenant was defeated, and died at *Salona*: And *Octavius* one of *Pompey's* party, intending to poſſeſſe himſelf of that province, found *Corniſicius* to oppoſe him in that deſigne. So did *Vatinius*; who being at *Brundiſium* and hearing this news putteth to ſea, meeteth *Octavius*, giveth him battel and defeateth him in *Spain*. *Caſſius Longinus*, whom *Ceſar* had left there, had made himſelf hateful through his covetouſneſſe as well to thoſe of the

the countrey as his own ſouldiers. They combine againſt him and ſorely wound him, and believing him dead each one diſcovereth his joy: he recovering rigourouſly puniſheth the conſpiratours; nevertheleſſe that hindred not the revolt of his army. And as he thought to have remedied it in one place it breaketh out in another, and by a generall conſent they chooſe *Marcellus* for their commander, who incamped himſelf beneath *Cordova*, which was at his devotion. *Longinus* ſendeth to deſire aid of the King *Boguld*, who ſendeth him a great recrute: nevertheleſſe *Marcellus* mainteineth himſelf without fighting; and *Lepidus* coming with freſh forces to labour a reconciliation between them, *Longinus* miſtruſteth him, and withdraweth himſelf from them; but upon the approch of *Trebonius* his ſucceſſour in the government, he imbarked for *Africa* where *Ceſar* had deſigned him, and was drowned at the mouth of the river *Iberus*. Let us return to *Ceſar*: who though he were much preſſed to viſit *Rome*, yet would he firſt revenge the defeat of *Domitius*; he departeth from *Egypt* with the ſixth Legion onely, leaving the reſt of his army for the guard of that kingdome: and with thoſe forces which he gathereth together in *Aſia* he giveth battel to *Pharnaces*, defeateth him, taketh from him what he had poſſeſſed himſelf of, and giveth the kingdome of *Boſporus* to *Mithridates* the *Pergamenian* as a recompenſe for the good ſervice he had done him in the *Alexandrian* warre: then triumphantly after ſo many victories he returneth to *Rome*.

Obſer-

Obſervations.

OF all the warres which Ceſar hath made I find not one leſſe neceſſary, more dangerous, and wherein he hath ſhewed leſſe foreſight then in this. For having underſtood the death of Pompey at Alexandria, to ſet downe there with three or foure thouſand men, and in this weake eſtate to attempt to force a young king to make reſtitution of part of his kingdome in favour of his ſiſter Cleopatra, was an argument that he truſted much to his good fortune, or was very amorous. But as this beginning was much ſhort of his ordinary prudence, ſo the progreſſe and the end thereof ſurpaſſeth all his other actions; and it ſeemeth that he hath not here erred but to make his vertues ſhine ſo much the brighter. This hath been a warre without rule: for he hath been put to defend croſſe wayes of ſtreets, and to barricado himſelf there, to diſpute the one half of the town againſt the other, to remedy unthought of accidents, to reaſſure his ſouldiers, to fight with a navall army without ſouldiers, and to beat them; and, as if he were fallen into another world, to make a warre after a new manner. Which ſheweth that he excelled in three things principally; namely, that he was never left hopeleſſe, that he was of great experience, and that he confounded not himſelf in his commands.

This warre finiſhed, he goeth againſt Pharnaces; wherein we will onely obſerve two things: the firſt, that howſoever he deſired to finiſh this war ſpeedily, becauſe his buſineſſe required him elſewhere, yet he goeth not to aſſault him raſhly, but alwayes beginneth by encamping himſelf ſtrongly; then (having left his baggage in ſafetie) he goeth with all his armie to make another camp near to Pharnaces, leaving a great valley between both; to the end that if he would hinder him from fortifying there, and aſſault him, he could not get to him without great diſadvantage. The other is to ſhew the advantage which he hath that aſſaileth: for Ceſar himſelf obſerveth, that though Pharnaces aſſaulted him raſhly, yet his ſouldiers were ſtruck with fear, and put into ſome diſorder upon their firſt approch. Which may ſerve to confirm that he which aſſaileth hath a great advantage, and that there is nothing more neceſſary in warre then retrenchments.

Of

Of the *Africane* war, written by *Aulus Hirtius*, or *Oppius*.

The V. Book.

THe broken forces of *Pompey's* partie being rallied in *Africa* under *Scipio*, *Cato*, and king *Juba*, *Ceſar* goeth thither in the moneth of December, and arriveth there at the beginning with no more then onely three thouſand foot and ſome few horſe. He preſenteth himſelf before *Adrumetum*, but *Conſidius* ſeeing him ſo weak ſtandeth upon his guard: and *Ceſar* in his retreat was aſſaulted by a ſally from the town, and by the horſe which were come to their aid, which he repulſeth: where it was obſerved that thirtie *French* horſemen put above two thouſand *Moors* to the recoil. The fame of his arrivall opened the gates of many cities and caſtles, which furniſhed him with victuall. He made choice of the ſite of *Ruſpina* to encamp himſelf, and there to expect the reſt of his armie; but not having patience to attend, he goeth to the port, imbarketh himſelf, and goeth to find them out; and as he was about to hoiſe ſail a good part of them arrive. After that he goeth with thirty cohorts to look about for corn, and in the way meeteth with *Labienus*, with whom he had a great skirmiſh, and had the beſt on't, and ſo retired himſelf into his camp, which he fortified more then ever, becauſe he found himſelf weak. He drew two trenches from the town to the port for his better ſecuritie: then he diſpatcheth into *Sicilia*, *Sardinia* and *Italy*, for

ſupplies of men and corn. On the other ſide *Scipio* and *Cato*, deſirous to fight with him before he ſhould gather more ſtrength, haſten *Juba* to come with his armie: but he, being on his march towards them, is conſtrained to turn back the ſame way he came, by reaſon that *P. Sitius Ceſars* Lieutenant, and king *Bogud* aſſaulted his kingdome. Mean time *Labienus* joyneth with *Scipio*; they come and encamp near *Ceſar*: both ſides attempt to take advantages, and divers skirmiſhes paſſe between them, yet without hazarding a battel. *Ceſars* neceſſities increaſed dayly, which he ſupported with great conſtancy, and onely mainteined the hopes of his own ſide by chearfull words and looks: he diſpatcheth others to haſten his troups and victuall: ſome of his ſhips are caſt away; and hearing that others were chaced even into the port of *Leptis*, he poſteth thither with all ſpeed poſſible, imbarketh, and with what he could there gather together goeth and relieveth his men, chaceth his enemies, taketh ſome of their ſhips, and recovereth his own which were taken. At laſt his troups come from divers parts, he beginneth with purging his army of ſome ſeditious perſons and libertines; then reſolveth upon a definitive battel. To this end he goeth and encampeth before *Thapſus*, which he environeth with trenches, not doubting but *Scipio* would come and relieve the town: who having cauſed king *Juba* to return again, they come and encamp neat *Ceſar* in three ſeverall camps. And there was the battel fought, which *Ceſar* gained with loſſe of fiftie ſouldiers onely, and ſome few hurt: but on the other ſide were ten thouſand

ſlain

ſlain, and the three camps taken. *Thapſus* on the report of this victory was yielded to *C. Rebilius*, *Cato* ſeeing he could not prevail with his men to reſolve to defend themſelves killeth himſelf. *Utica* openeth her gates to the Victour: *Adrumetum* doth the like. *Zama* ſhutteth hers againſt her conquered king, and calleth in *Cæſar*: all the reſt of *Juba* his kingdome revolteth: he and *Petreius* kill each other through deſpair. *Sitius* having defeated and killed *Saburra Juba's* Lieutenant, and coming to *Ceſar*, meeteth with *Afranius* and *Fauſtus Sylla*, which were going for *Spain*: theſe he defeateth and taketh priſoners, who afterwards in an uprore were both ſlain. *Scipio* and divers *Senatours*, having imbarked themſelves for *Spain*, were by a tempeſt caſt amongſt *Sitius* his fleet, where all periſhed or killed themſelves. This was the ſequele of that battel, wherein all things concurred (as if by conſent) to ſmooth the way to *Cæſars* abſolute victory, who pardoned all that had recourſe unto his clemencie, and after that returned to *Rome*.

Obſervations.

CEſar hath done three things in this warre which came near to raſhneſſe: the firſt, to paſſe into Africa in the dead of winter with a ſmall force, not having any aſſured port there, for which cauſe he was not able to appoint any Rendes-vous *for his ſhipping; which thing was imputed him as a want of foreſight. Neverthleſſe after his paſſage his manner of proceeding was altogether admirable: He maketh choice to encamp himſelf near the citie* Ruſpina, *which was within half a league of the port, which he joyneth to the citie and his camp, and fortifieth it exceedingly: for from thence he had one foot on land and the other on the Sea, and could (as occaſions ſhould require)*

all by either ſea or land, and be ſecured from being ſhut up, whatſoever ſhould befall. This is a good leſſon for ſuch as enterpriſe upon a forrein countrey, being weak at the beginning: for in this poſture great attempts may be withſtood, and in all extremitie a good retreat may be made. The ſecond, to leave his army near Ruſpina, *and without giving knowledge to any man to caſt himſelf aboard to go ſeek his ſhipping. And the third, having news of the defeat of his fleet, to leave his camp, to haſten in full carier to* Leptis, *to caſt himſelf into a ſhip, and to rally others, and aſſault the enemies: and although he periſhed in none of them, there can be nothing ſaid in his defenſe, but that he truſted wholly to his good fortune, and that he never was wearied or diſheartned in the moſt dangerous or laborious deſignes.*

It is obſervable that Ceſar *in all his warres hath alwayes been inferiour to his enemies in number; for which cauſe he hath alwayes helped himſelf by fortifications, more then ever any other hath done, which he made much the better when he found himſelf not ſufficiently ſtrong to give battel, as he was a long time in* Africa; *inſomuch that* Scipio *himſelf wondered at his coldneſſe: nevertheleſſe he alwayes continued his ſouldiers in exerciſe, and himſelf exerciſed new-levied men, and entred them by ſmall ſkirmiſhes, wherein by his induſtry for the moſt part he had the beſt; and alwayes attempted ſomething upon his enemy. which is an excellent maxime to give courage to your ſouldiers, and ſecure you from being ſurpriſed.*

The *Spaniſh* warre againſt *Pompey's* ſonnes.

The VI. Book.

THe reliques of the *Africane* troups reaſſemble themſelves once more in *Spain* under *Cneus* and *Sextus*, the ſonnes of *Pompey*. *Ceſar* goeth thither: He findeth the one laying ſiege to *Ulla*, and the other in *Cordova*. He ſendeth relief into the firſt, and goeth and encampeth himſelf

ſelf before the other: which inforceth *Cneus* to quit his ſiege to relieve his brother. Some skirmiſhes paſſed between both armies; but *Ceſar*, not being able to draw his enemy to battel, goeth and beſiegeth *Ategua*, and after a bold reſiſtance he taketh it in view of *Cneus*. Afterwards both armies had divers encounters and combats, but to little purpoſe: at laſt they encamp themſelves in a champain near *Munda*, both reſolving not to refuſe battel: nevertheleſſe *Cneus* took a high and advantageous ground for his field of battel, where *Ceſar* making difficultie to aſſail him was put upon it by the fury of his ſouldiers. The fight was long and doubtfull, even by his own confeſſion, and with much ado he got the victory, which was bloudy. Thirtie thouſand on *Pompey's* part died upon the place, and a thouſand on *Ceſars*: they which ſaved themſelves into *Munda* were conſtrained to yield themſelves. *Sextus Pompeius* abandoneth *Cordova*: *Cneus* is ſwiftly purſued, overtaken and killed. All places yield themſelves to the victour. This was *Ceſars* laſt battel, and the deadly wound to *Pompey's* party.

The military order of the *Grecians:*

and particularly of their *Phalanx.*

THe order of the *Grecians* is but obſcurely to be found amongſt their authours, becauſe the moſt part of the books which they have written thereof are loſt, and none have come to our hands but fragments, ſo that it is hard to collect it very exactly. The *Phalanx* was formed after this manner.

Zugos, Jugum, ſignifieth two men in front, and more joyned together make a rank; and ſo the word is often taken.

Stichos, Verſus, ſignifieth two men one behind the other, and more behind each other make a file; and *verſus* is often taken for a file.

Lochos, Decuria, ſignifieth a file, which the *Grecians* made of ſeverall depths, but never exceeded the number of ſixteen, as being ſufficient to ſuſtein the violenteſt charge: conceiving that to give a greater depth to their *Phalanx* was but to imploy men unprofitably; and that it was better to extend the battalia into breadth, to prevent overwinging, and ſo to be charged on the flanks, or elſe by this means to overwing the enemie, then to give ſo great a depth to their *Phalanx.*

The *Phalanx* was compounded of *hoplita* onely (that is, heavie-armed) with *ſariſſas* (that

(that is, long pikes) and their bucklers: for the archers, ſlingers, and other caſting-weapons had their orders apart.

In a *Lochos* or file of 16 men, there were five which had command; namely, the firſt, fifth, ninth, thirteenth, and ſixteenth; as we may ſee by the figure following, and their names.

The firſt figure.

Lochagos - - - o - - - o - - - - - - - - *File-leader.*
1. *Enomotarcha* - - - - o
2. *Enomotarcha* - - - - o - - - - *Half-file-leader.*
3. *Enomotarcha* - - - - o
Uragos - - - - - - - o - - - - - - - - *Bringer-up.*

They made the moſt valiant the File-leader, and the moſt prudent the Bringer up.

Now to begin their order; They joyned two files together, which made 32 ſouldiers; & thoſe two files ſo joyned they called *Dilochia*, and the Commander of theſe two files they called *Dilochites.*

Then they doubled the number of thoſe two files, which made foure files and 64 ſouldiers; and this troup they called *Tetrarchia*, which had a Commander called *Tetrarcha.*

After that they doubled the number of theſe, which made eight files and 128 ſouldiers; and this body was called *Taxiarchia*, and their Commander *Taxiarcha.*

Then they doubled thoſe eight files, ſo made them 16: and this body was called *Syntagma*, and the Commander of this body was called *Syntagmatarcha.*

To this body they appointed five generall officers: An Enſigne, a Lieutenant, a Trumpeter, (for they had no Drumme) a Cryer, and a Sergeant.

The Enſigne was placed in the middle of the firſt rank, as all will appear by the figure following.

The ſecond figure.

The *Phalanx* was compoſed of ſixteen bodies, like to the foregoing figure.

This body of 16 files they doubled, which made 32 files, and called it *Pentacoſiarchia*, and the Commander of it *Pentacoſiarcha*.

Then

Then theſe 32 files they doubled, which made 64; and this body they called *Chiliarchia*, and the Commander *Chiliarcha*.

Theſe 64 files being doubled made 128 files, and were called *Merarchia*, and their Commander *Merarcha*.

And 128 files being doubled make 256, called *Phalangia*, and the Commander *Phalangiarchos*; ſo that the *Phalanx* is compoſed of 4096 ſouldiers, and of one *Phalangiarchos*, which commanded in chief, two *Merarchas*, foure *Chiliarchas*, eight *Pentacoſiarchas*, 16 *Syntagmatarchas*, 32 *Taxiarchas*, 64 *Tetrarchas*, and 128 *Dilochites*, as the next figure ſheweth.

The third figure.



Now according to the ability of their Commonwealths they augmented this army by doubling the *Phalanx*, which was called *Diphalangarchia*, and the Commander *Diphalangarcha*: or by doubling the *Diphalangarchia*, and this they called *Tetraphalangarchia*, and the Commander *Tetraphalangarchos*: who then was the higheſt Commander: And this they held to be a complete army, which afterward hath been called a *Phalanx*. Nevertheleſſe it was alwayes divided into foure bodies as foure *Phalanges*, and was compoſed of 16384 ſouldiers.

The

The fourth figure.



This is the order of the Grecian *phalanx* for the heavy-armed, called *hoplitæ*, namely, of pikes and targets; which took up (allowing six foot for each souldier, and without accounting the three intervalls) six thousand one hundred fourty foure foot in breadth, and ninetie six foot in depth.

To this army they joyned half that number of light-armed souldiers, called *Psyllagi*, which fought from afarre off with flying and casting-weapons, and were ordered into battalia behind the *Phalanx* in equall front (but that their files were but eight deep) in the same order, and with the same officers: And when they were to begin the battel, they passed through the intervalls and assailed the enemy; when the armies were drawn so near each other as to come to the shock, they retreated by the same intervalls into their places behind the heavy-armed, and over their heads poured a showre of stones, darts, and arrows upon their enemies, and fortified the depth of the Phalanx to sustein the shock, being now of 24 men in depth.

The

The fifth figure.



Concerning the cavalrie, they alwayes placed them on the wings: and whether it were the cavalrie or the infantery, they changed the form of their order according to the site of the places, or to the number of the enemies forces with whom they had to do, or to the order wherein they were ranged into battalia, enlarging the front by leſſening the depth, & doubling their front by the half files, as *Cyrus* did in the battel which he fought againſt *Creſus*; for fearing to be overwinged, he made his files (which were 24 deep) but 12, and ſo augmented the front of his army by the one half.

Beſides they made uſe of ſeverall orders of battalia according to occaſions; as the Orb, and the light-armed in the middle, to ſuſtein a ſtrong charge on all parts; or the Wedge, the better to enter into a battalion; or a Half-moon to encloſe or overwing; and others, which are of no great uſe in theſe times.

And that they might not confound themſelves in ſuch orders when occaſions ſerved, they had publick Schools, where all the younger ſort of men went to exerciſe themſelves, which they called *Gymnaſia*, and had Maſters to teach the uſe of arms and motions, called *Tactici*. Now to perform all the motions they allowed to every ſouldier ſix foot of ground ſquare; and for fight, three foot; and to ſuſtein a violent charge they

they ſerried them ſo as they took up but a foot and a half.

By this means it was that ſo many ſmall Commonwealths of the *Grecians* mainteined their liberties ſo long, & have performed ſo brave actions, having repulſed ſo great armies with ſo ſmall forces, and having even planted their tropheys in *Aſia* and elſewhere; untill their diviſions overthrew them: which *Philip* dextrouſly laying hold on brought them to ſubjection; and after that, *Alexander* his ſonne with them and their *Militia* conquered a great part of the world.

It is true indeed that the conſtitution of thoſe Commonwealths was more proper for a happy mainteining of their liberty then to encreaſe themſelves: for howſoever they all addicted themſelves to arms, ſo that none were exempted from them, yet their poverty, and the ſmall number of ſouldiers of every Commonwealth apart by it ſelf, hindred them from making any great progreſſe; ſo did their diviſions; it being a hard matter that ſo many ſovereigne Commonwealths ſhould agree together, unleſſe it were in a common neceſſity, to defend themſelves, as they did divers times againſt the *Perſians*; but not for a conqueſt, where men cannot agree, neither about places of command, nor about ſharing of what is gotten.

Concerning their retrenched camp, which they called *Apleſtos*, they choſe rather ſtrong ſites, then that they fortified them by induſtry; neither had they any certain form, as the *Romans* had, but according to the advantage of place they fortified one part more then another: and hereof there is nothing certain to be found in writing amongſt ancient Authours.

The Militarie diſcipline of the *Romanes*.

Chap. I.

Of the election of ſouldiers, and their arms.

Romulus having built the citie of *Rome* divided it into centuries and militarie orders; every body conteined foure thouſand foot and three hundred horſe: Now becauſe the moſt valiant were choſen, it was called *Legio*, which ſignifieth as much as a ſelect company.

The citie being more populous by the addition of the *Sabines*, the *Legions* were doubled, which then became to be of ſix thouſand foot and ſix hundred horſe; yet after that they have been of a greater number.

Tullus Hoſtilius third king of the *Romanes* eſtabliſhed military exerciſe, and diſtinguiſhed all the people into five *Claſſes* or orders. They of the firſt *Claſſis* (as being the richeſt) were bound to mount and arm themſelves to ſerve on horſeback. The three following *Claſſes* were imployed on foot, and (according to their means) were *Haſtati Principes*, or *Triarii*, and were bound to arm themſelves according as their order required. The fifth and laſt *Claſſis*, as being too poor, was exempt from going to the war. Nevertheleſſe, after that the *Romanes* made war by ſea, which was foure hundred eighty nine yeares after

after the foundation of the citie, they choſe out the ableſt of this fifth *Claſſis* to make them ſerve at ſea; and yet they obliged them (in caſe of neceſſitie) to ſerve twentie years amongſt the land-forces.

None could attein to the office of a civil magiſtrate in *Rome* unleſſe he had ſerved ten years in the warre; nor by that could be capable of any ſuch office, unleſſe he were twentie ſeven years of age; for at ſeventeen yeares of age they were inrolled, and then entred into the warre, and ended their ſervice at forty five years of age. They were obliged during theſe twentie eight years to ſerve fifteen: and when they had accompliſhed their ſervice, they were no more tied to take armes, but onely for the guard and defenſe of the citie.

After that the kings were driven out of *Rome*, they choſe every year two *Conſuls* in their ſtead: Then thoſe *Conſuls* choſe twenty foure military *Tribunes*, but afterwards the people would chooſe them: fourteen of them were to have ſerved already five years in the warres, and the other ten a longer time; namely in the infantery, eleven years; and in the cavalrie, fifteen years: which ſheweth what eſteem they had of their foot above their horſe.

The *Conſuls* every year called out of all the *Tribes* ſuch as were from ſeventeen yeares of age to fourtie five to the *Capitole* or to *Campus Martius*: and ſuch as ddnot there make their appearance were rigourouſly puniſhed; which was eaſily diſcovered, for by the ordinances of *Tullus Hoſtilius* they kept a regiſter of all that were born, and that

that died: now they of the territorie were reckoned into the number of inhabitants as well as they which dwelt within the citie.

They alwayes choſe foure Legions, two for each *Conſul*; ſometimes they levied more, but very ſeldome, and that according to the neceſſitie of their affairs: And even in the time of *Hannibal* they had twentie three Legions, and yet every *Conſul* had but two, the reſt being commanded by *Prætors*, *Proconſuls*, and other officers. But after that the Common-wealth grew more powerfull, and their laws grew weaker, there have been under *Ceſar* in the warres of *Gallia* ten Legions.

Before they proceeded to election of their ſouldiers, they divided the twentie foure *Tribunes* amongſt the 4. Legions: namely, of the fourteen youngeſt of them they gave foure to the firſt Legion, three to the ſecond, foure to the third, and three to the fourth: and of the ten eldeſt they gave two to the firſt, three to the ſecond, two to the third, and three to the fourth. By this means there were ſix militarie *Tribunes* for every Legion, and in every one both old and young ones.

The *Tribunes* being thus diſparted and divided into foure parts, the *Tribes* were drawn by lot; and of the firſt they choſe foure men of a like qualitie as near as could be: of theſe foure the ſix *Tribunes* of the firſt Legion choſe one; the ſix of the ſecond choſe the ſecond; the ſix of the third, the third; and the ſix of the fourth had the fourth man Then they choſe foure more, whereof the *Tribunes* of the ſecond Legion began to chooſe the firſt; they of the third, the ſecond;

cond; they of the fourth, the third; and they of the firſt Legion took the fourth man which was left. And ſo ſucceſſively they made their choice throughout all the *Tribes*: Inſomuch that by this choice the ſouldiers of the firſt Legion had no advantage over thoſe of the laſt, but were all equally formed.

After the election thus made of the Infanterie, the *Cenſor* elected the Cavalrie.

Concerning the number of ſouldiers of every Legion, it hath differed at divers times. For the Infanterie, it hath been 3000, 3200, 4000, 4200, 5000, 5200, 6000, 6200, alwaies following that proportion of number, for the convenience which they found in it for the readie dividing them and forming of their *Maniples*, *Centuries*, and *Cohortes*.

So in their Cavalrie, it hath been at divers times 200, 220, 250, 300, 320, 330, 350, and 400.

The election being thus made, the *Tribunes* of every Legion made them take the oath one by one, (holding up their right hand, and raiſing up the thumb of that hand) to obey and perform whatſoever ſhould be commanded them by their ſuperiours.

At the ſame time the *Conſuls* commanded the magiſtrates of *Italy* to make their elections after the ſame manner amongſt the *Allies* of the *Romanes*, amongſt which there was choſen a like number of Infantery, and double the number of Cavalrie: ſo that in a *Conſular* armie there muſt be foure Legions, two *Romane* and two *Auxiliary*.

That done, they were ſuffered to depart, having

ving a ſet day given them to meet at a place appointed without arms, where the *Tribunes* choſe the youngeſt and the pooreſt to be *Velites*; the next, to be *Haſtati*; the more vigorous, to be *Principes*; and the elder ſort, to be *Triarii*.

Then they were armed, and therein they ſometime varied: but moſt uſually the arms of the *Velites* were a morion, a ſmall target, darts, and a ſword. Their archers and ſlingers were called extraordinary, and were auxiliars. The *Haſtati* bare targets of foure foot high, an head-piece, and a ſmall breaſt of the cuirace: The richer ſort of them bare the whole cuirace, a ſword on the right thigh, (being ſhort, broad, and ſharp-pointed, and cutting on both ſides) and two darts to caſt. The *Principes* and *Triarii* bare the like arms; onely the *Triarii* in ſtead of darts had javelins.

Concerning the Cavalrie; that was but ill armed at the beginning; but it learned of the *Grecians* afterwards to be armed with a cuirace, a buckler, and a caſting-javelin.

The Allies (aſwell horſe as foot) were armed and diſciplined as the *Romanes*.

Beſides the foure bodies of *Velites*, *Haſtati*, *Principes* and *Triarii*, the ancient authours alſo make mention of *Tirones*, *Rorarii*, and *Accenſes*, all which were young ſouldiers, either *Romanes* or *Auxiliars*, and (in my opinion) fought not but with caſting-weapons. And in effect there was no other body of the Infanterie amongſt the *Romanes* but of thoſe three orders, the *Haſtati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*: for even the *Velites* had no body apart by themſelves, being both in the orders of battalias, as alſo in the encampings,

entermixed amongſt the other three orders, and began not to be imployed by the *Romanes* but at the ſiege of *Capua*.

The election being made, the ſouldiers armed, and the orders formed, the *Tribunes* ſeparated every order by *Centuries* or *Cohorts*, then made two elections of ten men apiece: they of the firſt were the more honourable, aſſiſted at the counſel of warre, and were as the Captains of our time; they of the ſecond repreſented our Lieutenants. Indeed all of them were called *Centurions*, but they of the firſt election were called firſt *Centurions*, and the other, ſecond *Centurions*. After that, the *Centurions* choſe their *Vexillarii*, which are the Enſignes of our times, and there were two of them in every *Cohort*. Then they choſe twentie *Tergiductores*, which were Rear-commanders of the troups: ſo that in every *Cohort* there were two commanders for the front, and two for the rear.

Chap. II.

The diviſion of a Legion of 4200 *foot and* 300 *horſe.*

A Legion was alwayes divided into five bodies: namely the Infantery into foure bodies, called *Velites*, *Haſtati*, *Principes*, *Triarii*; and the Cavalrie into one. Every body was divided into ten troups, which amongſt the Infantery were called *Cohorts* or *Maniples*, and amongſt the Cavalrie were called *Turmes*.

In the three firſt orders of Infanterie were 1200 ſouldiers apiece, each of which make ten troups

troups of 120 ſouldiers: and in the laſt, namely the *Triarii*, there were onely 600 men, which make ten troups of 60 men apeece.

The body of Cavalrie was of 300, which maketh ten troups of thirtie ſouldiers apeece.

Amongſt authours there is a diverſitie in the names of *Cohorts*, *Centuries*, and *Maniples*, which here do ſignifie one and the ſame thing; but in ſome places of *Titus Livius* you may ſee the diſtinction from a *Legion* to a *Cohort*, from a *Cohort* to a *Centurie*, from a *Centurie* to a *Maniple*. Which I conceive grew from this, that when the *Legions* grew to be of 6000 and 7000 men, they then made thoſe ſubdiviſions.

Chap. III.

Of marching.

When they were to march, at the firſt ſound of the trumpet they took down their pavilions, and packed up the baggage; at the ſecond they loded it; and at the third they parted away from their quarter: But none were allowed to take down their pavilion, untill the *Conſuls* and *Tribunes* had taken down theirs. The extraordinaries marched firſt; then the right wing of the Allies, and their baggage in their rear; then the ſecond *Legion*, and their baggage after them; then the left wing of the Allies, and their baggage following them: the cavalrie was in the van and rear, and ſometimes in the flanks, thereafter as the enemy was to be ſuſpected.

Every *Romane Legion* with one wing of the Allies marched in the van by turns, that ſo

every one might have the commoditie of arriving firſt at the camp.

If in the march there were greater ſuſpicion on the rear then on the van, or on the flanks, they ſtrengthened themſelves there accordingly. This was their ordinary manner of marching; but I find in *Ceſar*, that when he marched in an enemies territories, and particularly in a countrey incloſed with hedges and woods, he made all the Legions to march in one body, then all the baggage together, leaving onely ſome new-levied troups on the rear thereof to guard it. When the army marched in three equidiſtant bodies, namely all the *Haſtati*, aſwell *Romanes* as *Allies*, together, having their baggage before them, then the *Principes* and *Triarii* in the ſame order, the extraordinaries and cavalrie were to be on the flanks and on the van to ſecure the baggage, or at leaſt on thoſe parts where the moſt danger was: And being ſo ordered, when an occaſion of fight befell, on what part ſoever it were, on a ſudden all the troups could be drawn out very eaſily (without being troubled by the baggage) to go and affront the enemy.

When the army drew near to the quarter, the *Tribunes* and *Centurions* ordained for that work marched before to conſider of the ſite of the camp: Which being made choice of, they firſt marked out the place for the *Conſuls* lodging, or of the Generall, with a white banner; then they diſtinguiſhed his lodging from others by a red banner; then with a ſecond red banner they marked out the *Tribunes* quarters; then with a third they divided and diſtinguiſhed the lodgings of the Legions from the fore-mentioned

tioned ones: after that they gave to every one their proportion of ground, which they marked with banners of other colours: then with a line they quickly marked out and divided all the lodgings, becauſe they never changed the meaſures nor form of the camp; and that they were exceeding well accuſtomed thereunto, by having alwayes the ſame way of encamping.

When the army arrived, every troup took notice of their lodging by the marks and banners; ſo that all went to them without confuſion, and without miſtaking.

Chap. IV.

Of embattelling the Army.

They quartered their foure bodies of *Velites*, *Haſtati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*, under the name onely of the three laſt; and they divided and intermixed the *Velites* amongſt the three other bodies: as may be ſeen in that which followeth.

Haſtati	1200
Velites joyned with the *Haſtati*	480
	1680
Principes	1200
Velites joyned with the *Principes*	480
	1680
Triarii	600
Velites joyned with the *Triarii*	240
	840

The *Romanes* allowed ten foot ſquare of ground to lodge two ſouldiers; inſomuch that allowing 100 foot breadth of ground, and 1000 in depth, there was ſufficient to lodge 2000 ſouldiers: and ſo ten cohorts of *Haſtati*, which made but 1680 ſouldiers, were lodged ſufficiently, and had room enough beſides for their baggage.

The ſame proportion of ground was allowed to the *Principes*, becauſe they conſiſted of the ſame number.

And the moity of that ground was given to the *Triarii*, becauſe their number was but the half of that.

To the cavalrie they allowed for thirty horſes 100 foot ſquare; and for 100 Turms 100 foot in breadth and 100 foot in depth apiece.

For the allies they allowed the ſame proportion of ground to their infantery as they did to the *Romane* legions; but becauſe the Conſul took the fifth part of the legions of the allies near to himſelf, they cut off alſo the fifth part of ground in this place, which they allowed them elſewhere.

Concerning the cavalrie of the allies, it was alwayes double to that of the *Romanes*: but the Conſul taking a third part of the to lodge round about him, there remained in the ordinary lodgings but one fourth part more of them then of the *Romanes*: and becauſe the ſpace of ground was more then ſufficient for them, their ground was not inlarged, but they had 100 foot in breadth and 100 foot in depth, as the *Romanes*.

This quarter was divided by five ſtreets, each of them of fifty foot in breadth, and divided in the middle by a ſtreet called *Quintana*, of the ſame length as the other.

A

At the front of the quarter there was a great ſtreet of 100 foot broad, next which the twelve Tribunes were lodged, juſt over againſt the two *Romane* legions; and the twelve Prefects were quartered juſt over againſt the two legions of allies: there was 50 foot ſquare allowed to each of theſe lodgings. Then there was the Conſuls lodging, called the *Pretorium*, which conteined 200 foot ſquare, and was placed in the middle of the breadth of the camp. On the right and left hand of the Conſuls lodging, there were two void places, the one for the market-place, the other for the Queſtor. On each ſide of theſe they lodged the 400 horſe and 1630 foot which the Conſul drew out of the two legions of the allies, as alſo the voluntaries: and beſides that ſome lodgings were reſerved for the extraordinaries which might happen to come to the army, as wel cavalry as infantery; and theſe together made a perfect ſquare.

After all the lodgings were appointed, there was a ſpace left round about them of 200 foot broad: then they made a retrenchment, whereof the moat was more or leſſe in depth & breadth, and the rampart higher or lower, thereafter as the enemy was more or leſſe to be feared.

It is to be obſerved that the infantery was alwayes quartered the neareſt to the trenches, as they which were to defend them, and which were to ſhelter the horſe, which were lodged in the middle of the quarters. The figure following will make all this more plain.

The quartering of the foure Romane legions.



This figure in the Authours copy (by the Gravers mistaking) being very faulty, I have rather used another, being more perfect

A. *The Pretory, which contein'd* 200 *foot square.*

B. *The Treasury*, 200 *foot long, and* 100 *foot in depth.*

C.D. *The two Legates tents, the ground for each of which conteined* 50 *foot in depth and* 100 *in length.*

E. *The Prefects over the Allies, whose lodgings were square; each side having* 150 *foot: their tents were twelve in all.*

T. *The Tribunes of the two Romane legions: their lodgings were square, of* 150 *foot aside, and* 12 *tents.*

F. *The lodgings of the cavalry of the* Evocati *amongſt the Allies, having* 80 *foot to* 125 *in breadth.*

G. *The* Ablecti *amongſt the Allies, having* 120 *foot to* 112 *in breadth.*

H. *The quarter of the foot of the* Evocati *amongſt the Allies, having* 80 *foot to* 238 *in breadth.*

I. *That of the foot of the* Ablecti *amongſt the Allies, conteining* 120 *foot, upon* 252 *in breadth.*

K. *The extraordinary cavalry, every lodging conteining* 80 *foot in depth, for* 167 *in length.*

L. *The extraordinarie Infanterie, having* 70 *foot for* 200 *in breadth, every quarter.*

N. *The quarter of* 20 *turms of the Romane cavalrie, each having* 100 *foot ſquare.*

O. *The* Triarii *of the Romane legions; the quarter of each Maniple had* 100 *foot in front and* 50 *in depth.*

P. *The* Principes *of the Romane legions; the quarter for every Maniple was* 100 *foot ſquare.*

Q. *The* Haſtati *of the Romane legions; each Maniples quarter was* 100 *foot ſquare.*

R. *The cavalrie of the Allies; the quarter for their turms was* 34 *foot in length and* 100 *broad.*

S. *All the Infantery of the legions of the Allies, every cohort having* 100 *foot in front and* 200 [a] *in depth.*

V. *The ſtreets, being* 50 *foot broad.*

X. *The alarm-place, being* 200 *foot broad.*

Y. Z. *Two ſtreets, each of them being* 100 *foot broad.*

♂. *The Pretorian gate.*

♀. *The right hand gate.*

♂. *The left hand gate.*

☿. *The Decumane gate.*

♎. *Void places reſerved to lodge ſtrangers.*

[a] *Obſerve that from the Decumane gate there runneth a ſtreet which divideth the two legions, which have all their quarters facing outward, and their backs meeting at that ſtreet, both fronting to their alarm-places* X.

When the *Conſuls* armie was compoſed of more then foure Legions, they were quartered after the ſame manner, the one on the ſide of the other; ſo that in ſuch a caſe the camp was a long ſquare. And when both the *Conſuls* armies were joyned and made but one camp, they took up the room of two ſquares. Sometimes both camps were near each other, but ſeparated.

Here *Polybius* hath omitted the number of the gates of the camps, and their names, and where they were placed, how the encloſure of the camp was made, the lodgings for the *Conſuls* two *Lieutenants* (one for each Legion) of the *Queſtor* (who was their *Treaſurer*) of the *Preſect* of the camp (who was the fiſcall or marſhall judge) of the twelve *Preſects* of the Allies, of the victuall, the arms, and the engines for war, of the apparel, and what the tents were made of; which (with the help of ſome authours, and according to probabilitie) we will here ſupply.

Firſt we find in ſeverall hiſtories that the camp had foure gates, placed and called as is ſhewed in the foregoing figure.

Concerning the encloſure of the camp, we reade alſo that they made the rampart of the earth which they took out of the moat; and to make the earth hold together they planted two or three rows of ſtakes, about which they enterlaced bruſh-wood, after the manner of hurdles.

For the lodgings of the *Conſuls* Lieutenants, it is probable that they were lodged about the *Prætorium*.

And

And for that of the *Queſtor*, who (beſides the money) had charge of the arms, of the engines for warre, of the victuall and apparel; I conceive that that great and ſpatious place which was given him, was to lodge all therein.

Concerning the tents, we find that even to *Ceſars* time they were made of the hides of beaſts.

Chap. V.

Of the orders and guards of the camp.

Beſides the oath which was required of the ſouldiers after their election, they were made to take another in the camp, namely not to ſteal any thing, and if they found any thing to carry it to the *Tribunes*. *Polybius* reporteth that it was thus done between the hands of the *Tribunes*; and *Cicero* ſaith that they did it at the beginning of the election of ſouldiers between the hands of the *Conſul*.

That done, they divided the *Cohorts* of the *Principes* and *Haſtati* as followeth: two to take care to keep clean the great ſtreet which was between the *Tribunes* and the reſt of the ſouldiers, and to caſt water on it in ſummer, to avoid the diſcommoditie of duſt; for that was a place where every day a great part of the armie met: The other eighteen were divided to ſerve the *Tribunes*, namely three for every *Tribune*; of which they took every day eight ſouldiers for the guard of their lodging. The *Cohorts* of the *Triarii* made the guard for the *Cavalrie*; and one *Cohort* every day kept the guard before the *Conſuls* lodging.

The

The moats and the ramparts were made on the one ſide by the *Romanes*, and on the other ſide by the Allies. The *Centurions* made the ſouldiers to work at them, and two *Tribunes* had the charge to ſee the work well done.

The authoritie of the *Tribunes* in the camp was very great, and two of them together exerciſed it over their Legion for two moneths, after each other ſucceſſively.

Concerning the Word; a ſouldier of the laſt *Cohort* of the Infantery, or of the laſt *Turm* of Cavalrie, was to come to the *Tribunes* lodging, and there to take it upon a writing-tablet, where alſo was written the name of the ſouldier which took it, and the place of his lodging; and this he delivered before witneſſes to the commander of his troup: That officer delivered it to the commander next him; and ſo the tablet was delivered from hand to hand to the firſt *Cohort* near to the *Tribune*, to whom it was brought back before night, ſo that by this means he was aſſured that all the armie had the word. And if any tablet were wanting of being brought back again, it was eaſie to find where it had failed. It muſt be obſerved that here onely one *Tribune* is mentioned; which cauſeth me to believe that the two *Tribunes* which had the authority for two moneths time did agree to command every day by turns. Concerning the guard, it was kept day and night: and the foure and twentie houres were divided into eight watches.

Firſt the *Conſul* was guarded by his ordinary *Cohort*; then every body made their guard round about his lodging; and beſides there were three guards kept, one at the *Queſtors* lodging, and the

the two other at the lodgings of the *Conſuls* two *Lieutenants*.

The *Tergiductours* or Rear-commanders ordered the guards, which drew by lot which ſhould begin firſt: and they which were to begin were led to the *Tribune* which then commanded, who gave them the order of the guard, and (beſides that;) a little tablet with a mark; and all the guards were ſet after the ſame manner. The rounds were made by the Cavalrie, whereof the chief officer commanded foure for the day and foure for the night: the firſt went and took their orders from the *Tribune*, who gave them in writing what guards they were to viſit.

The relieving and viſiting of the guards was done eight times in foure and twentie houres, at the ſound of the trumpet, and the firſt *Centurion* of the *Triarii* had the charge to cauſe them to march when occaſion ſerved.

When the trumpet gave them warning, the foure forementioned ſouldiers drew lots, and he to whom it fell to begin, took ſome of his friends with him, and if in going the round he found the guards in good order, he onely took from them the mark which the *Tribune* had given them, and carried it him back again next morning: But if he found the guard abandoned, or any ſentinels aſleep, or any other diſorder, he made his report thereof to the *Tribune* with his witneſſes: and preſently a councel was called to prove the offenſe and to puniſh the delinquent according to his deſert.

The *Velites* made the guard round about the retrenchment, on the outſide and inſide of it, and at the gates. The Allies had the ſame order.

We

We find not in writing the number of their Corps-du-guards, how they placed their Sentinels round about the camp, and how many a day were free from the Guard.

Chap. VI.

Of puniſhments and rewards.

None but the *Conſul* could condemne any to death, and he had this authoritie as well over the principall commanders of the army as over the meaneſt ſouldiers thereof.

The *Tribunes* adminiſtred military juſtice, which was rigourouſly practiced. The manner of their ordinary puniſhing was thus,

So ſoon as the *Tribune* had touched the partie condemned with a ſtaff or a rod, every ſouldier laid on upon him with cudgels, or battered him with ſtones, and oftentimes before he could get out of the camp he was killed: but yet if he eſcaped, he was not received into his countrey again, and none of his kindred durſt give him enterteinment.

He that oppoſed or neglected the orders given for the guard, or for the rounds, or other ſervice concerning the ſecuritie of the camp; or falſely pretended to have done ſome ſignall act; or had forſaken the place where he had been placed; or had loſt his arms in the battel; or had ſtolen any thing in the camp; or born falſe witneſſe; or elſe had forſaken his enſigne, was puniſhed after this manner; as alſo he which committed ſmaller faults thrice.

If it happened that many Legions, or one Legion, or a groſſe troup had run away, they were puniſhed

puniſhed two wayes: the more rigourous way was to make them all draw lots, and to puniſh every tenth man; or more or fewer according to the exigence of the cauſe: by this means all were partakers of the fear, and a ſmall number of them were puniſhed. The more gentle way was, to cauſe them to lodge without the camp, and to give them barley in ſtead of wheat, which was a mark of ignominie; which many troops have wiped out by performing valourous and memorable acts.

Concerning their rewards, they excited thoſe ſouldiers by honourable acknowledgements and publick commendations in preſence of all the reſt, which had performed ſome valourous and extraordinary act. Beſides that, to him that had wounded an enemy in ſome light skirmiſh, or that voluntarily had gone and aſſaulted him, they gave a dart: To him which had killed and diſarmed him (if he were one that ſerved on foot) they gave a target: if he were a horſeman, a horſe-furniture.

To him that (at the aſſault of a town) was firſt got up upon the wall, they gave a crown, which they called *Muralis*: to him which had reſcued a *Romane* citizen, a crown called *Civica*, which was ſet upon his head by him which was ſo reſcued, whom he reſpected and honoured all his life after as his father.

The commanders had alſo their ſhares of honour, by the ſeverall triumphs which they obteined, according to the greatneſſe of their actions and the felicitie of their victories.

CHAP.

Chap. VII.

Of their Pay.

Concerning their pay; It began not untill three hundred fourty eight years after the foundation of *Rome*: before that every ſouldier armed and victualled himſelf at his own charge, which was no hard thing in thoſe times, becauſe their warre was then extended no further then *Rome*: But when they began to go out of *Italy*, it was neceſſary to give them pay, which at the beginning was very ſmall: afterwards it encreaſed as the *Romane* empire grew in greatneſſe. I will not trouble my ſelf to make the valuation of it according to our money, it being a thing of no utility: onely I will ſay, that the ſouldiers pay muſt be ſo proportioned as he may maintein himſelf well thereby. I will further obſerve here, that the *Romanes* charged themſelves with the furniſhing of bread, apparel, arms, and tents for all their ſouldiers; and beſides, barley for the horſemens horſes (abating theſe things out of their pay) which I find to be a good order, and above all things neceſſary to make an army ſubſiſt: for beſides that the greater part of ſouldiers are bad husbands, and ſuch (as if a care be not taken) will never be well clothed nor well fed, it is impoſſible that a ſouldier ſhould everywhere find bread to be bought, and that he ſhould carry all things with him which he ſtandeth in need of.

Chap

Chap. VIII.

Of their order of battalia.

THere is a diverſitie of opinions about the order of battel of the *Romanes*. Some would have it that when the *Haſtati* be not able to ſuſtein the enemies charge, in their retreat they ſhould fall into the order of the *Principes* by files; and both they into the order of the *Triarii*; and ſo to renew the fight three times. Others will have it to be done by troups, whereof I conceive there is much the greater probability, holding the firſt way not onely impoſſible to be put in practice but alſo moſt dangerous, & the other exceeding feifible and profitable. For to fall one into another in that maner by files, the *Haſtati* muſt then fight at ſo wide a diſtance, that between two files they might receive two other files, which ſheweth the weakneſſe of this firſt order, which being ſo ranged in battalia could not be able to repulſe nor ſuſtein the adverſe battallion. And even the files, being at ſo wide a diſtance from each other, were not able to keep themſelves right in fight nor to obſerve their diſtances; but in the other way there are many conveniences to be found. Firſt many bodies of a hundred and twenty men apiece (or thereabouts) aſſaulting a battallion, they may very well defeat it; at the worſt they may retreat without diſordering themſelves or looſing their diſtances. And the ſecond order, which is embattelled behind the firſt, juſt over againſt their intervalls, may eaſily fill them: as alſo (in caſe of neceſſity) the third body may ſupply thoſe diſtances which are reſerved for them, renewing the fight three

times. And that which confirmeth us the more in this opinion is, that in reaſon it ought to be ſo: next, the deſcription of the battel of *Zama* which *Scipio* fought againſt *Hannibal*, where it is ſaid that *Scipio* to hinder *Hannibals* elephants from routing his ſouldiers, cauſed the *Coborts* of the *Principes* (which were placed juſt over againſt the intervalls of the *Haſtati*) to ſtand juſt behind them, ſo to leave ſtreets for the paſſage of the elephants: which ſheweth plainly that the order of battalia was diſpoſed by *Coborts*, and not by files.

I ſpeak not of the *Velites* in this order of battalia, nor of all other light-armed ſouldiers, becauſe they fought not but with caſting-weapons, and afar off, and when the armies approched to give the ſhock, they retired themſelves behind the heavie-armed.

Now to form the ſaid order, I will ſay that the file was alwayes of ten men in depth; that a Cohort or Maniple of a Legion of foure thouſand two hundred men conſiſted alwayes of one hundred and twentie ſouldiers, and conſequently the Cohort made ten ranks and twelve files, conteining (at ſix foot ſquare of ground for every ſouldier) ſeventy two foot in breadth and ſixty in depth: and the moity of it when they were at three foot diſtance.

The

The firſt figure of a Cohort.



This figure in the Authours copy hath 13 files & 11 ranks, which I conceive to be a miſtake

In each of the three orders, howſoever the Legions were weaker or ſtronger, there were alwayes ten Cohorts or Maniples; but the Cohorts were either increaſed or diminiſhed according to the proportion of the Legions.

The ſecond figure of ten Cohorts.



The two firſt orders are of an equall number, and the laſt of half as many; and by this example of one Legion, you may ſee how all the troups paſſed into each other.

The third figure, of a Legion.



This figure (in my opinion) is not right. For first the Haſtati *are too cloſe to fall into the intervalls of the* Principes; *neither are thoſe intervalls (nor thoſe of the* Triarii*) made fitly in a ſtraight line, as they ought. Beſides, the Cohorts of the* Principes *ſhould have as great a breadth as the* Haſtati; *and neither they nor the* Triarii *ought to have a greater depth then the* Haſtati, *which here are double that depth. Beſides, the diſtance between the* Principes *and the* Haſtati *is here wider then that between the* Principes *and* Triarii; *which ſhould be to the contrary. See the figure in* Praiſſac, *pag.* 187.

I conceive that between the Legions there was a far greater diſtance then between the Cohorts, that ſo they might prevent confuſion amongſt them; which I judge to be ſo neceſſary, as that without the obſervation thereof it was altogether impoſſible to obſerve any good order.

Concerning the cavalry; ſeeing it was divided into the like number of troups as the Infantery, it is like they fought in the ſame order; but the one half were on the right flank, and the other on the left: Thus the army was compoſed of ſix great bodies, namely foure bodies of infantery, and two bodies of the cavalry; and every body divided into ſmall troups, as hath been ſhewed before.

The

The order of Battalia of a complete Army.
The fourth figure.



So in this figure, the intervalls ſhould be 4 times wider, if the bodies muſt be ſo large; but I conceive a generall miſtake in the figure, and that in Praiſſac *pag. 190. to be much better.*

Chap. IX.

Of Sieges.

NO *Romane* Commander hath made braver ſieges then *Ceſar*, nor deſcribed them more perfectly. He hath left examples for the aſſailing of all ſorts of ſites, and to maintein a ſiege againſt all kinds of reliefs. At *Brunduſium*, which is upon the ſea, he conſtrained *Pompey* to abandon it, for that he ſhut up the haven by which that town was to be relieved. At *Cadenac*, which was a ſite inexpugnable, he conſtrained the garriſon to yield it, by taking away their water. At *Alexia*, where were 80000 ſouldiers within the town, and which expected two or three times as many, he ſo fortified himſelf before it, both againſt the town and againſt the enemy without, as he famiſhed it. And at *Bourges* and *Marſeilles* he took the firſt by aſſault, and conſtrained the other to yield, when it was upon the point of being taken by aſſault. I will not here particularize the engines

which they then made uſe of to force places of ſtrength, becauſe the cannon hath taken away the uſe of them. Yet I will onely ſay that they approched to the walls by degrees, as much ſheltred as they could, and then attempted to batter them down by their engines, or by mines to force an aſſault, or at leaſt to lodge upon the breach: which I the rather ſpeak, to ſhew that howſoever we have changed the manner of fortifications, the better to make reſiſtance againſt our new thundring engines, nevertheleſſe the ancient maximes for the taking of towns are the ſame, which we make uſe of at this day. Concerning the ſiege of *Alexia*, it is the modell by which the Prince of *Parma*, the Prince of *Orange*, and the Marqueſſe *Spinola* have directed themſelves to make theirs. And all theſe great works and circumvallations which we admire, and by the help of which they have taken many great cities in ſight of greater armies then their own, which have not been able to relieve them, are nothing in compariſon of thoſe which *Ceſar* made at this ſiege of *Alexia*. To conclude, they which come neareſt to the manner of warring of the ancient *Romanes*, as well in ſieges as in the field, are they which prove the moſt excellent Commanders.

Chap. X.

Obſervations upon ſome battels of the ancients.

NOw that we have ſhewed the ancient *Militia* of the *Grecians* and *Romanes*, by means whereof they have obteined ſo many brave victories,

ries, we muſt yet obſerve two principall cauſes, which their moſt excellent Commanders have ſucceſſefully obſerved to obtein victories in battel: namely, to ſtrive to overwing their enemy, and never to cauſe their army to fight all at once. *Cyrus*, to keep himſelf from being overwinged in the battel which he fought againſt *Creſus*, doubled the front of his army by as many more as they were, by making the files of his infantery but 12 deep, which before were 24: and to encloſe his enemy, he placed his beſt men on the wings; who having defeated the wings of the adverſe army, came to aſſault the body of the battel on their flanks and on their rear. At the battel of *Canna Hannibal* placed all his beſt ſouldiers on the wings, and the meaner ones in the middle, that ſo the *Romanes* finding but little reſiſtance there, might inſenſibly ſink into them, and by that means they found themſelves encloſed on both flanks. At the battel of *Pharſale*, *Ceſar* ſheltred one of the flanks of his army by a little river, and fortified his Cavalry (which was on his other flank) by a body of Infantery, to reſiſt *Pompey's* horſe, which exceeded his own by much; ſo that having routed it by this means, he aſſailed the army on the flank, and eaſily defeated it. At the battel of *Zama Hannibal* made a body of all his old companies of *Italy*, which he divided from all his army, that ſo when all the reſt (as well of the one part as the other) ſhould be weary with fighting, this body being freſh, might carry away the victory. So that *Scipio*, after that he had defeated all that were before him, found himſelf aſtoniſhed to ſee a ſecond army for him to fight with afreſh.

Here may be an objection made, that the armies might be ſo unequall in number, as all theſe maximes might prove unprofitable; whereunto I anſwer, that when an army paſſeth a certain number of fourty or fifty thouſand men, the ſurpluſſage ſerveth for no other end but to famiſh the army: for it is an eaſie thing by retrenching to avoid battel. And if you ſhould reſolve to give battel, if you would obſerve the forementioned orders, there is no plain ſo ſmooth but you may find ſomething wherewith to ſhelter one of the flanks of your army; either by a river, wood, hill, or a ditch; and the other with waggons: nor nothing that ſhall be able to hinder you from having ſome body of reſerve which ſhall not fight at the beginning; nor from placing thoſe troups on the wings which you eſteem to be your beſt ſouldiers. Which things if they be exactly obſerved as they ought, they may avail very much for the obteining of victory.

Chap. XI.

A comparing of the arms and military orders of the Romanes with thoſe of the Grecians.

The arms of the *Grecians* were the buckler, the pike, and the ſword. Their order was of great bodies of battalions of 16 deep of the heavie-armed, and then ſtrengthened by eight in depth of the light-armed: ſo that the battalions came to be 24 in depth, and fought all at once, making all one front.

The arms of the *Romanes* were the target and the ſword; their order was to make ſmall bodies of

of 150 or 200 ſouldiers at the moſt, which were onely ten in depth, and to make three orders of battalia, that ſo they might fight three times, one after another.

Concerning the arms of the *Grecians*; it ſeemeth that their long pikes had a great advantage of the *Romane* targets, becauſe they reached farre; and even at this day we find no weapon comparable to the pike againſt the violence of the horſe: and for their order, thoſe great bodies met with nothing that could reſiſt them. On the other ſide thoſe great *Romane* targets covered the ſouldiers ſo well as the pikes could not hurt them; and if once they came to joyn, they made a great ſlaughter with their ſhort & broad ſwords; for then the pike was unuſefull. Moreover, their ſmall troups gave them this advantage, that they brought more hands to fight at once. Concerning their diſpoſing of their three orders one behind another, to the end they might relieve each other, and to be able to begin the fight again by all three, they had this advantage by it, that all were not wearied nor diſordered at once. In ſo much that oftentimes they have carried away the victory after the defeat of their two firſt orders: for that their third order being freſh, and having rallied all the reſt, gave the laſt charge againſt an army which was tired and in diſorder, and ſo gained the battel.

There be two diſcommodities more in thoſe great bodies; namely, that they muſt ever have a very ſmooth field for the battel, elſe they are not able to keep their order; and that they cannot agitate on the right or left, but onely fight juſt before them. But the ſmall troups weild them-

themſelves on all ſides, and continue their order in all places. It is true that the *Romanes* ſometimes joyned all their forces together, making but one body of all their army, in an Orb; but this was but to ſave themſelves in a retreat, and not to charge an enemy: for as theſe great bodies are as it were unmoveable and of little uſe in aſſaults; ſo when they will onely defend themſelves, they are hard to be broken.

And yet they uſed not this laſt order but when they were perſecuted by the arrows of a great Cavalrie, as that of the *Parthians:* for not being able to come to hand-blows with them, they were conſtrained to put themſelves into this order, and to ſhelter themſelves with their targets. So that I conclude that the arms and orders of the *Romanes* were better then thoſe of the *Grecians;* becauſe ſmall troups accommodate themſelves better to all ſites then great ones, and fighting at ſeverall times they continue the fight with more obſtinacie then when all fight at once: and that it is more eaſie of many ſmall troups to make a groſſe readily and without diſorder, then of a groſſe to make many ſmall troups.

A TREATISE OF Modern VVar;

Written

By the late great Generall the *Duke* of *Rohan*:

Engliſhed by *J. C.*

CAMBRIDGE,

Printed by ROGER DANIEL, Printer to the UNIVERSITIE.

1640.

To the right worſhipfull Sir
Thomas Glenham Knight,
one of the Deputie-Lieutenants,
and Colonel of a Regiment
in the countie of
Suffolk.

Right Worſhipfull,

I *Make bold (incited by your many favours) to preſent you with a ſhort* Treatiſe of Warre. *How well the Authour hath acquitted himſelf therein, Your worthy ſelf (by reaſon of your known abilities, both for Theorie and Practice, in that profeſsion) are beſt able to judge. And for my tranſlation, your ſtudies and travels having made that language naturall to you, I might iuſtly fear a ſevere cenſure; but that I know your candour ſuch, as you will excuſe*

Your obliged
ſervant,

T. C.

A Treatiſe of Warre.

I Undertake not here to treat of all the functions of warre in particular, becauſe ſo many have written thereof as it would be a thing ſuperfluous. I content my ſelf to make generall obſervations upon all thoſe things which depend thereon, and which may in theſe times be put in practice: being loth to touch upon any thing but what experience hath taught me, and in all to be ſobrief as I may not weary the Reader.

Chap. I.

Of the election of Souldiers.

THe election of ſouldiers was by the Ancients and is by Moderns made after divers wayes. The *Grecians* and *Romanes* contented not themſelves to enroll the ſouldiers which of their own accord were willing to go to the warre, but choſe out of them ſuch as they judged to be fitteſt for that ſervice; which is the cauſe they had ſo good ſouldiers. The *Carthaginians* for the moſt part imployed ſtrangers, and therefore had no worſe ſouldiers then their own countrey-men. The *Turks* chooſe their ſouldiers, and train them. The *Swiſſes* make uſe of their own men. The *Venetians* and *Hollanders*, in imitation of the *Carthaginians*, are ſerved by auxiliarie ſouldiers. The *French* and *Germanes* abound in good ſouldiers, and may well forbear auxiliaries. *England* alone,

of

of all the States of our time, may chooſe them, and take ſuch as ſhe pleaſeth. Whereupon we muſt conſider the conſtitution of theſe States, on what maximes they be founded, and what either of them may beſt do to have good ſouldiers. The greater part of States at this time are more founded upon policie then upon warre, and endevour rather to conſerve themſelves then to grow greater. Wherefore we ſee that learning flouriſheth there, and arms degenerate; in ſo much that thoſe States which are founded upon warre do devour the other.

The example of the *Turk* to the ſhame of the *Chriſtians*, and that of the king of *Spain* to the prejudice of *Germany* and *Italy*, are two manifeſt proofs. That which cauſeth this miſchief is, that men of the gown have poſſeſſed themſelves of the government of almoſt all States, which (for that they hate ſouldiers) cauſe them alwayes to be ill dealt with, and do adviſe Princes to imploy auxiliars rather then their naturall ſubjects: which is a moſt pernicious maxime. But this being no fit place to treat of it, we will onely ſpeak of the election of ſouldiers.

England, which hath right by the laws of that kingdome to make choice of her ſouldiers, may obſerve the form of the election of the *Romanes*, which is very good. The other kingdomes which have not that power muſt incite their men which are ambitious of honour to cauſe themſelves to be enrolled, aſwell for the hope of being advanced to other honours by embracing the profeſſion of warre, as by ſhutting up the means of atteining thereunto by any other way then that

For

For example, not to beſtow any office of the kingdome, nor of the kings houſe, nor any charge amongſt the ſouldiers, to any but ſuch, as have ſerved in the warres a certain number of years; nor to make any man Colonel of horſe which hath not been a Captain and other officer of the Cavalrie; nor any to be Marſhall of the field, which hath not honourably born leſſer charges; nor any to be Generall of the army, which hath not been a worthy Marſhall of the field: briefly, that none may be advanced to any office, which hath not paſſed through the degrees of warre. And as the hope of advancement is a ſtrong ſpur to encourage every man to exerciſe the profeſſion of arms; ſo the fear of finding ones ſelf poore and needy after long ſervice is a ſharp bit to keep men from it. Therefore I would prevent that by eſtabliſhing a foundation for men of that profeſſion, ſo that they might live out the reſt of their dayes commodiouſly and honourably. Thoſe States which by reaſon of their form of government are carfull to arm their own people (as *Venice*) or where their ſubſiſtence dependeth on traffick (as the *Low-Countreys*) and which for theſe reaſons are conſtrained to help themſelves in their warres by auxiliars, muſt principally be carefull to chooſe good Commanders; next, to have a certain body of well exerciſed and diſciplined ſouldiers alwayes in readineſſe, ſufficient as well to guard them from a ſurpriſe as to give them time to aſſemble greater forces. For an armie formed and diſciplined at leiſure, though but ſmall, is more capable to defend it ſelf, yea to conquer, then thoſe armies which aſſure themſelves onely

in

in theis great numbers. And great conqueſts are almoſt alwayes made by ſmall armies, as great Empires are alwayes loſt with their innumerable forces. For that they which were to fight againſt ſuch numerous armies, oppoſed them with an exact diſcipline and good order; and the other, having neglected all diſcipline and order, have endeavoured to ſupply that defect by their great number of men; which hath brought upon them the greater confuſion and hath ſerved them for no other end but to make their loſſe the more diſgracefull. VVhence I conclude, that the beſt meanes to have good ſouldiers is to chooſe ſuch as are moſt fit for warre; the ſecond, to incite men of ambition and vertue freely to enroll themſelves, by ſhutting the doore of any other way to advancement; and laſtly, to entertein a body of an armie, and to be carefull (as well in peace as in warre) to keep them under an exact diſcipline, without relaxation. One of which three wayes all ſorts of States may make uſe of.

Chap. II.

Of Arms.

THe moſt uſuall arms of the Infanterie at the preſent time, are (for the defenſive) the head-piece, the cuirace, and the taſſes: and for the offenſive, the ſword, the pike, and the muskets which are rather the arms of the *Grecians* then of the *Romanes*. Whereupon we muſt obſerve, that our muskets ſerve us as the caſting-weapons did the Ancients; ſo that the body of the battel conſiſteth of pikes, which is a very fit weapon to reſiſt the Cavalrie

Cavalrie, for that many of them joyned together make a very ſolid body, and very hard to be broken on their front, by reaſon of their length, whereof foure or five ranks extend the heads of their pikes beyond the firſt rank of men, and do alwayes keep out the ſquadrons of horſe from them twelve or fifteen foot of. *Maurice Prince of Orange* had a great deſire to make uſe of the target, and having cauſed divers trials to be made thereof, hath found that it hath not onely reſiſted the pike, but that half the number of targets hath alwayes entred into twice the number of pikes, and hath routed them. Nevertheleſſe, being but Generall of the armies of a State, and not a ſovereigne and abſolute Prince, he durſt not make ſo great a change; whether it were that he feared the Cavalrie, which now-adayes is exceeding well armed, or elſe the reproch of ſome evil ſucceſſe; not being ignorant that the people judge of the actions of ſuch as ſerve them rather by the event then by reaſon. For my part, I would adde this kind of arms to our diſcipline, making alwayes the principall body of my Infantery to be of pikes, and to have for every battallion a ſmall body ſeparate of one hundred or one hundred and twentie targets to charge on the flank, which would work a marvellous effect on the day of battel; and this ſhould be the true place of voluntiers, and of very brave Nobilitie, which often prove to be but troubleſome to an army. Concerning the offenſive arms of the Cavalrie, there be of five ſorts; namely, the lance, the piſtoll, the ſword, the carabine, and the musket: the two firſt are given to the heavie-armed calvarie, which muſt have for

defenſive arms the cuiracecask, vambraces, taſſets, cuiſſes, and guard-rein, and (not many years ſince) ſome horſes have been armed with barbs. Of the two other kinds, they which ſerve with carabines have the head-piece and cuirace; and becauſe they fight on horſeback, they muſt be well mounted: but they which ſerve with the musket have no defenſive arms. Of theſe five ſorts of offenſive arms there be but three much in uſe; namely, the piſtol, ſword, and carabine. The Spaniards onely have continued ſome few companies of lances, which they keep rather for gravitie then reaſon; for the lance doth no effect but by the violence of the carreir of the horſe, and beſides there is but one rank which can make uſe of it; ſo that their order muſt be to fight by ſingle ranks, which cannot reſiſt the ſquadrons: and if they ſhould fight in ſquadrons, they would rather be troubleſome then ſerviceable. And for musketiers on horſeback or dragones, they are alſo in a manner left off, for that in the civil warres they ruined the Infantery, every man deſiring to have a nag, that ſo he might be the fitter to rob and pillage: nevertheleſſe ſome well-ordered troups of this kind in an armie are of very great ſervice; either for executions, to gain bad paſſages, to guard the quarters of horſe, or elſe (on a day of battel) to cauſe them to diſmount as forlorn hopes before the ſquadrons of Cavalrie.

Now the Cavalrie muſt be proportioned with the Infantery; which may be diſtinguiſhed according to the ſituation of the countrey where the warré is made, or elſe according to the enemy againſt whom you are to fight. For if you be

you be in a champain full of forrage, and if ye be to make warre againſt a great Cavalrie, as that of the *Turk*, in ſuch a caſe you muſt fortifie your ſelf with the greater number of horſe. But if the warre be in a countrey encloſed, either by mountains, forreſts, moores, or hedges and ditches, and that hath many fortified places, for that the warre is rather reduced to ſieges then to battels and field-combats, in ſuch a caſe you muſt ſtrengthen your Infanterie. And theſe two bodies are ſo neceſſary the one for the other, as an armie cannot be held to be good nor ſubſiſt unleſſe it be equally provided of both. Nevertheleſſe, if I were not induced by ſome extraordinary reaſon, I would make the proportion of my army for the open countrey of a fourth part of horſe to three fourth parts of Infantery; as to twentie foure thouſand foot, eight thouſand horſe: in an incloſed countrey, of a ſixth part of horſe to five parts of foot; as to twentie foure thouſand foot, foure thouſand horſe. It remaineth to give to theſe two bodies ſuch arms as were before mentioned with the moſt profitable proportion. The *Swiſſes* have many more pikes then muskets, and for this they have made themſelves to be much feared in a champain countrey; for in a day of battel where you come to hand, the number of pikes hath much advantage of that of muskets. Other nations do equally divide the pikes and muskets; and becauſe the war in theſe times is reduced to ſieges rather then battels, we deſire to have a greater number of muskets then of pikes. For my ſelf, which adde the targets to them, my opinion ſhould be to have the regiments of 1440 ſouldi-

ers, namely of 600 pikes, 600 muskets, and 240 targets. For the Cavalrie; I would proportion it after this manner: I would compoſe the regiments of 500 horſe, whereof I would arm 400 with Cuiraſſiers arms; 50 with carabines, and 50 to be dragones.

But this is not all, to provide good arms for your ſouldiers, unleſſe you oblige them to wear them; it being an unſufferable ſhame to ſee their delicateneſſe in theſe times, and how they diſeſteem them: and to cover this fault, they publiſh that it is want of courage to go armed, and that they will go in their doublets into the moſt dangerous places, aſwell as they which are armed. It is not enough to go into a place to cauſe ones ſelf there to be knocked on the head; we ſhould go thither to conquer, and not to be beaten. Beſides this inconvenience groweth of it, that if you uſe not your ſelf to wear your arms, you are ſo peſtered with them as you cannot fight in them: on the contrary, if you accuſtome your ſelf to them, they are no more troubleſome to you, and you are at as much libertie in them as if you were in your doublet. But the greateſt miſchief that cometh of it is, that the ruine of military diſcipline followeth on it; which a good Captain ought to cauſe to be exactly obſerved in every part. For if he ſlacken it in one, or in favour of ſome perſons, the conſequences which follow on it by little and little will be ſuch as they will wholly overthrow it: and then he ſhall find himſelf without obedience and without reſpect; which he ſhall never recover without incurring the hatred of thoſe whom he hath too much ſpared; it being moſt certain that it is

eaſier to prevent a miſchief then to help it when it is befallen.

Chap. III.

Of Militarie Diſcipline.

BEſides that which hath been ſaid to incite every one to take upon him the profeſſion of arms rather then any other, we muſt make other obſervations to make a man worthy thereof, which conſiſt in three things: namely in the recompenſe of commendable actions, in the puniſhment of bad ones, and in the continuall and exact exerciſe of militarie diſcipline; for there is no profeſſion in the world which hath more need of ſuch helps then that of warre, where for the ſingle pay (which hardly affordeth livelyhood, and with which the meaneſt artiſan would not be contented) the ſouldier abandoneth himſelf to all ſorts of perils and labours: but none are inſtigated thereunto unleſſe it be by emulation of honour, or by licence to do evil; and as the firſt aim is vertuous, ſo you ſhall have good ſervice of ſuch as enter into it for that end. But of the other you ſhall reap nothing but ſhame; for in ſtead of a good and obedient army you ſhall find that you have no better then a troup of pillaging rogues, which without order or obedience forſake you, either after a good boot-haling, or in any eminent danger. For this reaſon the election of ſouldiers is a better way of forming an army, then onely to receive voluntaries; where all the vagabonds and evil livers, and ſuch as cannot live but by robbing, cauſe themſelves to be enrolled. Therefore to incite

cite ſuch as are vertuous to well-doing, and to deterre the vitious from doing evil, recompenſes and puniſhments are principally neceſſary. The *Romanes* have made very profitable uſe of theſe two means: and if we follow not their way we ſhall never have good nor well-diſciplined ſouldiers. It matters not though we uſe not the very ſame remunerations and the ſame puniſhments they did; it ſufficeth that they be equivalent, that ſo we may receive the ſame benefit by them: and theſe things are diverſly done, according to time and cuſtome. The principall is to be an exact obſerver of them, that ſo the remunerations may excite brave men to worthy actions, and the rigour of puniſhment may keep cowards from doing baſely. The manner of decimating the ſouldiers which the *Romanes* had, is held to be cruel: nevertheleſſe there be ſometimes ſo infamous actions committed, as you are conſtrained to uſe great ſeverity, to give a terrour to all; finding it very good to ſtrike a fear into all thoſe that have eſcaped by the means of the lot, and to put but few to death. For you muſt imprint this belief into your ſouldiers, that by baſe flight they eſcape not death, but they onely exchange a glorious death which they ſhould have acquired by fighting valiantly for an infamous one. After that the ſouldier be incouraged by the honour of being eſteemed valiant, and brought to a hatred of being held a coward, it muſt be made a like degree of honour for every one to know how well to obey his ſuperiour, from the private ſouldier to the Lieutenant generall: for on this obedience all the functions of an army depend, and without it you can keep no-

thing in rule, nor do any thing that is good. This muſt be ingraffed into the hearts of the ſouldiers, as being one of the principalleſt vertues required in them. From hence groweth order; by this military exerciſe is mainteined; briefly, by this brave deſignes are executed, and without this all goeth to confuſion and ruine. I will not trouble my ſelf here to ſpeak of the particular military exerciſes which the ſouldier is to be exerciſed in, becauſe divers books are ful of them, and that cuſtome doth alwaies change ſomething or other in them. I will onely ſay that there is nothing ſo profitable as to exerciſe every ſouldier to carry his arms properly, to uſe them ſouldier-like, to keep his rank well, and therein well to execute all the motions and charges which are commanded him. So much concerning the ſouldiers: But concerning the recompenſe of Generals of armies, I will ſay the ſame which I ſaid for the ſouldiers, namely, that according to the time, or the conſtitution of kingdomes or common-wealths, ſuch courſes ought to be taken as the honour of ſuch as have done brave actions and great ſervices be not diminiſhed nor blemiſhed: For that the moſt generous ſpirits (which will eaſily excuſe all want of other recompenſe for their ſervices) will never endure to be robbed of the honour due to their brave actions, and will ſooner ſtomach ſuch a want of due honour then any other thing whatſoever: whereupon very often great miſchiefs have followed.

Chap. IV.

Of the obedience of ſouldiers.

NOw as the Generall of the armie requireth of the ſouldiers that obedience which is due to him, ſo he muſt have a care to give them no juſt cauſe to exempt themſelves from it: to this end he ought to keep them in continuall imployment, for that idleneſſe engendreth corruption of manners and diſcipline, whence proceed luxury, neglecting of exerciſes and the guards, and diſobedience to ſuperiours. It was the eaſe and idleneſſe of *Capua* that deſtroyed *Hannibals* army, and the delicacies of *Babylon* which corrupted *Alexander* himſelf, and from whence he drew away his army to prevent the totall ruine of it; there being no means of greater efficacy to keep it in due order, and to prevent ſeditions, then to imploy it in warre. It is therefore a maxime which muſt be exactly obſerved, never to ſuffer your ſouldiers in any place to be idle, eſpecially when the army is brought together in a body; for if you imploy them not in that which is good, they will buſie themſelves in that which is naught. This courſe muſt be taken aſwell in the time of ſecureſt peace as of open warre; particularly, to exerciſe them to uſe their arms well, and to obſerve good order; and though there be no need, yet to uſe them to make retrenchments of the camp, and to make their huts: that ſo they may be ſo accuſtomed to remove the earth, that when neceſſity ſhall require, it may be no trouble to them. I would further imploy them to make

make fortifications and other works of this kind, not onely to keep them in exerciſe, but that alſo they may get (beſides their pay) wherewith the better to maintein themſelves, and that they accuſtome themſelves to that which in time of warre is as profitable to them as to fight well, there being nothing impoſſible for twenty or thirty thouſand men which will work in the earth; for in eight dayes they will make fortreſſes which ſhall be impregnable: And *Ceſar* hath made himſelf as much redoubted and admired by the great works which he hath cauſed his ſouldiers to make, as by his great battels. Moreover, the Generall muſt take care that they be well clothed and well fed; eſpecially that (out of their payes) they be furniſhed with clothes and ſhoes, otherwiſe he will ſoon find his army to decay, and diſeaſes to rage in it for want thereof. He muſt alſo have a great care of thoſe which are ſick and hurt, and therein to ſpare for no coſt; that ſo the ſouldiers may not excuſe themſelves from going on upon dangerous ſervices, or to undergo laborious imployments, becauſe they are abandoned when they are ſick or wounded. The General ought alſo to take a particular care not to overlabour his ſouldiers, nor to put them to extraordinary hard marches without great neceſſity: but when need requireth it, he muſt be the firſt to undergo the labour; for the example of the commander maketh all things eaſie to the ſouldier. The examples not onely of the greateſt Captains amongſt the Ancients, but even of the greateſt Monarchs and Emperours, ſhould ſhame our delicate Captains of theſe times, which are afraid

to

to ſpoil their fair complexion in the ſunne, and their goodly plumes in the rain, which would believe themſelves to be diſhonoured if they ſhould march on foot at the head of their companies: and thoſe great men have not ſcorned to march at the head of their armies, and have refuſed to quench their extraordinary thirſt, becauſe there was not water enough to make all the army to drink; and ſo making themſelves companions of the dangers and labours of their meaneſt ſouldiers, have made themſelves maſters of the greateſt part of the world, and have gained an immortall glory.

Chap. V.

Of Marching.

THere are divers conſiderations to be made upon the marching of an army; which may be aſſaulted in the day-time, or at its diſlodging, or even in the night when it is lodged. If it be not encamped, but lodge in villages, you muſt (to cauſe it to meet in one body) give it a Rendez-vous on the way which it muſt take; which if the enemy learn time enough to be there firſt, or that he meet with it there by chance, he will put the army to run a great hazard, which cometh to its Rendez-vous at divers times and by divers wayes. The beſt means to guard ones ſelf from ſuch an accident are; to keep your Rendez-vous very ſecret, to have good ſpies amongſt the enemies, and to ſend out many diſcoverers for intelligence. When you encamp you are not ſubject to that danger, becauſe the army is alwayes together. For the march you muſt

muſt conſider the countrey where you are, and the number of ſouldiers which you have. If you march in great plains, you may (for the moſt part) march in battalia; or at leaſt with formed battaillons and ſquadrons: then it is very eaſie to put your ſelf readily into a good form to fight well, becauſe you march not in a long order. But when you march through a ſtrait countrey, where but few can march in front, then you muſt compute the diſcommodity of the way, and the time you have for your march, with the number of ſouldiers whereof your army conſiſteth; for 10000 foot marching 10 in front, and 1000 horſe marching 5 in front, with the lighteſt baggage they can poſſibly have, and ten cannons, with equipage for every piece to ſhoot 100 bullets, take up about 28000 foot of way in length; whereby you may judge how much way in file 30000 foot and 6000 horſe will take. Therefore when ſo great armies find themſelves in ſuch a troubleſome way, you muſt of neceſſity divide them into ſeverall bodies, which may march one after another, and lodge ſeverally; or rather cauſe them to march by divers wayes, ſome miles diſtant from each other; or howſoever, to make wayes through the fields for your ſouldiers to march in, leaving the great road for your cannon and baggage. If there be a river to paſſe where you can make but one bridge, or ſome paſſage over a mountain, mooriſh ground, or forreſt where you cannot make ſeverall wayes, then you muſt march one after another, and on ſeverall dayes. I trouble not my ſelf to ſhew how you are to paſſe through ſuch bad paſſages in view of the enemy, becauſe many have

have written thereof: yet when it cometh to execution, few will get off well, if they be charged home; but I will onely ſay that the beſt way is to calculate the time ſo well as you may avoid ſuch encounters. Concerning the march; I find it almoſt impoſſible that two armies ſhould meet each other, if one of the two Generals be deſirous to avoid it, eſpecially in an incloſed countrey: but whatſoever happen, the beſt way is to have the baggage wholly ſeparated from the ſouldiers, leaving onely on the rear ſome few troups to keep it from diſbanding: for if in time of alarm every body have their baggage behind them, it cauſeth a great confuſion, and hindreth the ſouldiers from rallying themſelves and helping each other. The time of lodging is alſo a dangerous time to be aſſaulted in, becauſe the army is then tired, and every man (deſirous to be lodged) haſtneth to the quarter in diſorder, which is a thing hard to avoid, if (before you enter your lodgings) you cauſe not your army to ſtand in battalia, and ſo cauſe them to lodge troup after troup, without ſuffering any to lodge but by command, mean time ſending out on all ſides upon diſcovery.

There remaineth the aſſaulting of a quarter, which is that which is more frequently attempted, eſpecially when the army is not encamped, becauſe it being lodged in ſeverall quarters, the enemy may attempt to ſurpriſe ſome one quarter without hazarding a generall combat: for which I do not find the ordinary guard alone (how exactly ſoever it be performed) ſufficient to remedy ſuch an accident; becauſe it cannot give the alarm but at too near a diſtance, and the

of

ofttimes you have not leiſure to put your ſelf in order to fight; therefore you muſt be carefull to ſend out diſcoverers every night, by divers ſmall troups, which (if they do well perform their task) will not ſuffer you to be ſurpriſed; for an army or a groſſe troup capable to aſſail a quarter of an army cannot march ſo ſecretly that it be not perceived. And when you have to do with a vigilant enemy, and that you fear ſuch aſſaults in the night, there is nothing ſo good as to prevent him, if it be not in earneſt, at leaſt to give him alarms every night, that ſo he may be more troubled about keeping himſelf upon his guards, then about aſſailing you. If it be in an intrenched camp, where all the army is in one body, it is a high enterpriſe to aſſault it. And this one chapter ſheweth the ſecurity of an intrenched camp: which I will end with this concluſion, That all the forementioned things to aſſure the quarters muſt never be omitted, though you believe your ſelf to be far off from any enemy; for that, beſides the profit you draw from hence in accuſtoming your army to do their duties, there may ſuch an occaſion befall you as it may be the ſafety of your army, of your life, and of your reputation.

Chap. VI.

Of encamping.

I Will not here deſcribe the form of entrenched camps, but onely the profitableneſſe of them, not being able to wonder enough that they have been wholly diſcontinued. No people made ſo exact uſe of them as the *Romanes*; and in

in our time *Maurice Prince of Orange* hath revived the uſe of them, or at leaſt hath given them a great perfection. The entrenchment of a camp aſſureth an army, in that it is never diſperſed in the villages, where ſome quarter or other is ever in danger to be ſurpriſed, but lodgeth all in one body, and in ſuch faſhion as being aſſailed it may fight with great advantage. The entrenchment ſaveth a great deal of trouble, becauſe by it there is need of the fewer guards by many, & thoſe leſſe toilſome, eſpecially to the Cavalry, which when they are lodged in open villages, are conſtrained to be on horſeback almoſt all night. The entrenchment encloſeth your army as a walled city: from whence you may march privately with ſuch troups as you pleaſe, to execute all ſorts of brave deſignes, leaving your baggage in ſafety. The entrenchment hindreth the enemy from conſtraining you to fight, unleſſe when you pleaſe. The entrenchment cauſeth you to be without danger at the head of the moſt dreadfull armies. The entrenchment cauſeth you to take ſtrong cities in the face of more puiſſant armies then your own. Briefly, the entrenchment is leſſe ſubject to infection then the villages where you lodge, becauſe you chooſe a wholſome place to ſit down in, and in villages you muſt take them as they fall out: Alſo, becauſe this is more ayrie, the lodgings are here better divided, thoſe things which may cauſe bad air are more eaſily removed; and in effect an army incamped and entrenched wil rather ſubſiſt three moneths in health in a camp, then a fortnight in the beſt villages. Whence I conclude, that one of the moſt neceſſary parts of warre is

wel

well to know how to incamp and entrench.

Chap. VII.

Of Battels.

OF all the actions of warre the moſt glorious and moſt important is to give battel: the gaining of one or two acquireth or ſubverteth whole Empires. Anciently all warres were divided by battels, which cauſed ſuch ſpeedy conqueſt: For the preſent, warres are managed more fox-like then lion-like; and are rather founded upon ſieges then combats. Nevertheleſſe, there be divers nations at this day which decide the moſt part of their warres by battels, as the *Turks* and the *Perſians*: and even amongſt the Chriſtians we have ſeen of late divers battels given in *Germanie*, whereof onely one had almoſt inthralled all the Proteſtant Princes. And an army well-diſciplined, and which feareth not battel, hath a marvellous advantage in all deſignes of that which feareth it. For this reaſon (howſoever the manner of warring at this time be not ſo frequent in the hazarding of battels as in times paſt) the knowledge of them muſt not be neglected. And a Generall of an army cannot be ſaid to be a good Captain, which knoweth not all advantages which may be taken on a day of battel, and all diſadvantages which ought to be avoyded; that ſo he may well diſintangle himſelf. I will not ſpeak of duſt, the ſunne or rain, whereof it is obſerved that many Captains have made uſe, driving them on the face of the enemy by gaining the wind of them; becauſe they are caſuall things which may change in a moment,

moment, and which by conſequence happen rather by hazard then come by deſigne; but of things more ſolid.

He then that will give battel muſt have regard to ſeven principall things. The firſt is, never to ſuffer himſelf to be forced to fight againſt his will. The ſecond, to chooſe a field for the battel fit for the quality and number of his ſouldiers: for if he feareth to be incloſed by a great number, he muſt ſhelter his flanks, or at leaſt one of them, by the nature of the place; as by a river, wood, or ſome other thing equivalent: and if he be weak in his Cavalry, he muſt avoid the plains; as he muſt ſtrait paſſages or incloſed places, if ſtronger. The third, ſo to range his army in battel, as according to the quality of his ſouldiers it may be within its own advantage, ſheltring his horſe by his foot, if therein he be the weaker; and if the contrary, his foot by his horſe; diſpoſing all his ſouldiers in ſuch order as they may fight divers times before they be wholly defeated: for if we well obſerve the ſmall troups of ſouldiers which fight not all at once, and believe that a hundred horſe in two troups wil beat two hundred in one entire troup, and have obſerved in our times that divers battels have been won by him which had made a troup of reſerve, which was not to fight until all the reſt had fought, how much greater effect will a ſecond order of battel produce, which will come to the charge after that all the adverſe army hath fought againſt the firſt order, and yet after that a third, in imitation of the *Romanes*, if the two former be defeated. It is a maxime, That every troup (how groſſe ſoever it

be

be) which hath fought, is in ſuch a diſorder as the leaſt troup that chargeth it, is able to defeat it abſolutely: ſo that that Generall which can reſerve ſome troups to the laſt without fighting, will with thoſe bear away the victory: it being a long work and difficult to go about to rally an army that hath fought into good order to fight afreſh; ſome gazing about for pillage, others being vexed to return to the danger again, and all being ſo diſtracted as they do not or will not underſtand any command: on the contrary, ſuch as have not as yet fought, are under obedience, and ready to do whatſoever their Generall ſhall command them. So that the knowledge of a Generall of an army is not ſo much to rally diſordered and defeated troups (which is properly but an action of courage) as to make his troups fight to good purpoſe, the one after the other, and not all at once: for he muſt conſider that he cannot be well obeyed by his ſouldiers, but onely untill the houre that he ſendeth them to the combat. After that all the orations of the world will not ſtay them when they flie; but this troup which is in good order will eaſily do it. The fourth is, to have many good commanders, it being impoſſible that a Generall ſhould ſuffice for all places. After that he hath made a good choice of his field for battel, and put his army into good order, it is altogether impoſſible for him (when it cometh to blows) to give order, more then in that part where he is preſent: ſo that if he be not well aſsiſted everywhere elſe, aſwell amongſt the horſe as foot, though he ſhould work miracles in that place where he himſelf is, he cannot make good the

ignorance of thoſe officers which command in the other parts of his army. Therefore there muſt be at leaſt five principall commanders to make an army fight well, namely for three bodies of Infantery, diſtinguiſhed by vanguard, battel, and rearguard, and two for the horſe which are on the wings. The fifth is, ſo to obſerve your diſtances in your order of battel, that the foremoſt troups being put to recoil, may not fall upon thoſe which ſhould come up to relieve thē, nor the ſecond upon the third. The ſixth is, to place the moſt valiant ſouldiers on the wings of the army, and to begin the battel by that wing which you think to be ſtrongeſt; for if you once break one of the enemies wings, you fall upon his flank and rear, and it is impoſſible for him to reſiſt you. The ſeventh and laſt is, not to ſuffer any to purſue the enemy, nor fall to pillaging, untill he be routed on all parts; and although it be good to give him a hot chace, you muſt ever have ſome troups in order, which muſt not disband, that ſo you may avoid all inconveniences. I will not ſpeak of the advantages which may be met with in a field of battel, whereof a good Captain often maketh uſe with great profit; becauſe there can no certain rule be given for it, by reaſon the diverſitie of ſituations is ſuch, that you ſhall never find two every-way alike.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Fortreſſes.

BEcauſe the gain and loſſe of battels draweth ſuch conſequences after it, as it giveth or taketh away whole Empires at once, it hath cauſed a reſolution of oppoſing the conquers by fortified places, to ſtay their firſt fury with few men, and to ruine their armies: But ſince the invention of the cannon they have been enforced to change their manner of fortifications; and even by reaſon of the invention of petards we have beene conſtrained to aſſure the gates of cities by porteculices, palliſadoes, draw-bridges, and other inventions; becauſe there was no place, how ſtrong ſoever it were, which did not runne a hazard to be ſurpriſed by this new invention. Now the beſt fortreſſes againſt the cannon are thoſe which are made of earth; becauſe (when they have a ſufficient thickneſſe to make reſiſtance) they are not ſubject to endamage the beſieged, as thoſe fortifications are which are made of maſons work, the ſhivers whereof do much miſchief. Nevertheleſſe, when a Prince can be at the coſt to line them as high as the rampart, leaving the parapet upon it to be of earth cannon-proof, it maketh the work to laſt the longer.

In fortreſſes you muſt obſerve foure principall things: namely, that the line of defenſe be within musket-ſhot; that the flanked angle exceed not ninety degrees, nor be leſſe then ſixty; that the gorge of the bul-wark be not too narrow; and that the flank be as great as may be. And

theſe foure generall maximes muſt be ſo proportioned amongſt themſelves, as that to make one of them exceeding good you deſtroy not the reſt. You muſt alſo avoid tenailles in the principall body of fortification, unleſſe the ground be ſo ſmall as it will not ſuffer you to make good flanks. For the interior angle of ſuch a fortification raiſed as it ought to be cannot be defended by any flank, and men may lodge themſelves at the foot of it without receiving any hurt, unleſſe it be by ſtones thrown over. This is the reaſon why tenailles are not uſed but in the counterſcarps. The moats are uſually proportioned according to the earth neceſſary to make the fortifications; and ſuch as are full of water are beſt to hinder a ſurpriſe, and the forts defend themſelves the beſt againſt an aſſault: their breadth muſt have a due proportion; for when they are too broad the out-works are too farre diſtant from the defenſe of the principall fortification; but depth never ſpoiled a moat. The falſebrayes are joyned to the body of the fortification. It is a new invention and excellent to hinder the approching to the bulwarks by galleries. The counterſcarp, half-moons, ravelins, and horn-works are beyond the great moat; all the out-works (if it be poſſible) muſt be commanded by the body of the fortification. Theſe are in groſſe the principall obſervations which are in fortifications in a place which is levell and approchable: the reſt dependeth on the judgement of the Enginier, which muſt make profitable uſe of the ſituation of the place which he is to fortifie, either in taking what ſerveth for his advantage, or in avoyding whatſoever is to his hinde-

hinderance. I adde further, that there be ſituations ſo favourable, as nature it ſelf defendeth them, and maketh them more inexpugnable then all the art in the world; as an inacceſſible rock, a quagmire or a lake: But every commodity hath its diſcommodity; ſeldome you ſhall meet with ſuch ſituations on frontier-places, or upon any important paſſage, or capable to contein a garriſon of ſufficient ſtrength to give ſcalouſie to an enemy which would invade your countrey; or elſe they are found ſo eaſie to be blocked up, as five hundred men without are able to beſiege five hundred within.

They which deſire to know the particularities of fortification, may find them amongſt an infinite number of books where they are deſcribed; but much better in the exerciſe of warre, where experience cauſeth every day ſomething to be added.

Chap. IX.

Of defenſe againſt ſurpriſes.

NOw that we have ſpoken of fortreſſes, we muſt come to the way of guarding them, and not ſuffer them to be ſurpriſed. It is moſt certain that men will alwayes attempt to take them by ſurpriſe rather then by open force; for that thereby they ſave charge and time. But becauſe ſurpriſes are grounded upon ſome defects which they find in the place, or in the guard thereof, I will begin with that which muſt be obſerved to defend your ſelf againſt ſuch ſurpriſes.

The Captain which ſhall have a place to guard muſt provide for ſix principall things,

whereon all the reſt depend: namely, to ſee that the walls be out of danger of a ſcalado; the gates not ſubject to the petard; the way for the rounds eaſie and convenient; the ſentinels well ſet; the guard very exact; and to hinder intelligences and treacheries. For the five firſt, the way is beaten for them, there be books full of inſtructions, and there be now ſo many Princes orders in writing and in practice, as he muſt be very negligent which is not carefull therein. But for the laſt it is not ſo eaſie to give rules. Treachery may be wrought by the townſmen or ſouldiers: the mingling of them together, whether it be on the guards, rounds, or patrouilles, may much hinder it; as alſo the drawing all the functions of the guard by lot, the keeping a guard without the town, and the having of ſpies amongſt the enemies. You muſt double your guards at times of fairs and markets, in harveſt and time of vintage, becauſe men uſe to ſpy out ſuch times to frame a deſigne. You muſt obſerve to be in arms at the opening and ſhutting of the gates; and in whatſoever time of peace it may be, you muſt never neglect the obſervation of any of theſe particulars. There is alſo a way to avoid intelligences, namely, by making double enterprifes your ſelf, feigning to diſcontent an officer, private ſouldier, or townſman, who running over to the enemy, cauſeth him to undertake ſome deſigne probably feiſible and facil: for beſides the profit which you gain by it, by getting the boldeſt of them in a trap, you reap this advantage by it, that your enemie dreameth on no other ſo long as he hopeth in that; for that every one alwayes undertaketh that

that which he believeth will ſucceed moſt aſſuredly. Whereby we may ſee how doubtfull thoſe enterpriſes are which are grounded upon intelligence, either for that they may be double, or elſe by the fault of traitours, which in the very point of execution may loſe courage and diſcover all; or by their indiſcretions and not keeping ſecret their negotiations. For theſe reaſons in enterpriſes made upon intelligence both the defendant and aſſailant muſt be very ſuſpicious and exceeding diligent to obſerve the words, actions and behaviour of ſuch as promiſe to ſerve them by betraying their own ſide, and to omit no precautions to aſſure themſelves of their perſons, ſo that they may not catch them; the hoſtages of women and children being not alwayes ſufficient (as *Montluc* obſerveth at the enterpriſe of *Darges*) for that ſome traitours are ſo reſolute as they will hazard all to attein the height of their deſignes, and make account to releaſe their pledges by ſuch priſoners as they intend to take.

There remaineth a word to be ſpoken of alarms. You may therein uſe two wayes: the firſt and uſuall way is to put your ſelf in order in the allarm-place, where the governour muſt be preſent, that ſo from thence he may lead to the place of danger; the ſecond is, for every company to repair to their colours, and from thence to go and find out their ſquadron which is upon the guard. If the garriſon be weak, the ſcalado eaſie, and the place large, this laſt way of going to the alarm is the beſt, becauſe they go more readily to the defenſe of the walls; but in this caſe they muſt have no ſuſpicion of the fidelitie of the inhabitants.

Chap. X.

Of aſſaults by ſurpriſes.

THe enterpriſes of fortified places are made after ſeverall faſhions, either by petard, or by ſcalado, or by ſome holes in the wals, or by ſaucidges, or by ſome ſuch other wayes and inventions which men ſeek every day to encreaſe, according to the meaſure of the remedies againſt ſuch as are alreadie invented. But to make them take good effect you muſt be very carefull of three things; namely, intelligence, conducting, and execution: for for want of one of theſe we ſee all enterpriſes miſcarry; either by being prevented by the day-light, or being diſcovered too ſoon, or for want of ſome petard or ladder, or by ſome diſorder in the execution. For the firſt, which is intelligence, they which are imployed in it muſt inform themſelves exactly of the form of the garriſon, number of the townſmen, and of their affections. They muſt obſerve at the gates whether there be a bridge dormant to come at them; whether it be of wood or ſtone; and if of wood, whether they uſe not to take away ſome planks in the night-time; whether this bridge hath not rails: whether the moat be deep and broad, and whether by a commodious deſcending into the moat you may eſcape the draw-bridge, which is uſually made upon the bridge dormant: or whether by the benefit of the moat the gate or draw bridge of the town may be petarded without carriages or rolling-bridge. They muſt well obſerve all the hindrances which may be before

fore the bridge dormant, whether they be gates, barres, palliſadoes, or portculices, there being uſually a ravelin: and whether there be a corps du-guard kept in the night, either on the outſide or upon the bridge dormant: taking notice how many gates, bridges, barres, palliſadoes, portculices, trap-doores, grates, iron-pinnes, chains, and other impediments whatſoever there be from the field to the inſide of the town, and how all theſe things are faſtened: how many paces of diſtance there may be from one piece to another, and (as near as may be) the length, breadth and thickneſſe of all thoſe things, and in what places they are: whether there be loopholes over the gate, or holes in the roof of it: how many corps du-guards there be, in what places they are, and how ſituated; whether the entrance be ſtraight on, or winding; obſerving the place of the flanks, whether they be on the ſide before, behind, above, or below; whether they keep any ordinance there, and how many; or whether they be onely for musketiers; what number may be lodged on them, and at what diſtance they flank the gate; diſcovering the way by which you are to go from the town you go from to that which you intend to aſſail: To ſpie out a fitting place within half a league of it to alight, and to diſtribute the petards and other inſtruments: they muſt alſo obſerve the places and ſtreets within the town which muſt be ſeiſed upon, all the corps du-guards to be forced; and well conſider the condition of the ſouldiers, and other neceſſarie things, to ſurmount all obſtacles which might be met with. If it be to give them a ſcalado, they muſt well obſerve

ſerve the avenues, the counterſcarp and the moat; to know whether you may come at it undiſcovered, go down into the moat, and come up out of it eaſily, eſpecially over againſt the place where you would make the ſcalado, or near it. For if you muſt go farre about the town after you be entred into the moat, the enterpriſe becometh much the more dangerous and difficult. It muſt be known whether the moat be drie or frozen, or that the water be but ſhallow, without mud and eaſie to paſſe; whether the wall be low or weak, ſo as it may eaſily be ſcaled or pierced, or whether there be ſome hole or drain or other means for the water to paſſe in or out which are ill guarded or weak. You muſt judge what height your ladders muſt be of, and regard how they may be ſet on ſure footing, and whether there be a ſcarp or not; whether the place where you mean to give on be far from guards or ſentinels; whether the place of ſcalado be capable to raiſe good ſtore of ladders, and for ſtore of men to enter at once: as if it were very ſtrait, you muſt ſee if the firſt being entred can accommodate themſelves upon the rampart to ſubſiſt ſo long untill the reſt mount. You muſt alſo obſerve the diſtances of the wall to enter into the town, and to go and ſet upon the corps du-guard.

For the ſecond, which is the conducting, it may be made two wayes, by parts or in groſſe: by parts, when they are deſignes upon places of importance, and which are farre within an enemies countrey, and whereof the enterpriſes are held to be very feiſible in the execution; for they may not fail, without putting all the ſouldiers which go

go on that ſervice into eminent danger: therefore there muſt be great prudence uſed, and none imployed in it but reſolute men and ſecret, becauſe they muſt either there overcome or periſh; which happeneth not in ſuch enterpriſes where there is as great care taken of the ſafety of retreating as of giving on. The Marſhall of *Briſac* made one (being in *Piedmont*) upon the caſtle of *Millain*, which was excellently well conducted, and deſerveth to be here taken notice of, to ſerve for a leſſon for ſuch as may deſire to undertake the like. He made choice of eightie *French* men and fourtie *Italians*, the braveſt and reſoluteſt ſouldiers of all his army, and made *Salvaiſon* Captain of the *French*, and *Peter Maria* of *Recuperat* of *Breſignolle* commander of the *Italians*, which two onely knew whither they were to go: then he cauſed them to come by five at once to his Secretaries lodging, and cauſed twenty five crowns to be given to each of them, and to the chief man of every five there was a note given, wherein was ſpecified the way they were to take, and the dayes journeyes they were to go, that ſo the brigadoes might not meet each other. The firſt rendez-vous was at an out-houſe (or farm-houſe) on the confines of *Millanois*, whither *Lodowick Birague* had conveyed himſelf ſome dayes before very ſecretly in diſguiſed apparel, to give ſuch order to this deſigne as ſhould be neceſſary. The manner of meeting at this farm-houſe was thus; At the parting from the valley *Camonica* or *Bergamaſque*, the firſt five or brigado (and ſo by turns all the reſt) found a countrey-fellow having a ſtraw-hat with two pheaſants feathers on it; to whom the chief man

man of every brigado was to ſay, *O buon compagno, voi tu vender my quella capelina* ! that is, *Ho, good fellow, wilt thou ſell me that hat* ? to which he was to anſwer, *Meſſer no, ne ho biſogno per me* ; that is, *No ſir, I muſt uſe it my ſelf.* That was the watchword ; which being ſo known, the chief (without ſpeaking a word) followed the countrey-fellow, which conducted him with his brigado to the farm-houſe where *Lodowick Birague* was ; and in this wiſe the Marſhall of *Briſac* his hundred and twenty ſouldiers paſſed very ſecretly to that place. From this farm-houſe they were to get to the houſe of one of *Sienna* near *Millain*, who was the plotter of the deſigne : to this end they paſſed along as before, by five and five together, and after they had paſſed the river *Adde* at the haven of *Vaure*, they had meaſured the time to arrive towards night at the bridge *Navilio* of *Millain*, near the Monaſtery of *Angels* ; on which bridge being arrived, the chief of the brigado ſhaked a little bell, at the ſound of which he was anſwered by another like it, and preſently there came (from below the bridge) the man of *Sienna* (the authour of this deſigne) who conducted the brigado to his own houſe, and continued after this manner every night, untill the whole troup was paſt : which is a matter worth the obſerving, to cauſe a hundred and twenty ſouldiers to go by ſtealth from *Piedmont* to the very gates of *Millain*, without being diſcovered, and not a man of them (except onely *Salvaiſon* and *Peter Maria* of *Recuperat*) untill then, knowing whither they went or where they were. Concerning the conducting in groſſe, which is the

the more ordinary, you muſt meaſure the length of the way to the place upon which you have your deſigne, with the time which you muſt have to arrive at the juſt time to execute it : wherein many deceive themſelves very often, for that uſually there befall unexpected caſualties which prolong the time; inſomuch that what meaſures ſoever you take (without great experience in ſuch actions) you ſhall commonly find the time too ſhort, eſpecially if you have a groſſe troup to lead. For to make two thouſand men to march by night in their long order, the Altes which muſt be made at the head to ſtay for the rear, or thoſe which a narrow or troubleſome way, or that is cut off by a river compell you to make, are ſuch, and cauſe you to loſe ſo much time, that unleſſe you be very diligent to make them march, and that you have cauſed good intelligence to be taken of the way, and provided for all theſe things, you will find you have not half time enough. I ſpeak not of the great ſhowers of rain, nor of froſts, which ſometimes happen ſo unlooked for and extraordinary, that, what foreſight ſoever you may have uſed in all other things, it is impoſſible to overcome them. After that you have proportioned the time with the way, you muſt provide your ſelf of good guides, and as many of them as may be : then you muſt form your order before you depart, as it ſhould be at the execution, giving to every man your commands in writing of what he is to do, and keeping a regiſter thereof. For if you deferre to do it untill you come upon the place where you are to alight, and where all the equipage is to be accommodated (which is uſually about half

a league from the place) may hinder you therein, the place haply will not be ſpacious enough nor commodious to make the order, contentions which may befall, jealouſie of honour amongſt the ſouldiers, and divers unthought-of accidents wch ariſe, are able to fruſtrate the deſigne: which things being reſolved on before your going out, and there being nothing to be changed in your order, this (moſt certainly) is the means to avoid ſuch obſtacles. I adde this, That if it be a citie from whence you go out, you muſt keep the gates ſhut long before and after; and cauſe the troups to march by day, that ſo you may ſee that not a man go out but they of the enterpriſe. And afterwards to cauſe the troups to make Alte, beyond the gate or in ſome private place near hand. Concerning the order; you muſt cauſe ſome horſe to march foremoſt, whoſe ſcouts muſt have charge to ride farre enough before, and to ſeiſe upon all ſorts of perſons whereſoever they go, that ſo they may hinder the giving of intelligence to the town which you intend to ſurpriſe; eſpecially if there be ſome bridge or paſſage by which unavoydably you muſt paſſe, you muſt gain that. Then muſt fifty musketiers follow; next the train, the petards or ladders, being followed by thoſe men which are choſen to carry them; whereof there muſt be a treble number, to eaſe and ſucceed each other, in caſe any be hurt or killed: and theſe muſt be men of execution, the moſt reſolute and adventurous of the troup; for on theſe foremoſt uſually the good or bad ſucceſſe dependeth: you muſt alſo carry double equipage of petards, becauſe all work not that effect which you purpoſe they ſhould;

ſhould; and often the want of one petard hath cauſed brave enterpriſes to fail, and ſo of ladders, which are often broken by the enemies, or break by being too much laden. In the purſuit you muſt not make any troup of above fifty ſouldiers, namely fifty muskets, then fifty pikes, and ſo ſucceſſively: for you muſt conſider that the firſt encounters are in narrow ſtreets, and in the night; ſo that the groſſe troups cauſe but diſorder. And if you find ſtreets that are broader then the order which you have framed, you muſt joyn two troups together, that ſo they may take up the whole breadth of the ſtreet. Every troup muſt have officers at the front and rear of it, and the ſergeants on the flanks, to keep them to their duties, and to hinder them from ſtraggling and pillaging. You muſt alſo obſerve in the order you make (when you part from your quarter) that if you make ſeverall aſſaults, the commanders, ſouldiers, and equipage muſt be diſtinguiſhed into ſo many troups as you will make aſſaults, and that they march according to the order they ſhould aſſail in. In all enterpriſes (eſpecially in thoſe where the retreat is dangerous and long) you muſt more regard to have good ſouldiers then many; for a ſmall troup may come from farther off, march more ſecretly, and retreat with leſſe danger and confuſion then a groſſe troup. Beſides, a ſmall troup with good ſtore of officers, is more obedient in execution, and begetteth leſſe diſorder then a groſſe. I adde further, that in enterpriſes by night you affright an enemy as much with a ſmall troup as with a great one: for it is a maxime, That they which are ſurpriſed and aſſailed fight in fear, alwayes per-

perſwading themſelves that you aſſail them with forces ſufficient. Briefly, if you overcome with a ſmall troup you get more honour then if it had been with a great, which oftt imes diſturbeth you both in fight, in march, and in their retreat: and if you be beaten, the diſhonour is the leſſe. Concerning the third, which is the execution, all the order muſt be given in writing, that ſo none of them which have any command in the enterpriſe may excuſe themſelves by pretending they miſunderſtood you. If it be by ſcalado, there muſt be 2 men to carry every piece of a ladder; and becauſe it is almoſt impoſſible to do the execution upon a place where there needeth more then five pieces of ladders in height, it is ſufficient that there be ten men for every ladder, and one man to command them: The men for every ladder muſt be mentioned in a roll by their names and ſurnames, and of what company they be. You muſt command them on pain of death to bring back their ladders if you cannot get the town: for they ſeeing the danger and trouble of bringing them back again, will rather deſire to do their uttermoſt endeavour to enter the town: moreover you muſt command ten other men to enter after the firſt ten, which muſt be led by an officer, and another to be on their rear to take care to ſee them mount without loſing of time and without making too much haſt: otherwiſe the ladders will be ſo much laden as that they will break; after this, ten more muſt follow, commanded and divided as the former: and every file of ten muſt know by which ladder they muſt mount, and in what order, that ſo all may be done without confuſion. The firſt ten which

which follow their ladder muſt carry another, though they have no order to raiſe it; that ſo if any piece of the firſt ſhould break, there may another be raiſed in the ſtead. If it be by petard, the petardier ſhall call him that is to carry the madrier or planchier; then he is to call three for the petard (two to carry it, and the third to aſſiſt in time of need) and if the planchier be faſtned to the petard, thē foure men may carry it interchangeably by two and two: and thoſe two which carry not the petard with the planchier ſhall each of them have a great ſmiths hammer. After theſe foure, the petardier ſhall call two men, each of them carrying a great ax; after them one with a crow-lever, then another with a dark-lantern, then one with three or foure pieces of lighted matches: beſides theſe there muſt be one to command them, which ſhall carry a piercing inſtrument, or a coopers turrell, or ſome good hooks with ſteeled points, and a weighty hammer. So that to attend every petard well there muſt be ten men; this file of ten for the firſt petard ſhall be led by ſome brave Sergeant, which ſhall have the name of every man of his file in writing, and ſhall alſo know what every of them is to carry. The men muſt know the Mule which carrieth their equipage, and ſo ſoon as they come to the place where they are to unlade, they muſt place themſelves about the Mule, that ſo each of them may receive what he is to carry. If the ſecond petard muſt be applied to a gate or barres, they which ſhall carry it muſt be in the ſame order as they of the firſt petard: but if it be for a draw-bridge, the rolling-bridge or carriage goeth formoſt, with ſeven or

eight men which are imployed as well to carry it as to puſh it forward: after this the planchier and petard muſt be carried, after the ſame manner as the firſt; then ſhall they follow (in file and in cloſe order) which carry the ladders and planks to caſt upon the breach which the petard ſhall have made upon the draw-bridge; then ſhall they follow which carry hãmers, hatchets, pinſõs, inſtruments to pull out bolts and to cut chains: then ſome with fire-lances and granadoes, and ſome dark lanterns. The officer which ſhall have the leading of them muſt take care that not a man loſe his rank, and ſhall divide them into files, and ſhall take care to cauſe the ſpare men to carry ſuch portions of the equipage as they did carry which ſhall happen to be hurt or killed, which he ſhall onely cauſe to be laid out of the way, without ſuffering thoſe which are to be imployed about the ſervice of the petard to trouble themſelves about carrying away any man that is killed or hurt. At all the gates and bridges the men muſt be diſpoſed in the ſame order. But when you go againſt iron-grates or portcullices, you muſt cauſe thoſe to march firſt which carry the treſſes or iron-hooks; then marcheth the planchier and the petard; after which follow hammers, hatchets, crows of iron, and other inſtruments which may be thought fitting: you muſt not forget to carry fire-balls, granadoes, or fire-lances, if you have obſerved that you may make uſe of them; every man muſt carry a hatchet at his girdle: you muſt rather have a ſupernumerary number of inſtruments, then want one. Having thus put all into order, and officers at the head and on the flanks of every file,

you

you muſt have beſides ſome petards, ſanchiers, and other inſtruments for reſerve, which muſt be carried in the ſame order as the other: For you muſt alwayes have a double equipage. When you come near the place where the execution is to be done, you muſt diſtribute to every man what he is to carry. The Sergeant ordereth them in file, and commandeth every one duly to follow his leader: then he cauſeth them to march forward to give room to thoſe of the ſecond petard; and ſo conſequently of all the reſt, there being a guide for the firſt file to ſhew them the way. And that you may not be intangled, ſometimes you may cauſe ten cuiraciers to march before one foot, to diſcover whether the enemy be not on the advenues; then follow three men bearing good targets, to ſhelter (amongſt others) the petardier; then march they which carry the petards and the other train, in ſuch order as hath been ſaid, which ſhall be followed by fifty muskets led by a Captain, to give fire for their defenſe (if need be) with large hailſhot. He muſt look that no man ſtay by the way as they march; when the enemy asketh, *Who goeth there*, they muſt haſten their pace, and then the petardier taketh the firſt petard with him, and the reſt muſt follow very cloſe, that ſo when the firſt is fired the ſecond be ready to be put into his hands. The ten horſmen which have marched before all the equipage ſo farre, ſhall not advance further then the diſtance of piſtoll-ſhot from the firſt bars; then they ſhall fall back to the Captain which leadeth the fifty musketiers. The firſt petard being fired, the officer ſhall cauſe his men to be placed on the right and left hand,

to give room for the ſecond petard; then that ſhall do the ſame, to give paſſage to the third; then that maketh room for the rolling-bridge, and they for the petards and other inſtruments, and conſequently all the reſt. And they which are unladen muſt help the reſt, without making any noiſe. And if the petardier calleth for any thing, he that carrieth it muſt be ready to give it him, and no man upon pain of death muſt ſtirre out of the place where he was placed, but onely to give to the petardier what he calleth for, or to ſupply ſome bodies place which in carrying ſomething to the petardier was hurt or killed. The officers muſt take care that the petardier be preſently ſerved, and all be done without noiſe or confuſion. The ouverture being made, they which ſhall be commanded for the firſt attempts muſt be ready to enter, and to force whatſoever ſhall reſiſt them; they which are to follow them muſt do the like, and ſo conſequently all the reſt which are to act any thing: And when they are within, they which firſt entred muſt not ſcatter themſelves in the town (whileſt they are yet weak) whether it be in purſuing the enemy, or though they meet none: but they muſt make two bodies, the one to act, the other onely to be put into battalia to ſuſtein the reſt. This done, they muſt march in good order, the one to force that whereunto they are appointed, the other to go and embattel themſelves in the ſtreets and market-places which you had reſolved ought to be ſeiſed upon, by the plat or draught of the town, by which the whole enterpriſe ought to have been deſigned. For howſoever it hath ſometimes ſucceeded well to follow the

enemy

enemy ſpeedily with ſuch few men as are entred, yet is it not the ſureſt way, becauſe they may be repulſed by a few men; which hath often cauſed brave enterpriſes to be fruſtrated.

There muſt alſo be a third body which muſt ſtand in battalia without during the execution, to the end that if they which entred ſhould be repulſed, they may ſuſtein them; or elſe to remedy ſuch accidents which might befall them by ſome of the enemies troups, which caſually might arrive in that place. If you be wholly repulſed, that troup which is without ſhall make the retreat, and ſhall remain firm in battalia untill that the repulſed troups be recollected and put in order: but if they which entred become maſters of the town, to hold it they muſt diſarm the townſmen before they diſarm themſelves. And being well aſſured of all the corps du-guards and commodious places, the houſes muſt be ſhared, that ſo every man may have his proportion of the bootie, they being not ſuffered to take it any other way; and they which ſhall begin to pillage muſt be ſeverely puniſhed. By this means you may appoint the beſt houſes to them which have beſt deſerved, and do the reſt by lot, whereof no man ſhall have cauſe to complain but of his own ill fortune. If it be needfull, in ſuch places as are aſſailed by ſcalado, you may diſpoſe ſome troups of musketiers, which ſhall give fire perpetually upon the flanks; and if you can, you may adde to them ſome fire-lances: and ſuch as give fire at the top of the ladder, muſt ceaſe ſo ſoon as their men begin to mount. I have been more particular in this chapter then in any other; but ſo many enterpriſes have failed

by the not obſerving of the leaſt of theſe things, that I rather choſe to be ſomewhat long herein then to omit them.

Chap. XI.

Of aſſaults by ſieges.

IN the two chapters of ſurpriſes I have begun with the means to defend ones ſelf, for that we muſt never undertake to attempt the ſurpriſe of any fort, but upon the defects which are to be found in them: ſo that he which knoweth not on which part nor after which manner he ought to make his aſſault, muſt be prepared for all manner of accidents. In theſe two I will begin to treat of the aſſailing of towns by ſieges, for that you muſt obſerve by what place and after what manner you are aſſailed, to make a good defenſe againſt it.

Sieges are undertaken either by blocking up of towns to famiſh them, or by taking them by force; for both the one and the other you muſt be maſter of the field, and you muſt have two armies, the one to hinder the enemy from undertaking any thing, and the other to form your ſiege. Or in any caſe you muſt be the firſt in the field, that you may ſo fortifie your ſelf before the town you beſiege as you may be able to maintein your ſelf there in ſpite of the furious attempts of the enemy. To get the town which you mean to beſiege at the eaſier rate, you muſt attempt to ſurpriſe it when there is but a ſmall garriſon in it: to this end you are to uſe all manner of inventions to keep them from the knowledge of your purpoſe to beſiege it; then all on a ſudden you muſt

muſt go and block it up. But if (notwithſtanding all your ſtratagemes) you be not able to ſurpriſe it atcunawares, or that you apprehend the charge to be too great, it will be better to make ſome other ſiege of leſſe importance: for a town well and obſtinately defended is the ruine of an army; and if it be not taken, it often diminiſheth the reputation of the commander which aſſailed it.

For this cauſe, before you undertake any ſuch thing, it muſt be well conſidered on; and you muſt provide your ſelf abundantly of all things neceſſary to effect it. When you form a ſiege, you muſt appoint your quarters (aſmuch as may be) in healthfull places, and be carefull to make them ſpacious enough, and to keep them clean: for you muſt account upon your time of abode there, that your army be not waſted by diſeaſes. You muſt make the quarters of your army ſo near the town beſieged as may be, yet ſo as they be not diſcommodated by their artillerie: And if the ground be level and lie open round about, the quarters muſt be out of reach of the cannon. You muſt make as many quarters as the places are which you intend to aſſault, or at leaſt as the bigneſſe of the town beſieged, or the ſituation thereof requireth. Nevertheleſſe I would have the Generals quarters to be ſo large, as (in a caſe of neceſſity) it might receive all the troups of the other quarters; If you make a ſiege with a ſmall army, and that the garriſon be ſtrong, you muſt fortifie the quarters one after another, with the whole body of the army; and in this caſe you muſt make the fewer quarters, and attempt the fewer places. But if you find

your ſelf ſtrong enough you may abbridge the buſineſſe and make them all at once. Beſides this, you muſt make a circumvallation with forts and redoubts without reach of cannon of the beſieged, which ſhall joyn all the quarters one to the other, behind which your army may preſent it ſelf in battalia, and this line muſt be led in ſuch manner as it may poſſeſſe all the commanding places. And if the garriſon of the town beſieged be ſo ſtrong as you may fear to be aſſailed on both ſides, you muſt make another circumvallation about the town, the neareſt that may be, that ſo it may require the fewer men to guard it: for it being made to oppoſe your ſelf againſt the town, you need not take care to make it out of the reach of the cannon. For the opening of the trenches, you are to uſe the more or fewer ceremonies, according as the garriſon is ſtrong or weak. If it be ſtrong, you begin by a good fort, and continue by good redoubts along the trenches, leaving onely ſentinels in them. For it is an old errour to think to defend trenches. If the garriſon be weak, you need not make ſo much ado to gain time. The batteries muſt be well ſtrengthened by good moats, and flanked by good corps-du-guards, to preſerve them againſt the ſallies of the beſieged. If there be any outworks which are not yet in good defenſe, and which may be carried by force, you muſt attempt them; otherwiſe you muſt approch them by little and little: for it is there where the braveſt defenſe is made, becauſe that at the beginning they can eaſilieſt make their ſallies. When the outworks are taken, and the cannon is planted on the counterſcarp, and you ſap into the

the moat, and prepare your ſelf to lay over your galleries to get over to the bulwarks, you muſt then place your musketiers all along the counterſcarp, that ſo under favour of them and of your cannon you may paſſe over your galleries. If the moats be drie, they will diſpute it with you, but at laſt the ſtronger overcometh the weaker. If they be full of ſtanding water, that hindereth you not from making your cawſie whereupon you place your gallerie: If they be full of running water, you muſt make uſe of floting bridges to put over your miners. When you are got cloſe to the bulwarks, you are to uſe mines (great or ſmall) ſo by little and little to get into the ground, and the retrenchments which may be made behind the bulwarks. I trouble not my ſelf here to ſhew how to make the quarters, forts, circumvallations, the trenches, (that they lie not open to the enemy) the batteries, (that they be well aſſured) the deſcents into the moat, how to aſſail the falſe brayes, how the galleries are to be made, alſo the mines, and the lodgings which are to be made after they be ſprung; becauſe whatſoever may be ſaid on that ſubject is alreadie written, and it muſt be experience that muſt perfect the reſt; where every day ſomething is altered or ſome new thing is added.

Chap. XII.

Of the defense of towns against sieges.

TO withstand a siege well, the town must be well fortified; it must have a sufficient number of souldiers to defend it; it must abound in victuall; and it must have good store of arms and munitions of warre: And these foure things are so necessary, as that if there were an abundance of three of them, if the fourth be wanting the rest will serve for nothing. For what will a well fortified place serve for if there be not souldiers to defend it? or what good will souldiers do if they have neither arms nor munitions of warre to fight? neither will arms nor munitions avail, if they want bread to live by; to which I adde instruments to work in the earth, without which it is impossible to make any great resistance. But it is not enough to have all that is necessary for resistance; there must be a good order and rule kept, otherwise it will all be dissipated by those which will desire to get out of danger quickly, and will find some pretext to yield upon terms which shall not be dishonourable; the number of such being alwayes greater then of those which will resist stoutly. You must proportion the labour and watch amongst the souldiers and the townsmen, that so they which are well affected be not suppressed, and that the rest grow not lazie through idleneſse. They must be distinguished by companies of pioners, miners, carpenters, smiths, and all artificers usefull for a siege, appointing a commander to every of them.

You

You muſt take an inventory in the town of all the iron, wood, linen, inſtruments to work in the ground, drugs fit for artificiall fires, and other ſuch things neceſſary for a ſiege: and take care that there be alwayes of them in the magazins to ſerve for the preſent neceſſity: and to avoid diſorder in the diſtribution of all theſe things, there muſt be a counſel which muſt have the overſight thereof, and which ſhall cauſe all to be delivered out and received in according to the order of the Governour and the Counſel of warre. Theſe things thus put in order, you muſt think upon defenſe, which is done principally after two wayes, by holding the enemy off by retrenchment, and by hindring him (when he approcheth) by ſallies.

For the firſt; it is approved and practiced by all; and he which breaketh ground beſt, and beginneth to diſpute it the furtheſt off, is he which maketh the longeſt reſiſtance. For the ſmalleſt retrenchment without (accommodated with palliſadoes) is hard to be forced. But if it be mined, and that there be another made behind it, it is a dangerous piece to enter, and you conſtrain the enemy to approch by little and little, and with the ſame ceremonies which are uſed to fall upon the bulwarks and the great moat; ſo that by divers retrenchments you keep off the enemy at a diſtance a long time before he can come to fall upon the counterſcarp, who cannot take away your outworks but by mines, which taketh up good ſtore of time. The moat alſo may be defended if it be dry by portable caſemats (which are called coffers) incircled by little moats or palliſadoes to hinder the approch,

proch, which are placed in ſeverall places of the great moat to defend it, and not to be diſcovered by the cannon of the aſſailant. The bulwarks are alſo to be defended by retrenchments, which you are to make either at the point, or at the middle, or at the gorge, according as they are capable, and that the mines of the beſiegers do enter forward within the bulwarks. And when all that is forced, the laſt defenſe is a retrenchment of the whole town, reducing it to keep onely one part of it.

For the ſecond way of defenſe; in ſtead of many ſallies to drive back them that work in the approches ſome would have onely ſome few to good purpoſe, in great neceſſitie; alleaging that the beſieged there alwayes loſe ſome men, and of the beſt of them, which they ought to conſerve againſt a ſtrong aſſault; and that oftentimes they which would have a fair pretext to yield the town cauſe their ſouldiers to be maimed by continuall ſallies, to ſhew that they yield not themſelves but through neceſſitie. For mine own part (which do approve of the quantitie of ſallies, and which have alwayes ſeen the works of the aſſailants retarded by them more in one houre then in eight dayes by other defenſes) I anſwer, that theſe reaſons would carry ſome ſhew if the town were attempted by aſſault; for they not taking any other but that way at that time, it were fit to preſerve the ſouldiers to withſtand them: but whileſt the aſſailant getteth ground by little and little, if you defend not the town otherwiſe then by retrenchment, you muſt loſe it at laſt: wherein your quantitie of ſouldiers ſtandeth you in no

ſtead

ſtead at all, in ſo much that the care you have taken to preſerve your ſouldiers doth not prolong the taking of the town one day; but if by your brave ſallies you ruine batteries, throw down trenches, force the redoubts which defend them; and when they are within the moat you burn their galleries, they muſt be inforced to begin their work anew as ofttimes as you overthrow it; inſomuch as the beſieger finding himſelf ſo enterteined, he approcheth with much more ceremonie, and at laſt his ſouldiers draw back. So that in my opinion it is very fit that the beſieged ſhould make frequent ſallies; but they muſt make them at ſeverall houres, that ſo they may the better ſurpriſe the enemy with few men (but reſolute) to avoid the diſorder in the retreat, and to do no other thing but what is commanded. For though you find not reſiſtance at the falling on, as is uſuall, if you ſtay to little purpoſe, you runne the hazard to be ill led off at the retreat. The other particularities of defenſe depend upon thoſe of aſſailing, the beſiegers teaching you by neceſſitie what you are to do; wherein there is nothing but practice and experience which can well direct you.

CHAP.

Chap. XIII.

Of Artillery.

IT is fit to speak of Artillery after sieges, since it is principally by means thereof that towns are taken; and that since this hath been in use, there are no places found impregnable, if they be not inaccessible: It hath changed all the form and matter of fortifications: for in stead of towers and ancient walls, which have not been able to resist it, we now make bulwarks and other works of earth. We may say that it hath even in a manner altered the manner of making warre. Anciently they began their approches to towns where now we end them: for on the first day they lodged on the brim of the moat; and now adayes we must go a great way before we come at it: then the circumvallation was made out of reach of arrows onely, now they must be made beyond reach of cannon: then it mattered not though the fortresses of the encamped armies were overtopped, so as they had their other conveniences; now-adayes there must be care taken above all things that they be not. In those times two armies were quietly led in batalia at two or three hundred paces distance from each other, and remained there whole dayes without being able to be dislodged but by a hazard of a general battel; now one cannot be before another but out of the reach of the cannon, otherwise he that hath most of them, or that hath planted them best, beateth out the other without fighting. At that time a Generall of an army could know the order of his enemy

enemy at a near diſtance, and form his own according to that, ſeeking his advantages upon the defects of another, and all without danger; now theſe things can no more be obſerved but ſo farre off as you muſt rather truſt to your own good order then upon any defect in that of your enemy. Then one army could charge another without loſing their order, becauſe they had not above two or three hundred paces to march; in theſe times it is impoſſible to obſerve it in ſight of the enemy for half a league together, and to find a plain which ſhall be even and without hindrances. Whereunto I adde further, that without a great exerciſe of marching in battalia you are not able to march a thouſand paces without loſing all your diſtances of battalions and ſquadrons, and by conſequence without being in confuſion. Since therefore the cannon is of ſo great uſe in warre, and hath ſo great a ſhare in the victory, it is neceſſary that you know how to make good uſe of it. It is an engine which all cannot well imploy, for it is of great expenſe, and belongeth onely to great and puiſſant States to make ordinary uſe of them. They tie them to a great charge for draught, there being a hundred draught-horſes required to draw one cannon for battery through all kinds of wayes, and to ſhoot onely a hundred bullets. By this you may judge according to the number which you mean to imploy what length of ground it taketh up. To mannage one piece of battery well, there muſt be eighteen men: beſides, how many ſmiths, carters, farriers, and other workmen muſt there be in the train to repair the carriages? how many carpenters to make bridges? how many

how many pioners to accommodate the high-wayes? Briefly an army which carrieth cannon with it cannot march but leiſurely, and that which hath none can do no great effect: therefore in theſe times the artillery is an eſſentiall part of an army; but withall, if the Generall ſuffereth himſelf to be approched too near, without entrenching himſelf it is impoſſible for him to diſintangle himſelf without fighting, or loſing it; which cannot ſo happen without loſing much of his reputation. For this reaſon he ought to inform himſelf very particularly of all that dependeth on the artillery: and that he may not be deceived, he muſt know the leaſt even of the ſmalleſt things, namely, of the mixture, founding, proportion, weight, calibre, and carriage; of what wood it muſt be, how it muſt be conducted according to the ſeverall wayes, miry or mountainous; how to paſſe rivers, how to ſecure the batteries, as well againſt the cannon of the enemy as againſt his ſallies; what ground the cannon muſt have for his reverſe, what diſtance between piece and piece; in what manner the platform muſt be made, at what diſtance the batteries are ſufficient, and other things, whereof I do not here ſpecifie the particulars, becauſe others have written of them. It ſufficeth me to ſhew the uſe of artillerie, the chargeableneſſe of it, the turmoil of it, and whereunto it engageth you, to incite Generals not to rely upon others; and to know the benefit and diſcommoditie thereof ſo well, that they may make uſe of the one to their advantage, and avoid the other by their foreſight.

CHAP.

Chap. XIV.

Of the baggage and pioners.

After the great turmoil of the artillery, I will ſpeak a word of that of the baggage. It is a great ſhame to loſe it, but it is alſo a hard matter to preſerve it when it is exceſſive; there being nothing that bringeth ſo much diſorder to an army: therefore it is highly neceſſary to reduce it to the ſmalleſt proportion that may be, and to make a review of it every moneth; for it groweth in the twinkling of an eye. We are ſo delicate nowadayes as we will hardly carry our arms, much leſſe would we carry a weeks victuall about us. So long as ſuch an abuſe be ſuffered in an army, it will make it ſelf incapable to do any thing that is good. For as in a battel he which can laſt preſerve ſome troups which have not fought, carrieth away the victory; ſo he that laſt keepeth his army in health, complete, and accuſtomed to labour, doth the like: which he cannot do if the ſouldiers be ſo delicate as they cannot carry their baggage. Beſides that, ſickneſſe and famine getteth not into an army, but by this raſcallicie of ſouldiers boyes: and this thing which ſeemeth to be a thing of nothing, is of ſuch importance, as it is for the moſt part the diſſipation of the moſt flouriſhing, yea I dare ſay, of the moſt victorious armies. It is principally in the time of proſperity that men grow effeminate, and give themſelves to take their eaſe; and in that time it ought leaſt to be done, if after the example of the delicacies of *Capua* where *Hannibals* army imbaſed it ſelf,

they would not do the ſame. Whilſt we are about cutting off unneceſſary things from the army, I will ſay a word concerning pioners. There be Captains of our time which will have an unbridled number of them, and ſay, that it were better to cut off ſome regiments of ſouldiers, and to take pioners in their ſtead, which are neceſſary to make the incloſures of the camp, the trenches in a ſiege, the accommodation of the wayes; briefly, to take away all imployment from the ſouldiers of working in the ground, for that they in theſe times cannot be brought to be ſubject to ſuch labours as the ancient Romanes were: alledging further, that the ſouldier when he arriveth at his quarter, is ſufficiently tired, though he be not imployed anew to caſt up earth. An opinion whereat I cannot wonder enough, and which ſtrengthneth me in that which I hold, that we ſpoil our ſouldiers by ſparing them too much. There muſt be care taken for their livelihood, for their clothing, for ſuch as are ſick and hurt: but they muſt be hardned to labour, and their Generall and other Commanders muſt be examples to them. For if you will reduce them to content themſelves with a little whileſt you burſt your ſelf with exceſſe of meat, and to labour whileſt you glory it, and live in lazineſſe; I confeſſe they will murmure. But to return to the pioners: it is neceſſary you ſhould have them to accommodate the wayes, for the artillery principally; for which five hundred may ſerve for a great equipage. Concerning the incloſing of the camp, the ſouldier is bound to make it; for that this labour procureth him a means to reſt himſelf and to ſleep in ſafety.

ſafetie. I ſay further, that it is a work which muſt be done in three or foure houres; to this end all the army worketh at it, or at leaſt half of it, when the enemy is near hand. So that if we muſt needs have it done by pioners, there had need be as many of them in an army as there are ſouldiers, which would be a means to famiſh a whole countrey, and to encreaſe the turmoil, which we would diminiſh. Concerning the trenches; I never ſaw it ſucceed well when pioners did it; and whileſt the danger groweth, the moſt valiant ſouldiers are not too good for that imployment; and further they muſt be incited to that work by the gain of it: which will ſerve to aſſure themſelves the better in that danger, and to give them a means to ſpare ſomething to cloth themſelves; and no money is ſo well imployed as that in an army.

Chap. XV.

Of ſpies and guides.

THere be yet two ſorts of people whereof (contrary to the pioners) there cannot be too many in an army; which are ſpies and guides. The firſt advertiſe you of the deportments of the enemy, upon whoſe report either you enterpriſe ſomething upon him, or you guard your ſelf from his deſignes. The ſecond give you knowledge of the countrey, of the wayes and paſſages by which you are to paſſe, or elſe by what way your enemy can come to you. Both the one and the other muſt be faithfull, for that in adviſing you alſly, or guiding you maliciouſly, they may cauſe you to fall into great dangers.

You must have good store of guides: for that (especially if you march by night) every grosse troup (or at least every body) hath need of their own; and before you set forward, they must all be agreed on the way which they will take. There must be a Captain of the guides, a man of spirit, and vigilant, and that may take care to get guides frō place to place. Concerning spies, there must be something more observed in them, and you must be alwayes suspicious of them: for that as it is a dangerous task for him that undertaketh it, so it is also for him that imployeth them. To this end it is necessary that no man know them but he which imployeth them; and that spies may not know each other, that so they may not agree to give false advises: for by this means by examining them severally, by the agreement or disagreement of their advises, you may judge whether they be good; and by the verification of those which speak true or false, you shall know who betrayeth you, or doth you true service. And howsoever when you discover traitours, yet I say you may make a profitable use of them, by feigning that you believe them to be faithfull, and giving them commissions which they may discover to the enemy, that you have some designe quite contrary to that which you intend to put in execution; that so while he is preparing himself for one side, you may attempt something upon him on the other. But this is not all, to beware of your own spies; you must also take heed of those of the enemy; which you must presuppose you have within your camp, as the enemy hath of yours. For this reason besides the secresie which must be used in all enter-

terpriſes, it is good to give a charge, by publiſhing (in a ſtill way) that you have a quite contrary deſigne to that which you purpoſe to put in execution, that ſo thoſe ſpies may ſo report it to the enemy. But the moſt eſſentiall means to be well ſerved by this kind of men, is to be very liberall to them; for they are faithfull to them which give them moſt.

Chap. XVI.

Of victuall.

But ſeeing it is to no purpoſe to have an army compoſed of good commanders and valiant ſouldiers, well diſciplined and obedient, well furniſhed with artillery and munition, if they have not what to eat; I will diſtinguiſh this chapter into five parts: the firſt to make proviſions of corn; the ſecond to provide for the carriage of it; the third of the ſafe conveying of it; the fourth of the making of good bread; and the fifth of the diſtribution of it. To this end the Commiſſary generall of the victuall ought to be a man of authority, faithfull, vigilant, and active; and this office ought not to be deſpiſed (as nowadayes it is) nor given to men of mean quality; for it is of ſuch importance, that according as it is either well or ill diſcharged, it cauſeth an army to ſubſiſt, or go to ruine. And the *Romanes* alwayes committed it to ſome eminent perſon. To come to particulars, I will ſay that the proviſion of corn ought to be made in due time, in ſufficient quantitie, in a commodious place for tranſportation, and that choice be made of very good corn. For you muſt not conceive any hope

of finding it, either in the champain or towns where you are to go, becauſe the enemy may either hoard it up or burn it; and ſo on that hope you ſhall find in this onely point all your deſignes fruſtrated. In the ſecond, you muſt make Magazines in divers places, that ſo you may not be in danger to loſe all at once, both in towns and caſtles which are neareſt and moſt commodious for the tranſporting of corn into your army: and (according to the ſituation of the countrey) you are to make proviſion of waggons or mules to carry it to the camp, where muſt alwayes be a Magazine for a fortnight, which ſhould not be meddled with but in extremitie, or for ſome extraordinary enterpriſe. In the third place, the carriage of it ought not to be performed without a good convoy, and never on any prefixed day, to prevent the preparation of taking of it whileſt it is on the way. In the fourth, to hinder the abuſes which are ordinarily uſed (and I dare ſay ever, unleſſe there be a very narrow looking to it) about the bread. For, for their private gain, they mingle bad grain with it, yea even earth, and uſe other baſe tricks, whence for the moſt part proceed diſeaſes in an army; which is a miſchief which cannot be too ſeverely puniſhed. And in the laſt place, that it may be well diſtributed and not waſted; for if you truſt the Sergeants, they alwayes take for double the number of ſouldiers they have in their companies: to this end it is neceſſary that the Commiſſarie generall of the victuall from week to week ſhould have an exact liſt of thoſe that are in the army, ſigned by the Generall, that ſo he may order the diſtribution of bread according

ing

ing to it. Beſides, you muſt cauſe them to be puniſhed rigorouſly which pillage thoſe victuallers and other perſons which bring victuall to the camp; whereof the price muſt be regulated, that ſo the ſouldiers may not be ſharked upon. When you are at a well retrenched ſiege, where the hope to make you quit it conſiſteth in nothing elſe but in cutting off your victuall, you muſt have that foreſight to cauſe ſo much to be brought within your camp as you judge to be neceſſary to ſerve your turn for the time you believe you ſhall ſtay to take the town beſieged; as *Ceſar* did before *Alexia*. There be many rules to be given on this ſubject, to hinder the abuſes which may be uſed therein, which I omit to avoid prolixitie: beſides they are pettie orders which are changed according to the places and occaſions; all which ſhould tend to no other end but to draw victuall to the army, and to hinder the exceſſive prices of it.

Chap. XVII.

Of the generall officers of an army, and of their functions.

THere is nothing more neceſſary in an army then to have the offices therein well regulated, and that every man may know whom he is to command, and whom he ought to obey; and yet I never ſaw that abſolutely decided in any, which is the reaſon why I have been willing here to make a project, how things therein ought to be eſtabliſhed. The Generall ought to have abſolute power, which ought not to be communicated to any: for in warre more then in any other profeſſion the command ought to be ſingular: and it is a very bad introduction to make Generals which command the army by the day, or by the week, or by the moneth. At all times when the *Romanes* did ſo, they ſped the worſe for it.

Then there muſt be a Lieutenant generall, or Marſhall of the field generall, which ought to take care to cauſe all the Generalls commands to be put in execution as abſolutely as himſelf, thereby to eaſe him: it being too hard a thing for the Generall to do all, eſpecially when the army marcheth; for that (of all neceſſitie) there muſt be a man of eminent authority at the head of an army, and whom all the other commanders do acknowledge. Sometimes there is a Lieutenant generall and a Marſhall of the field generall to perform theſe two offices; nevertheleſſe theſe two places, being born by two men in an army, oftentimes bring confuſion, and cauſe that

that which we deſire to avoid: for in the functions thereof they never agree; becauſe the Marſhall of the field generall doing his office, muſt diſtribute the commands of the Generall to all the other commanders; he muſt march in the vanguard, order the lodgings and encampings: inſomuch as I know not what function the Lieutenant generall ſhall have unleſſe he uſurp the others office, or elſe that he ſerve onely as a ſhooting trunk, that ſo through him the Generals commands may be delivered to the Marſhall of the field: which is the reaſon I conclude that there ought to be but one of theſe two offices.

That done, I divide all the functions of the army into foure principall parts, namely the cavalrie, the infanterie, the artillerie, and the victuall, and will treat of each part one after another.

The cavalry is a body which often lodgeth ſeparated from that of the army, and requireth a principall commander to whom all the reſt ſhould yield obedience, which muſt be of great authority and eminent qualitie, or of ſuch experience and vertue that all the other commanders may voluntarily obey him. For it is in the cavalrie, where you ſhall meet with more men of wealth and good families, and conſequently more difficult to be made to obey; and therefore this authoritie ought not to be divided. And becauſe in marching the cavalrie is ordinarily in the front and in the rear, and that in lodging you are ofttimes compelled to make two fronts, and for that in time of battel the horſe are at leaſt on the two wings, it is neceſſary that there be a

Lieute-

Lieutenant Generall, a man alſo of great authoritie. There muſt further be a third commander, whom the moſt part call a Commiſſary generall, who diſtributeth the orders, keepeth the liſt of the guards, of the convoyes, and other functions; and ought to go and take the orders from the Marſhall of the field generall, to carry them to his Generall of the horſe, who diſtributeth them to the Quarter-maſters, which come for them from every quarter. All the cavalry muſt be divided into companies, of which regiments are formed; not after the manner of the infantery, under the command of a Colonell; but onely to maintein the order of the lodgings and of battel. To form theſe regiments you put foure or five companies together, with one of carabines, and the ancienteſt Captain commandeth that body; and ſo all the cavalry is divided: which maketh it plainly evident how merely unprofitable an office it is to have a generall commander of the carabines; for the carabines cannot make a body, for that their want of fighting permitteth it not, neither were they inſtituted but to ſerve the cavalry, either at their quartering, or to diſcover, or for intelligence, or to give a charge in the flank in time of fight, or in a retreat to harrie them whom you chace, or to keep you from being ſo when you are purſued. In effect, good carabines mingled amongſt the cavalry are of very good ſervice; but alone are unprofitable.

If you make more quarters then there be generall officers, the ancienteſt Captain commandeth in the quarter, and therein taketh the moſt ancient quarter-maſter of his quarter. Inſomuch that

that the Generall of the horſe giving his orders to the Commiſſary generall, he to the Quarter-maſter generall, and he to the other Quarter-maſters which come for them from the other quarters (where the ſame order is obſerved) the commands are carried without confuſion, and paſſe through the hands of few perſons; and when there is any deficiency found, it is eaſie to be verified whence it aroſe.

The infantery is the more ſolid body of an army: that of the artillery and victuall alwayes are quartered with it. There is not that diverſitie between the companies which is between the horſe; they are all of the ſame faſhion, compoſed of half-pikes half-musketiers. Many companies make a regiment, which hath its commander; and many regiments make a body, which we call a *Brigado* of the army. The army is uſually divided into three bodies, Vanguard, Battel, and Rearguard. Every brigado hath its commander; and beſides it ought to have a Sergeant Major of a brigado, and a Quarter-maſter of a brigado; The firſt to go and take the orders from the Marſhall of the field generall, to carry them to the commander of his brigado; then he giveth the word to the Sergeant Majors of the regiments: and the other to give to every Quarter-maſter of a regiment, either his quarter, or the ſpace of ground which is neceſſary for him to encamp in; and he divideth it to the particular Quarter-maſters, or to the harbengers of every company, which afterwards lodgeth them. If there be a Colonel generall of all the infantery, he may have a care in generall of all the government thereof; but in an army he muſt

one-

onely command a brigado, otherwiſe we ſhould not be able to eſtabliſh the order which we have propounded. Moreover, there be divers nations which do not judge a Colonell generall of the infantery to be neceſſary, but content themſelves with particular Colonels for every regiment, which acknowledge onely the commands of the Generall, or of his Marſhall of the field generall.

The artillery ought to have a Generall, a Lieutenant generall, a Quarter-maſter, then other officers. And for that all pioners, miners, enginiers, conductours of works, ſmiths, carpenters, wheelwrights, and other workmen depend on him, I would eſtabliſh a commander for every ſort of theſe men; which I would take either out of the commiſſaries of the artillery, or other perſons apart, to addreſſe my ſelf to them when I had need of ſuch men. The Quarter-maſter muſt every night go to receive the orders of the Marſhall of the field generall. The charge of the victuals ought to be performed by a Generall; he ought to have his Lieutenant, his Quarter-maſter, and his other officers: his Quarter-maſter muſt every evening go and take the orders of the Marſhall of the field generall.

So then you ſee how the commands are diſtributed: the Marſhall of the field generall receiveth them from the Generall, then goeth to his own lodging; there the Commiſſary of horſe cometh and receiveth them for the cavalry; the Sergeant Major generall for the infantery, who delivereth it to the Sergeant Majors of brigadoes: for the artillery to the Quarter-maſter thereof; and ſo to him for the victuals: Briefly, the Marſhall

ſhall of the field generall ſpeaking with theſe foure perſons, giveth the orders to all the army. All orders and commands ought to be given in writing. The Marſhall of the field generall, the Generall of the artillery, the Fiſcall, the Controller of the Exchequer, the Generall of victuall, the Quarter-maſter generall, the Sergeant major generall and the Provoſt generall muſt alwayes be lodged within the Generalls quarter.

If all the army be encamped in bodies, the Quarter-maſter generall giveth to each of theſe bodies the ſpace of ground which is fitting; wh.ch is afterwards diſtributed (in every body) by the officers thereunto appointed.

On a day of battel the Marſhall of the field generall doth aſſigne the place for every body; afterwards the Sergeant major generall rangeth the infantery into battalia.

The Marſhall of the field generall ought to have three or foure aſſiſtants for the field, to carry the extraordinary orders; but they muſt not pretend to command any officer in chief, unleſſe they formerly have been either Colonels or Captains of horſe.

The Sergeant major generall muſt command the Colonels; but that they may the readilier obey him, he ought to be taken out of the Colonels; and none ought ever to have that place unleſſe he hath been one: as alſo the Sergeant majors of brigadoes ought to be taken out of the Sergeant majors of regiments. Things being thus regulated and eſtabliſhed, you ſhall ſee a great facilitie in the commands, and none ſhall be able to excuſe his fault by putting it off upon another, becauſe preſently it will be verified whence it pro-

proceeded: which obligeth every man to be carefull to do that exactly which he ſhalbe cõmanded

Chap. XVIII.

Of the aſſailing of States, according to their forces and ſituations.

After that you have formed an army, you muſt imploy it, either for the conqueſt of a new countrey, or for the defenſe of your own. We will begin with the firſt. The Prince which putteth himſelf upon the offenſive muſt be the ſtronger, or muſt ſee ſome garboils in the State which he aſſaileth, and that he be called thither by a partie: otherwiſe it would be a raſh enterpriſe.

If the countrey which he aſſaileth be large and open, he muſt ſeek in the beginning to hazard a battel or ſome grand skirmiſh, that ſo by the reputation of his arms he may affright the enemies. If it be a countrey encloſed with mountains, or divided by rivers and ditches, or ſheltered with forreſts, or full of fortreſſes, it is hard to force an enemy to battel; and in this caſe you muſt go to ſieges, and make your conqueſt by little and little. Now he that will make any progreſſe by this way muſt at leaſt have two bodies of armies; that ſo with the one he may hold his enemy in play, and with the other he may actuate without impeachment. For it is moſt difficult to accompliſh the deſigne of a ſiege, ſo long as you have a good army encamped near you, which ſhall cut off your victuall. If it be a countrey which is hard to enter, and that hath but few paſſages whereby to enter into it, you muſt force one; and before you go further, you muſt there fortifie, and ſo well aſſure your

your way for your victuall as you may not ſuffer though the enemy ſhould have burned or carried away that of his countrey into his fortreſſes. If you be called by a faction, that is a very great advantage for you; becauſe you are inſtructed of the ſituation of the countrey, and of the defects which are to be found in the fortified places, and want not ſpies nor punctuall advertiſements of whatſoever paſſeth amongſt the enemies. You muſt alſo be very carefull to uſe this faction very courteouſly, and to engage them by little and little into actions which may make them irreconcilable to their Prince. But when you ſee they make warre with reſpect, and that they will but by halves offend him from whom they have revolted, you muſt have them in great ſuſpicion, and march with them with bridle in hand: for whether it be the fear of a ruine without recovery, or the hope of a reconciliation that hindreth them from putting themſelves upon reall extremities, the one and other are equally dangerous; and at laſt you may fear they may accommodate themſelves to your prejudice: wherefore if they will not engage themſelves to do extraordinary and irremiſſible actions at the beginning, you ought not to joyn with them but under good pledges: You muſt alſo uſe ſuch as do voluntarily yield themſelves to you with all humanitie, clemencie, and liberalitie, and ſuch as reſiſt you with all ſeveritie; for beneficence towards the one and ſeveritie towards the other are the two principall means which get you obedience. A town taken by force, and hardly uſed, or one which yieldeth it ſelf of its own accord, and favoured, openeth the

gates

gates of a dozen others: as on the other ſide, a town taken by force and ſpared, or which rendred it ſelf voluntarily and is evil intreated, ſhutteth a great many. Whence I conclude, that a Conquerour muſt be as good as his word, whatſoever he promiſeth, be it in clemency or ſeverity

Chap. XIX.

Of the defenſe of States according to their forces and ſituations.

TO treat of this ſubject well, we muſt divide it into three parts; namely, into ſmall States, thoſe of a middle rank, and thoſe which are puiſſant. The ſmall ones are of that nature as they ſubſiſt not but by the jealouſies which their neighbours have one of another; for that if one of them will aſſail a weak State, the other will defend it: nevertheleſſe, it is but a tottering condition and ill aſſured; for if the one findeth himſelf able enough to aſſail them, the other will not find himſelf ſufficient to defend them. The counſels of Princes and States are not alwayes governed ſo equally, but for the moſt part one prevaileth above the other. Beſides this inconvenience there is yet another, that ſometimes they agree to divide the prey; ſo that ſuch kind of pettie States which have not ſtrength within themſelves for their own defenſe, are alwayes in perill; and they muſt uſe very much pliantneſſe to remove all pretexts from their neighbours of undertaking ſomething againſt them. The onely means which they have is to have one or two towns exceeding well fortified, with arms and money enough to defend them well; that

that ſo they may give leiſure to them which will not ſuffer the growth of him which ſhall aſſail you, to aid you: for if you have no means at all to reſiſt, your countrey will be taken before they ſhall have time to aſſiſt you: and beſides that, the happineſſe which they conceive of conquering you giveth them a ſpur to aſſail you; you ſhall find many more perſons diſpoſed to ſuccour you then to reconquer your countrey: for that the one is eaſie with equall forces, and the other without greater ſtrength is very difficult. To which I adde, that there is ofttimes as great danger that he which regaineth your countrey as your friend keep it not for himſelf, as well as he which had taken it as your enemy: or if he reſtore it to you, it will be with ſo hard conditions, as you ſhall poſſeſſe but the ſhadow of a Sovereigntie. And thrice happy are they which meet with ſo good and ſo generous Princes, which do reeſtabliſh them into their loſt States, with the ſame authoritie and liberty as they poſſeſſed them before: for ſuch examples are exceeding rare. Concerning thoſe States of a middle condition, I propound a Prince (or commonwealth) which for his defenſe is able to entertein an army of 20000 foot and 3000 horſe with all neceſſary equipage. If his countrey be of a difficult acceſſe, and that there be no entrance into it but by certain paſſages and mountains guarded and fortified, he hath a great advantage: but they which too much do truſt and reſt upon them, and have neglected other defenſes, have deceived themſelves, and have been loſt by thoſe wayes wherein they thought themſelves moſt aſſured. If it be encompaſſed by the

ſea, it is a fair moat, notwithſtanding he which is ſtronger will find means to make his deſcent into the iſland. If it be environed with mooriſh grounds and rivers, yet an enemy will find wayes to paſſe them, eſpecially when he hath artillery to favouriſe ſuch paſſages; inſomuch that the ſureſt way is to truſt to your own forces, namely a good army and good fortreſſes: I ſay, both joynned together: for that the army without fortreſſes being weak, and not daring to hazard any thing, leaveth the victuall of the champain to the enemy, and ſo the means to ſubſiſt at your charge, and at laſt to ruine you. And fortreſſes without an army are not able to preſerve you longer then the time you have made your magazines of victuall for, within them: but theſe things being proportioned with judgement, you may make a great reſiſtance. In theſe things you muſt not ſuffer your ſelf to be led by the fanſies of the people, which without conſidering the ſituations of their towns, or the publick good, when they ſee their neighbours fortifie themſelves, will all imitate them; a thing equally dangerous, to have more fortreſſes then you can guard, or to have none at all. Yet I ſhould rather like the laſt then the firſt: for that at leaſt by hazarding a battel you put your enemy to half the fear; but by the other way you muſt ſurely periſh, without being able to do any other thing but prolong your ruine: for the jealouſie which you have to preſerve all your fortreſſes by leaving great garriſons in them, hindreth you of the means of keeping an army in the field: and then the ſpoil of two or three harveſts compelleth you to yield your neck to the halter. I know there

there are ſome which ground themſelves upon this reaſon, That when all the principall places of a State be fortified, all the victuall of the champain may be drawn into them, ſo that an army coming thither, if it ſtayeth there, it dieth through famine; and if it doth but paſſe through, it doth no great hurt: inſomuch that it is almoſt impoſſible to make any great ſiege there. Whereunto I anſwer, that fortreſſes are principally invented for the weaker, that ſo a few men may reſiſt a great number: and if you have ſo great a number of fortreſſes, and thoſe requiring great guards (as the great fortified towns do) you muſt have a greater number of ſouldiers then he ſhall have which cometh to aſſail you; otherwiſe you were not able to provide them all with ſufficient garriſons to preſerve them from a ſiege. And if you be the ſtronger without any fortified place, you ſhall preſerve your countrey in keeping the field. There is yet a further inconvenience in the fortifying of great towns; that is, that you make them ſo proud as they will not acknowledge their Sovereigne but upon good terms; and upon the leaſt diſcommoditie they receive in any warre the inhabitants deſire rather to change their maſter then to ſee their goods waſted. Inſomuch that I conclude, that you ought to have ſo few fortreſſes that they may not hinder you from keeping the field; that thoſe which you have be ſo well fortified and furniſhed with munition as they may make a great reſiſtance; and to place them ſo well as they may bridle the great towns, and that they may aſſure the frontiers, that ſo the enemy may make difficultie to leave a place behind him which might diſcom-

modate his victuall, and that by intelligence or otherwiſe he may not ſeiſe upon ſome principall town which may ſerve him for a ſeat to entertein warre within the countrey. Theſe things thus diſpoſed of, you muſt regard what enemy aſſaileth you. If it be a power of confederates unired together, it is the more eaſie to diſunite, then when it dependeth on one alone: and in this caſe it is exceeding good to cauſe ſome diffidence to grow betwixt them, by feigning of intelligence with ſome one of the confederates, to whom ſhewing more reſpect and leſſe animoſitie, you may give jealouſie to the reſt: as alſo by procuring a diverſion upon the countrey of one of the reſt. It being a very difficult thing that many ſovereigne powers ſhould long hold a league together, without ſome diſguſts to ariſe amongſt them, or miſtakings, envies, and even enmities, by reaſon of the diverſitie of their humours and intereſts; ſo that that power which onely dependeth upon one State onely, is much more to be feared. And becauſe you may be aſſailed more or leſſe fiercely, I muſt ſay a word for that: If it be by forces which are not too much diſproportionable to yours, you may preſerve your countrey without forſaking it, and with your army and fortreſſes tie up the enemy, in hindring him from victuall; and by entrenching alwayes ſo near him as you ſhall hinder him from making any ſiege of importance. For if a Conquerour advanceth not forward he recoileth; and it is impoſſible for him to ſubſiſt in a countrey which he would conquer, if at firſt he taketh no footing, and doth not ſtrengthen himſelf by ſome conſiderable priſe. If alſo you be

be aſſailed by a power altogether diſproportionable to your forces; in this caſe you muſt leave the field, and burn all the victuall which you cannot contein within your fortreſſes, and alſo all the towns and villages which you cannot guard: for it is better for you to preſerve your ſelf in a ruined countrey, then to keep it for your enemy. And it is in this that a Prince, to gain, as he thinketh, the name of being compaſſionate towards his people (which in ſuch occaſions turn their backs upon him) becometh cruel towards himſelf: But it is rather a vice of irreſolution and of weakneſſe of courage which poſſeſſeth us, then a true compaſſion which we have of the misfortune of another: as that of the Emperour *Otho*, who upon the firſt ill fortune that befell him (his forces being yet entire) durſt not trie the hazard of a battel any more. And he who could not afford any pitie to *Galba* in his decrepit age (being his deſigned ſucceſſour to the Empire) and which had committed all kinds of villanies to attein it, would perſwade poſterity, that compaſſion to ſee the *Romans* bloud ſhed had made him reſolve to eſtrange himſelf from it by killing himſelf. Thus it is that we oftentimes deſire to cover our vices with the vertue which is neareſt thereunto. But as it is a maxime, that no publick good can be without ſome prejudice to ſome particular men, ſo a Prince cannot diſintangle himſelf from a perilous enterpriſe, if he will pleaſe every man. And the greateſt and moſt uſuall faults which we commit in matters of State and war proceed from ſuffering our ſelves to be carried away with this complacencie, whereto we re-

pent us when there is no remedy left. But to avoid ſuch ſtorms you muſt hold this for a fundamentall law for your own preſervation, Never to ſuffer that neighbour of yours to grow up which maketh himſelf the ſtrongeſt: for it is better to offend him by hindring him from enabling himſelf to deſtroy you, then to ſuffer him to grow greater out of fear to offend him. It being a thing certain, that no man preſerveth his libertie againſt a conquering enemy by complements but onely by force.

It remaineth that we ſpeak of puiſſant States which (without help of another) have arms, money, and what elſe is needfull to maintein a continuall warre.

Of this kind there be but few, and they need to care for none but themſelves; for that one ſole enemy is not able to aſſail them, and that it is hard for the leagues of ſeverall Princes all to agree in ſuch a deſigne, or for any long time to ſubſiſt together: Nevertheleſſe I will ſay a word on this ſubject. Great States are either compacted altogether, or ſpread abroad in ſeverall places: the firſt, which have all their forces united, are able to aſſail, and to defend themſelves more powerfully then they which are ſo ſeparated; becauſe they carry all their forces where need requireth with more diligence and facilitie, and leſſe charge: the other put a great part of the world into an alarm and jealouſie, becauſe they frontier upon the greateſt number of States. Nevertheleſſe, if the one or the other be aſſailed, they muſt make uſe of the defenſes we propounded before: onely I will ſay that they ought to have no fortreſſes

but

but good ones, and few in number, and onely on the frontiers, and none within the heart of the countrey; for that having more cauſe to fear civil warres then forrein, and without which no man will ever aſſail a great Empire, it is the way to take away the main root from them which maketh them to undertake the enterpriſe and to ſubſiſt. Beſides, you ought not to perpetuate any governments, neither to families, nor yet for life. But the principall and moſt able remedy againſt civil warre is to entertein a forrein warre; which chaſeth away idleneſſe, ſetteth all on work, and particularly giveth ſatisfaction to ambitious and ſtirring ſpirits: it baniſheth luxurie, it maketh your people warlike, and mainteineth you in ſuch reputation amongſt your neighbours, as you are the arbitratour of all their differences. It is true that this maxime is not good to be obſerved but by ſuch States as are of this laſt ſort. For as it is neceſſary for them, I find it hurtfull for pettie States, which muſt fear all ſorts of warre; for being too weak to gain by it, they run the hazard to be the pray of ſuch as are the ſtronger.

Chap. XX.

Of the means how to aſſure a conqueſt.

A Sovereigne Prince is more capable to make great and ready conqueſts then a common-wealth; for that finding himſelf ſecret in his counſel, courageous in his reſolution, ready in his execution, and not fearing to be contradicted by any, he maketh more conqueſts in ten years of his life, then a common-wealth which is leſſe ſecret, which is long in reſolving, which bridleth the authoritie of her Captains, and which every houre contradicteth their actions, ſhall be able to do in a hundred yeares: So alſo a common-wealth which goeth alwayes upon her own maximes, which is not ſubject to the want of one perſon, and whoſe government receiveth no alteration by the death of any of them, conſerveth much better and for a longer time that which ſhe hath conquered then a Prince; which ofttimes (and almoſt alwayes) hath a ſucceſſour as much a heartleſſe dullard as himſelf was vertuous. Nevertheleſſe, I will here eſtabliſh (as well for the one as for the other) the true maximes for the well aſſuring of a conqueſt: which conſiſt in two things; namely to take away the deſire of revolting from thoſe whom you have conquered, and the means of being able to do it.

For the firſt, it is a thing very certain, that if you conquer a free people, you ſhall not take away (at leaſt during the life of thoſe which have lived ſo) their deſire to recover their liberty. If they be ſubjects to a Prince and a State, and that they have onely changed their maſter, they will rather deſire to remain under the authoritie of him

him which ſhall uſe them the moſt courteouſly. Therefore you muſt alwayes begin by a fair way, and to eſtabliſh a condition for them which you have conquered which may be ſure, both for their life and for their goods. For if even your own ſubjects find not this aſſurance, it is to be feared they will revolt; how much more they which are newly conquered? it being a law of nature imprinted in every creature, that the meaneſt and leaſt *animal* taketh care for its own conſervation; to which man endued with reaſon addeth the conſervation of his honour and his welfare, which he ofttimes preferreth before his own life. Therefore a Prince muſt govern according to exact juſtice, uphold the oppreſſed in his due right, abſtein from all violence himſelf, aſwel concerning the honour of their wives as for their goods: for without this it is impoſſible to make a conquered people tractable. You muſt alſo (ſo much as may be) maintein them in the form of their government, & exclude none of them out of the poſſibility of atteining to thoſe offices, dignities and honours which they may poſſeſſe without prejudice to your ſafetie. And if it be a Prince which maketh this conqueſt, the means to aſſure himſelf well therein is there to eſtabliſh his reſidence the moſt that may be; for that his preſence doth hinder many diſorders, the ſplendour of his court imprinteth a certain veneration into the minds of the people, and it bringeth gain to the artificers and citizens where it is kept.

If it be a common-wealth which cannot change the ſeat of their government, it is therefore neceſſary that ſuch as they ſhould ſend thither to govern live there with ſplendour. For the

the people is ſometimes more taken with appearance then realitie. Theſe are the means which do inſenſibly inſinuate obedience into a newly conquered people: but becauſe this is not ſufficient, and that ofttimes the facilitie of revolting impunely cauſeth men to have a deſire to it, it is neceſſary for you to precaution your ſelf by requiſite aſſurances, which conſiſt in having their arms and fortreſſes in your own hands: I mean not that all the people ſhall be wholy diſarmed, for if it be poſſible it muſt not come to that; but to aſſure your ſelf of great communalties by good fortreſſes; to have arcenals in ſeverall parts, and not all in one place; and not to leave any town or caſtle (except your fortreſſes of garriſon) ſo ſtrong as to be able to endure 100 cannon-bullets. There is a laſt means, whereof the ancients made a profitable uſe, and is now wholly left, which I do marvellouſly approve of; which is, to eſtabliſh colonies, and to tranſport the people from one countrey to another. For beſides that it is a great bridle to keep a conquered countrey in aw, you recompenſe by this means the nearer part of thoſe ſouldiers which have done you good ſervice. And I find not the reaſon to be ſufficient which ſome alledge, that it is cruelty to make this permutation, and that it is againſt charity; but to the contrary I find indeed thoſe remedies to be cruel which are commonly uſed, to keep the people ſo under as they have nothing but their life, and cannot hope for any honour within their own countrey. For my ſelf I profeſſe freely, that I had rather be driven out of my countrey into another, where I ſhould have a hope for my ſelf and mine to be able to attein to

ſome-

ſomething more then now I am, then to remain in mine own countrey to be deprived of that hope; finding nothing to be ſo hard as to take away hope from a man, which is that which in this world, and for the goods of this world, maketh him undertake all things; and which for the goods of the other world furniſheth him with conſtancy to ſuffer all things: Moreover, there is nothing which diſtinguiſheth a man ſo much from a beaſt, nor yet a regenerate man from a ſenſuall, as hope. Which maketh me conclude, that you ſhould never take from a man the hope of being able to obtein a better condition then that which he poſſeſſeth, that ſo he be not caſt into deſpair.

CHAP. XXI.

How you muſt proceed to relieve your allie and confederate.

ONe of the moſt honourable actions which a Prince doth, and which bringeth him moſt reputation, is to ſuccour his allies in their neceſſities: but it is a thing which for the moſt part is very difficult. When you will make war, you chooſe your advantages, and you take your time and your meaſures according to that which you can and will do: it is not ſo in the ſuccouring of your allie, which muſt be aſſiſted with ſuch difficulties and diſcommodities as you meet with. If his countrey be joyned to yours, and that nothing hindreth you from aſſiſting him with all your forces united, you cannot excuſe the not doing of it, unleſſe it be that you fear his enemy, and would not offend him; which is an unmanly and no judicious reaſon. For by this excuſe you

you eſcape not the danger which your neighbours loſſe will draw upon you. It being much better for you to reſiſt joyntly, then ſuffer your ſelves to be undone one after another. But if it be an allie ſeparated from you by other Princes and States (which ofttimes ſo hapneth) and that you meet with great difficulties to get into his countrey, you muſt then well conſider after what manner you ſhould ſuccour him: for if the States which are between you both refuſe you paſſage, and that you muſt be enforced to give them battel before you be able to aſſiſt your allie, it is to be feared that you ſhall not be able to ſuccour him timely enough. And if your neighbour, either for fear of you, or of him which aſſaileth your allie, do offer you paſſage, you cannot accept thereof with ſafety, unleſſe he put you in poſſeſſion of thoſe places which are neceſſary to aſſure your return; which being refuſed you, you muſt go no further. But if the enemy of your ally hath territories near you, and ſuch as you may eaſily aſſail; you muſt do it ſtoutly; and that ſuccour which can be given by diverſion is (in my opinion) the ſureſt and that which ſucceedeth beſt; becauſe you do it with all your forces and conveniences, and ordinarily that countrey which you aſſail is not well provided, becauſe he which aſſaileth another State leadeth out with him the beſt Captains and ſouldiers which he hath. But if you want all theſe means, there is no other left but that of money, wherewith you may aſſiſt him; which ofttimes is not ſufficient to ſave him.

CHAP.

Chap. XXII.

Which is beſt, whether a great Prince make warre in perſon, or by his Lieutenant.

IT is to the purpoſe in this place to treat whether a Prince ought to manage his warre in perſon or by Lieutenants: for that the practice thereof being different, every man bringeth his beſt reaſons to maintein his opinion. They which diſapprove of his doing it in perſon alledge, that by going out of his territories he openeth the doore for diſorders, and robbeth himſelf of the means to prevent them; that it is more neceſſary for him to keep peace within then to make war abroad, for which nothing can do ſo much good as his preſence, which keepeth in aw the moſt ſtirring ſpirits; that holding them which are within in obedience he may give the better order to his affairs abroad; that there befall greater inconveniences and leſſe remediable, when the Prince is ingaged in perſon out of his countrey, then when he is within it; that if he ſhall receive ſome check in his perſon being farre from his owne territories, thoſe buſie heads are more daring to make innovations, every man emancipateth himſelf and ſhaketh off his obedience; if he be ſlain there, his ſubjects are affrighted, and his enemie is encouraged by it, and thence draweth great advantages; if he be taken, that is ſtill worſe; for none being able to declare himſelf Prince, and the great ones, deſiring to make their benefit of his calamity, put all affairs into ſuch a confuſion that nothing is done in the State with authoritie, becauſe they which ſeiſe upon the government tyrannize over the other great ones

ones which might pretend the ſame, which oftimes love rather to call in the common enemy then to obey their fellows. Whereunto they adde, that a Prince cannot free himſelf without giving great advantages to his enemy, which turn to a notable and irremediable prejudice both to himſelf and his State: So that all things being balanced, they conclude that the inconveniences are much greater of hazarding the perſon of the Prince in the warres then to cauſe them to be managed by his Lieutenants. This opinion is principally mainteined by men of the gown, naturall enemies to ſouldiers; who for that they can better preſerve their authoritie in peace then war, do not onely diſſwade from going in perſon to the warre, but even do adviſe the ſuffering of all ſorts of ignominy rather then to make war. Whereunto flatterers, panders, and all the plagues of Princes do adhere, which entertein them within their countrey in a lazineſſe wch bringeth them to all ſorts of luxurie, making them believe that their States are but made for them, and not they for their States; that the taking of a maidenhead is more honourable then the conqueſt of a Province; that there belongeth more induſtry and trouble to the well-ordering of a feaſt then of a battel; that labour is not appointed but onely for porters; and that great Kings ſhould cauſe all things to be acted without moving themſelves: which is the uſuall way of the loſſe of kingdomes and empires. They which counſel a Prince to make warre in perſon, alledge that the command of an army is a morſell ſo delicious that it ought not to be imparted to others without great neceſſitie: for that to acquit

quit a mans ſelf well in ſuch a charge, he muſt be very abſolute; and ofttimes the Generall of an army doth not contein himſelf within his dutie, eſpecially when the Prince performeth not his own. For in this caſe he is naturally envious of the glory of another, and cannot ſupport the good actions of his Lieutenant, though they tend to his own profit. In which humour they do entertein him which govern the affairs at court, with this fear, leaſt that an eminent vertue ſhould ſupplant them. And from hence proceedeth the infelicitie of the moſt part of brave deſignes, how well ſoever undertaken, which are made to periſh either for want of money or of victuall, or by reſtraining the authority of the Generall, or by putting officers upon him which oppoſe him, and which prove rather ſhackles to him then aſſiſtants: and when affairs have not ſucceeded as men imagined, the fault is caſt upon him which is innocent, and the blameworthy triumph: and thus great Princes ſhal be ſerved which make war by their Lieutenants: That the reputation of a Prince who is a good commander himſelf is much greater then a Princes which hath good commanders: that the firſt is feared for his own worth, and the other onely through others: that the firſt cannot betray himſelf, but that the commanders of the other may be corrupted: that the firſt can make choice of ſuch as are fit for warre, and the other hath no good commanders but by hazard: that the authoritie of the one is not ſo envied nor croſſed, ſeeing he is maſter, and is to give account of his actions to no man; but that the Generall of the army of another is ſubject to a perpetuall jealouſie,

louſie, and thrice happy is he that eſcapeth it: that the means to prevent civil warres is to imploy the moſt ſtirring and courageous ſpirits in forrein warres, where they ſhall find wherewith to ſatisfie their ambitions; as alſo to be alwayes armed, becauſe that will cool thoſe which are hotteſt: and that the Prince be at the head of his army, that ſo none may uſe it againſt him. They alledge further, that never Prince hath founded a great Empire, but by making warre in perſon; nor hath loſt any, but when he made warre by his *Lieutenants*. It is now left to the choice of Princes what is to be done upon theſe two adviſes. If he be a drone, which contenteth himſelf to be admired by his grooms, which taketh no delight but in voluptuouſneſſe, and which leaveth off the acting of the part of a King to act that of a ſcoundrel, he will never take that counſel to command his armies himſelf. If he be a wiſe Prince, which loveth tranquillitie to maintein his people in juſtice, nevertheleſſe he will not omit to be prepared for warre, and to inform himſelf therein, that ſo when occaſion ſhall ſerve he need not commit the command of his armies to others. But if he be a generous Prince which hunteth after glory, and deſireth to imitate thoſe great men which live ſtill 2000 years after their death, and whoſe venerable names at this day do honor thoſe which mention them, he will doubtleſſe chooſe for his principall imployment that of war; wherein he will endevour to make himſelf expert, that ſo he need not depend upon others for the leading of his armies, and will make that his chief delight. And this is the true pleaſure which contenteth the

ſpirit

ſpirit, which is particular to man, and common to great men: for corporall pleaſure hath more of the beaſt then of man; and ſo he that wholly addicteth himſelf thereunto is worſe then a brute beaſt.

Chap. XXIII.

Of reputation.

It is a thing which cannot be conceived, how available the reputation of a Generall of an armie is; and how hard it is to be preſerved. For after that you have acquired the eſtimation of being a wiſe man, and of great managing, if you will conſerve it by prudence, men will ſay you are become a coward; and if by hazarding ſome battel you receive a check, they will hold you to be raſh. So that there is no function in the world more ſubject to blame then that of a Generall of an army: and very happy is that commander which keepeth his reputation entire untill the the end. Nevertheleſſe, ſo long as it laſteth it worketh marvellous effects: for when he hath gotten the name of being proſperous in war, the ſouldiers believe that he cannot be beaten; and go upon his word ſo ſecurely to the combat, as they take no more knowledge of the danger; perſwading themſelves that he never commandeth them to fight, but that he is aſſured of the victory: which doth ſo encourage them as they fight with much the more reſolution. Moreover, the enemies meeting with ſuch a man, fight not but in fear, as being aſſured to be beaten. There be a thouſand of ancient and modern examples of this truth. When the army of *Alcibiades* (even when he was abſent) was beaten, the *Athenians*

believed that it was with his consent. The onely report of the arrivall of *Cæsar* and *Alexander*, howsoever but with small forces, hath oftentimes caused the yielding of provinces and the defeat of armies. The sole reputation of *Henry* the fourth, who was taken notice of in the combat of *Fontaine Francoise*, arriving there the day before in post, made the *Spaniards* abandon *Burgundy*. I have observed the *Dauphinois* to have this belief, that the Constable le *Desdiguiers* could not be beaten. But as this opinion is of great profit to a Generall of an army when he hath atteined it, so to be thought unluckie in warre is a great hindrance to him: for it is impossible for him to assure himself on those souldiers which have such an opinion of their Commander. Therefore a Generall of an army must make it his principall aim to begin well; then not to omit any thing for the preserving of what he hath gotten: resolving rather to die gloriously in some great action then to linger out a shamefull life after that he hath committed some unmanly act. For as the profession of war is that of all others which conferreth most honour upon a man which therein acquitteth himself well, so it draweth the greatest infamy upon him that demeaneth himself ill.

FINIS.

A Table of the books of the Abbridgement of the wars of *Gallia*.

page

The warre against the Suisses. 1
2 Against Arioviſtus. 5
3 Against the Belgæ. 7
4 Against the people of Vannes and their allies. 10
5 Against the Germanes of Francfort and Heſſen. 15
6 Against the Britans. 17
7 Against the ſame. 20
8 Against Ambiorix. 24
9 Against Vercingetorix. 28
10 Against Corbeus and Comius. 35

The ſecond Table, of the Civil wars.

The warre between Pompey and Ceſar, the ſiege of Corſinium, Brunduſium, and Marſeilles. 39
The continuation of the ſiege of Marſeilles, truce violated, a panick fear, the reliefe of Juba. 45
The ſiege of Salones. Ceſars camp, his retreat, the battel of Pharſalia, the defeat of Pompey. 48
Of the Alexandrian warre. 56
Of the Africane warre. 61
Of the Spaniſh war againſt Pompey's ſonnes. 64

A Table of the *Grecian* and *Romane* Militia.

Chap. page

The militarie order of the Grecians. 66
Of the militarie diſcipline of the Romanes. 1. 73
Of the diviſion of a Legion of 4000 foot and 300 horſe. 2. 78
Of marching. 3. 79
Of embattelling the army. 4. 81
Of the orders and guards of the camp. 5. 87
Of puniſhments and rewards. 6. 90
Of their pay. 7. 92
Of their order of battalia. 8. 93
Of ſieges. 9. 96
Obſervations upon ſome battels of the Ancients. 10. 98
A comparing of the arms and military orders of the Romanes with thoſe of the Grecians. 11. 100

A Table of the Chapters of the Treatise of warre.

	Chap.	page
Of the election of souldiers.	1.	105
Of arms.	2.	108
Of military discipline.	3.	113
Of the obedience of souldiers.	4.	116
Of marching.	5.	118
Of encamping.	6.	121
Of battels.	7.	123
Of fortresses.	8.	127
Of defense against surprises.	9.	129
Of assaults by surprise.	10.	132
Of assaults by seges.	11.	146
Of the defense of towns against seges.	12.	150
Of artillery.	13.	154
Of the baggage and pioners.	14.	157
Of spies and guides.	15.	159
Of victuall.	16.	161
Of the generall officers of an army, and their functions.	17.	164
Of the assailing of States according to their forces and situations.	18.	170
Of the defense of States according to their forces and situations.	19.	172
Of the means to assure a conquest.	20.	180
How to proceed to relieve an allie or confederate.	21.	183
Which is best for a great Prince, to make warre in person, or by his Lieutenant.	22.	185
Of reputation.	23.	189

FINIS.

p. page
1. 105
2. 108
3. 113
4. 116
5. 118
6. 121
7. 123
8. 127
9. 129
0. 132
1. 146
2. 150
3. 154
4. 157
5. 159
6. 161
7. 164
ſtua-
. 170
ſitua-
. 172
. 180
. 183
n, or
. 185
. 189

C 4338
19816 SL

REPRODUCED FROM THE COPY IN THE

HENRY E. HUNTINGTON LIBRARY

FOR REFERENCE ONLY. NOT FOR REPRODUCTION